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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the cultural and structural aspects
of a North Indian wholesale market (wandi) at which
agriculturalists sell their products, the marketing
process, and the relationships between the buyer and
sellers who use that market. The thesis is divided into
seven chapters.
.'hapter 1 describes the aim of the thesis, and
relevant theoretical perspectives, and suggests that
comprehending Indian society requires the use of a
context-specific approach. Chapter 2 presents a general
picture of Muzaffarnagar District, with brief reference
to its topology, history, and communication networks.
Special attention is paid to economic and socio-cultural
structures relevant to activities in the wandi, and the
factors that made Baniyas (a Hindu trading caste) the
most wealthy and influential caste group, and the larg¬
est landholders during the colonial period, at the
expense of traditional landholders who consequently
became their tenants and debtors. I also describe how,
after Independence, traditional cultivating castes
regained much of the land they had lost, and the influ¬
ential status of Baniyas declined.
Chapter 3 describes the ritual meanings of land,
crop production and different models of exchange from
the point of view of agriculturalists who today sell
I//'
their crops in the market. Chapter 4 presents a general
picture of the market organization of Muzaffarnagar
District,a description of the mandi, the relationship
between state and the mandi, and discusses the rela-
«
tionships and backgroundr of three groups--traders,
business clerks, and labourers --who work in the mandi.
«
Chapter 5 is concerned with the ritual dimension of
traders' commercial activities. I describe four main
analytically distinct sets of beliefs and rituals which
are concerned with the moral justifications of commer¬
cial activities, ensure success and profit, the predic¬
tion of profit and loss and the conversion of inauspi¬
cious profit into auspicious profit. The distinctive
beliefs and ritual practices and distinctive moral
perspectives of the traders clarify the importance of
incorporating an awareness of contextually and multiple
value systems within a culture in sociological analysis.
Chapter 6 deals with the marketing process in the mandi,
the manner in which traders initiate and maintain long-
term relationships with their c1 i ents,their images of
each other and their differing perspectives regarding
market exchange, profit, wealth, prestige, and so on. 1
also demonstrate that exchange in the mandi is signifi¬
cantly influenced by local cultural meanings that are
not comprehensible in terms of a formalist model of
economic behaviour.
In the final chapter, the conclusion is drawn that
actors in India not only adopt varying strategies and
vii
moral perspectives to adjust to many different types of
situations, but also that these strategies are context
specific. 1 argue that there are multiple interpretive
codes and values available for use within a single
situation in Indian society, and'I describe how Baniya
traders follow their own distinctive model of behaviour,
a model different from both the kingly and priestly
models, in order to gain profit and wealth. I have also
argued that it is impossible to separate the "religious"
clearly from the "economic" in Indian society, and that
traditional jajmani relationships within a village can
no longer be discussed in isolation from wider political
and economic contexts.
Finally, I have argued that the particular form
that South Asian market relationships assume cannot be
understood apart from the broad cultural milieu. In
general, it is argued that Indian society cannot be
understood in terms derived from European social and
religious categories. Indian society can only be finally
interpreted in terms of indigenous categories and mean¬
ings, and the multiplicity of social values found In
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A note on Non-Eng1 ish Words Used 1 n the Thes is
I have tried to avoid overburdening the text with
Hindi terms, but I have used such terms where they are
♦
frequently employed in the sociological and anthropolog¬
ical literature, and in case where straightforward
English translations are unavailable. Most of the non-
English words which are used frequently in this thesis
are listed in the glossary, and they are also explained
as they appear in the textv Throughout the text most
Hindi words italicized. I employ the convention of
adding *s* to form the plural (e.g. kisans). The common
translation uses diacritical marks (as in arhat) which
are hard to print. The transliteration system of Hindi
terms that 1 have followed in the text is as follows:
Hindi (Devanagari) alphabet
a aiiuueoeaio au a r
k kh g gh n ch chh j jh n t th d
dh n t th d dh n p ph b bh m y




Aim of the Thesis and Relevant Theoretical Perspectives
The purpose of this study is to analyse the cultural and
structural aspects of an Indian wholesale market place
i Jiancfi) . 1 have chosen to study a very large wholesale
market at which agricu1turaj .production--main1y sugar¬
cane products—are bought and sold. This wholesale
market is located in Muzaffarnagar city, situated in the
north-western part of Uttar Pradesh (U.P. ) state, India.
I shall pay particular attention to the relationships
between Hindu agriculturalists (the Hindi term is kisan:
see note to this chapter) and commission-agent cum-
traders (arhatis), their economic behaviour and the
« t
varying cultural perspectives from which each views
production, exchange, profit and so forth. 1 will also
be interested in the relationship between cultural
beliefs and economic actions in this setting, and, I
will discuss several other issues concerning Indian
markets and traders that have hitherto been largely
neglected by sociologists and anthropologists.
Generally economists focus, on only one aspect of
social life: how people manage finite resources to
produce, distribute and exchange goods and services on
the basis of market principles, although they admit that
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there are other aspects of life that significantly
influence economic behaviour. Economists usually assume
that for economic analysis these influences are constant
and so do not modify economic processes. In contrast to
this, economic sociologists and anthropologists have
been concerned with discovering how non-economic factors
influence economic life and vice versa. While economic
anthropologists have been engaged in studying the econo¬
mies of primitive and peasant societies however, econom¬
ic sociologists have been primarily concerned with
analysing the economic institutions of western socie¬
ties, mainly using the "system-subsystem approach" (see
Smelser 1964:500-1) with the terms and models they have
borrowed from formal economics.
My research in the Muzaffarnagar mandi, and my
reading of the ethnographic literature dealing with
primitive and peasant markets in Africa and Latin Ameri¬
ca (see e.g. Bohannan and Dalton 1962; Dalton 1969,
1371; Cook and Diskin 1975; Mintz 1960; Belshaw 1965;
P!attner 1983), have led me to the conclusion that there
are a number of important structural and cultural dif¬
ferences between the Indian town market I have studied
and those in Africa and Latin America that have been the
object of previous anthropological research. Little
empirical research has been conducted on the general
dynamics of markets and the social and cultural contexts
cr monetised town markets in developing countries. In
particular, Indian town markets have been largely ne-
O
i
glected by South Asianist anthropologists--except for a
few studies on periodic tribal and village markets (i.e.
Sinha 1968; Wamali 1977; Agarwal 1978; Bohle 1981 and
Gell 1982) and on regular retail town markets (i.e. Fox
1967; Ostor 1982; Chacko 1984). Also a few studies on
Indian trading communities have been conducted from an
historical perspective (i.e. Bayly 1983; Mines 1984;
Rudner 1987; Timberg 1978).
I believe that this is the first ethnographic study
of an Indian wholesale majr.ket and the relationship
between traders and agricultural producers. This ethnog¬
raphy will attempt to provide answers to the following
questions. What is the relation between the religious
beliefs of Hindu traders and agriculturalists on the one
hand, and marketing processes in the mandi on the other?
Uhy are these beliefs and associated rituals invoked in
the context of commercial exchange? How do traders
manage their trade, labour and clientage? What is the
nature of the frequently long-term and enduring rela¬
tionships between traders and kisans ? How do the vary¬
ing beliefs and ritual practices of kisans on the one
hand, and traders on the other, inform their relation¬
ship as buyer and seller in the mandil In addition, 1
shall make some suggestions concerning the adequacy of
present theories of intercaste relationships to account
for those aspects of mandi activities in which caste
identities come to the fore.
This study also makes a contribution to the study
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of village economic life, because most studies of vil¬
lage economic relationships have restricted themselves
to jajmani relationships within village and, as Fuller
(1989) persuasively argues, they have ignored the inter¬
connections between market and jajmhni ties.
There is no scarcity of empirical studies of the
Indian village economy, particularly in the context of
economic development and social change (e.g. Bailey
1957; Berreman 1961; Bliss and Stern 1982; Epstien 1962;
Gould 1964; Neale 1962: Swartzberg 1979). There has been
great academic interest in this subject since Wiser's
study of the jajmini system (a system of intercaste
exchange of goods and services) was published in 1936.
A number of important issues in South Asian anthro¬
pology and Indian sociology have been explored through
the study of jajmani exchange relationships: issues of
reciprocity verses exploration in the Indian village
community (see Beidelman 1959; Berreman 1961; Epstein
1967; Kolenda 1963; Parry 1979; Pocock 1962; Wiser
1936); caste hierarchies in village social life (Dumont
1970); the relationship between exchanges among kinsmen
and intercaste giving and receiving (Good 1982; Epstein
1967; Raheja 1988a, 1989); ritual aspects of South Asian
exchange systems (Gould 1958; Raheja 1988a); and the
relationship between village exchange systems and local
dominance (Dirks 1987, 1989; Raheja 1988a, 1988b). Yet
these anthropological studies, almost without exception,
focus only on the so called •traditional" relations of
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giving and receiving within the village, and they ignore
the myriad other forms of exchange relationships entered
into by most villagers, including the marketing of
agricultural surpluses. 1 suggest that a major task for
South Asianist anthropologists and sociologists is
understanding agricultural producers' se1f-perceptions,
actions in changing situations, and accommodations as
they enter a market situation from the JajnSni context.
The man<ji of Muzaffarnagar city provides a situa¬
tion in which people from different spheres, town and
village, interact. It is in order to illuminate this
that I have chosen to study a wholesale rather than
retail marketplace. The agricultural products' mandi of
Muzaffarnagar city not only connects village economy
with the town economy, but also, with the national and
international market economies.
The concept of market has been used by social
scientists in at least three different senses (see firth
1967; Nash 1966:29; Bohannan and Dalton 1962:1; Cook and
Martin 1976:140; Steiner 1968:575). Firstly, it implies
a physical site, a market place, where buyers, sellers
and middle-men meet for exchange. Secondly, the concept
of market as used by economists in the abstract sense,
i.e. the total area of interest of any good or service.
The third use of the term market is with respect to the
allocation of resources with reference to impersonal
criteria which disregard personal and social ties in
favour of maximization of profit-making. Openness,
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competitiveness and the principals of supply and demand
are other essential parts or this definition of market,
in oaxca, the term "plaza" has two meanings--a market
pi ace and as a principal of market (see Cook and Martin
ibid. :1510). The Indian term mandi is used exclusively
for a wholesale market place in north India. the term
"bazaar" (which is originally a Persian term), however,
is used in both senses in India.
It was Polanyi's work exemplified in Trade and
Market in the Early Empires (1957), whicn started a most
heated and lengthy debate concerning the analysis of
marxets, between the so-called "substantivists" and
"formalists," regarding the applicability of the logic
of western formal economic theory to the study of tribal
ana peasant systems of production and exchange.
Most studies ot non-western markets seem to have
been written to contribute to this debate. It is beyond
the scope ot my thesis to discuss this controversy in
detail. (for representative works, see Burling 1962;
Cohen 1967; Dalton 1969; Hodges 1986; Leclair and
Schneider 1968; Ortiz 1983; Prattis 1987; Salisbury
1973, 1985; Schneider 1974. ). This debate, however, now
seems to have largely exhausted itself. Both these
approaches appear to represent "non-market," "tradition¬
al* and "non-traditional" economies as opposed types,
rather than exploring in more nuanced terms the mter-
penetrations between types of exchange in any given
s oclety.
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I demonstrate in this thesis (in chapter 3) that
Kisans of Muzaffarnagar District have different and
sometimes conflicting ideologies of distribution and
excnange, and in some situations, they face a dilemma
concerning which ideology should appropriately come to
the fore. Some South Aslanist anthropologists (e.g.
Harper 1959; lshwaran 1966; Swartdzberg 1979) have also
suggested, on the basis of their ethnographic studies,
that in rural India both types of economy--subsistance
and formal or market economy--co-exist side by side.
Swartzberg found in a Bihar village that not only two ,
types of economles--*househoId economy" and "market
economy"--exist side by side in this village but also
that the market economy supports the household economy,
when village people earn money in the town market and
invest in land and unproductive units (e.g. building a
house) in their village. But this apparent solution to
the sudstantivist-forma1ist debate does not address the
crucial issue of how the multiple moralities and multi¬
ple perspectives of v i 1 1 age-leve1 exchanges on the one
hand and wider ties to local, regional, national and
even world markets on the other intersect and, perhaps,
mutually transform each other.
i agree with Gudeman (1986) that we must take into
account local symbols, beliefs, categories, metaphors
and so on to analyse any type of economy. But he tends
to ignore the importance of external factors (e.g.
government's marketing policies, national and lnterna-
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tional markets' prices ana supply and demand and so
forth) in his 'local model". He identifies three sepa¬
rate economies among the peasants or a Panama
viIlage--"househo1d economy", "cash economy" and "wage
goods economy". He analyses them separately and relates
them through an historical analysis of the transforma¬
tion of one type economy to another, rather than in
terms of their simultaneity within Panamanian society.
Thus, one important aim or the thesis is to examine
the relationship between religious beliefs and commer¬
cial activities in India, through an analysis or the
mandi that focuses on cultural aspects of commercial
activities, the relationship between village level
exchange and market exchange, and on the sort of exter¬
nal factors which are ignored in Gudeman's study.
Several previous studies have analysed cultural
aspects of the identities of trading communities in
India. Prom his study of the Moothan trading community
in a south Indian town, Chacko 11964) for example noted
that the ethics of this community encourage commercial
entrepreneursnip. industry is highly valued in terms of
an individual's position in thisunity. Moothan
traders believe that if one tails in trade, one is
condemned, and if one succeeds all one's evils are
forgotten. The ritual manitestation of commercial incen¬
tive is expressed in the unwritten norms that expenses
for the death ceremonies of a male person are met from
the savings of the dead person. Community life motivates
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individual enterprise. Hazlehurst (1968) also noted in a
town in Panjab state;tracers participate in many cross-
cutting social relationships and pursue diverse economic
interests, while still maintaining the cultural bound¬
aries of caste; and these alignments reflect their
entrepreneurship rather than attempts to subvert the
caste system. Similarly, Timberg (ibid.) has described
how the ethics of Marwari traders have been conducive to
their success in industry.
Regarding the relationship between religious be¬
liefs and commercial activities in Indian society, we
rind hardly any writing in the social sciences that does
not mention Weber's view. Using a deductive approach, ne
argued (1930, 1958, 1968) that the capitalistic from of
economy emerged in 16th and 17th centuries only in
western European countries because the emerging Protes-
ant ethical values were their necessary precondition. In
Asian countries, modern capitalism could not arise
because the ethics of the major oriental religions were
not conductive to capitalistic development. In the case,
of India, he argues (1958, 1968) that the "other-wor1di-
ness" of Hinduism--its values and beliefs in karma
icodes of conduct, action), dharma (duty, moral,
values), samsara (rebirth), moksha (salvation) and so on
have been responsible for the fact that modern capital¬
ism did not take root in India. Weber saw modern capi¬
talism not simply as an economic system but in relation
to cultural attitudes about the rational and systematic
9
pursuit of profit.
Weber's thesis on India has been challenged by a
number of scholars (e.g. Srinivas 1956; Morris 1967; Rao
1969; Singer 1966, I960, 1972; Munshi 1908), The main
criticisms have to do not only with historical complex¬
ities in the European cases, but also with the reifica-
tions and simplifications employed in Weber's analysis
of the Indian materials.
It was not Protestantism that was responsible for
modern capitalism in westernEurope, because it has been
shown that several countries in Europe that were domi¬
nated by Catholicism developed modern capitalism. For
example, Belgium, a Catholic country was the first
country after Britain to industrialize in a modern
capitalistic way. The units of comparision do not belong
to the same level when Weber compares Hinduism with
Protesantism because, whereas Protestantism is a sect,
Hinduism is a diverse collection of beliefs, practices,
and sectarian traditions. Therefore, the units of legit¬
imate comparison should be Protestantism and one or
other of the sects of Hinduism, and not a sect of one
religion to another religion as a whole (see Rao
1969:4), because there is so much doctrinal and ethical
variations from sect to sect and from community to
community within Hinduism. Weber drew his description
concerning Brahmanical Hindu ideology from the Hindu
classical text books composed by Brahman elites, not
from empirical social situations. But Hinduism consists
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of diverse models deriving from different varna's and
different systems of values isee e.g. Srinivas 1969;
Marriott 1959, 1968, 1976, 1989; Singer 1966, 1968,
1972). Hindu texts themselves prescribe different codes
of behaviour for different varnas.
Different sects and Hindu texts have also given
different interpretations of central Hindu tenets, and
there is no single definition of "Hindu" or "Hinduism"
but many different ideologies and values which govern
the social behaviour of Hindus, and on many issues
different castes have different ideologies and radically
different social practices. As 1 shall describe in the
.allowing chapters (particularly in chapters 3,5 and 6),
Hindu Baniya arhatis and people from Hindu kisan castes
have different images of each other and different per¬
spectives and values regarding life, trade, profit,
agricultural and so on. Therefore, from my point of
view, tor an anthropological inquiry, the important
question is how and in what degree everyday beliefs and
ritua1 practices, rather than simply textual ideologies,
inform economic activities. The debate over Weber's
contribution then, has been productive, but the particu¬
larities of Weber's own answer have not received much
suppor t.
The issue which Weber pointed to (however inade¬
quately) is, however, still problematic. How do reli¬
gious beliefs affect economic actions? For example, tor
Weber and some of his followers (e.g. Kupp 1963; Mishra
11
1962) the meaning of karma is fatalism and its anti-
rationality hinders individual initiative. But one
significant question is whether the idea of karma enters
the thought process as a cause or an atter-thought. we
may well find that when a person fails to succeed in
trade he rationalises his failure retrospectively in
terms of karma rather than thinks of it in advance as a
guide for action (Rao ibid. :6; Singer 1966:500).
My discussions with Hindu arhatis and kisans of
Muzaffarnagar District concerning their interpretations
of karma suggest that the notion of karma enters the
thought process in a lesser degree as a cause than an
after-thought. Usually, people do not invoke karma for
day to day ordinary matters but for an explanation of
unexpected events--particu1ar1y bad ones. Karma is
almost always invoked retrospectively. I found that for
Hindu kisans and arhatis, belief in karma is not neces¬
sarily fatalistic: therefore we cannot say that belief
in karma is an obstacle to Hindus being involved with
and adjusting to new economic situations, (see Keyes and
Daniel eds., 1983 for sophisticated and contextually
situated ethnographic discussions of karma).
It is also the case that different levels of be¬
liefs can coexist side by side. For example, Ueber's
view that caste ideology prevents people from entering
into industry or new occupations has also been rejected
oy several scholars (e.g. Morris ibid.:602; Singer 1966,
1968). Mandelbaum (1966) pointed to two interesting
12
generai functions of Hindu religion which, according to
him, are separate from each other and have different
deities, rites and practitioners. One runction of Hindu
religion is 'transcendental" and the other one is
"pragmatic". The transcendental complex, according to
Mandelbaum, is used by Hindus to ensure the long-term
welfare of the society and the pragmatic complex is used
for local exigencies and for personal gain. Each complex
of ideas is complementary to the other, rather than con¬
tradictory. In some situations both complexes may over¬
lap each other.
In the context of the Muzaffarnagar mandi, most of
the labourers who work there are from the Gujar caste.
But their caste ideology (as they claim Kshatriya origin)
does not sanction such work. The Jain religion contains
strong prohibitions against the consumption of meat and
alcohol, the accumulation of money and the worship of
Hindu deities. But a Jain arhati may offer meat and
alcohol to the Hindu deity Kali for monetary gain or for
success in his trade. A Hindu Baniya arhati may worship
a Muslim saint or deity for removing obstacles in his
trade or for achieving profit in his business, kisans of
western U.P., on the other hand, perform rituals explic¬
itly concerned with production and not with market
activities or profit. They are, however, simultaneously
profit-oriented in the matter of hiring labourers, sell¬
ing their products and buying seeds, fertilizers and
other agricultural items.
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Not only do different levels of belief co-exit
among Hindus but also in some situations when ideas come
into conflict, they use what Singer has termed "adaptive
strategies". Singer (1966, 1968) identified some adap¬
tive strategies or processes among the Hindu industrial¬
ists of Madras city that minimise conflicts caused by
new situations. He called these processes compartmenta1 -
ization, vicarious ritualization, interpretation and
naturalization. He describes a compartmenta1ization
process that permits Indian industrialists to combine
the modes of thought and behaviour of modern industry
with the traditional modes of thought and behaviour
without too much difficulty. Vicarious ritua1ization
allows a Hindu businessman to reduce thevtime he spends
on worship and on other religious ritual performances
and allows him time for his business activities by
delegating ritual tasks to his family members and the
family priest who performs the religious rituals on his
behalf. But this does not mean that the Hindu business¬
man is any less of a believer in his religion than those
who worship and perform other rituals for themselves.
Singer rightly states that for an Indian industrialist
there is no separation of ownership and control either
in the organization of the family or in the organization
of the factory. Most of the Indian industrialists adopt
the ritual neutralization process to such an extent that
the "at home culture" and "at work culture" are increas¬
ingly differentiated on the basis of the amount of
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"ritually neutral space". They oc some of their "busi¬
ness work" at home and some "family work" at the facto¬
ry. 1 found the same to be true of arhatis in the Muzaf-
farnagar mandi.
Besides the above mentioned strategies, the arhatis
of the Muzaffarnagar mandi perform numerous rituals,
vows and take into account many signs, symbols, omens
etc. for predicting loss and profit and for gaining
financial success in their businesses. And in these
rituals, Hinduism and capitalism are not compartmental¬
ized, but interwoven. The Hindu arhat is give donations
and other religious gifts to the temples, the poor, and
charitable organizations from their profit with the
belief that this action will convert their dishonestly
earned money into auspicious money or profit. In India,
religious institutions such as temples and monasteries
have often been associated with economic activities (see
Runder 1987; Haynes 1987). Therefore, we can say that
popular Hinduism has, to use Weber's characterizations,
both "this-wor1d1iness" and "other-worldliness".
1 suggest in this thesis that people in India not
only use adaptive strategies but also that their forms
■ i
of actions and beliefs are context-speclfic. In other
words, there are multiple interpretive codes and mean¬
ings available tor use by people within popular Hindu
culture. In their studies of South Indian culture,
Ramanujan liyQO, iy69) and Beniei iiy«3) have both snown
that Hindu culture contains within itself several con-
15
textually shifting meanings and modes of interpretation,
and there is no single definitive explanation ot any
Hindu belief or practice. Recently, Trawick (1988, 1990)
has also described how the inherent ambiguities or South
Indian language and social life provide many different
meanings and interpretations to different people in
situations. Celebration of the festival of Diva.il nas
different meanings for fianiya traders and kisSns in
western U.P. state. And also, they hold dramatically
different perspectives on the meaning or "prestige"
lirrzat). I focus in this thesis on such differences
between castes, and also on the context-spec 1ficity and
variability of kisans multiple perspective on market
exchange.
This thesis will also touch on an area the inter¬
pretation of Indian society in which the writings ot
Louis Dumont have sparked enduring controversy. uumont
(1970) argues that Indian society is basically grounded
in a hierarchical order or castes with the brahman
occuping the highest position and there is a definite
ideological relationship between caste and occupation in
India. According to Dumont, both high and low castes
live under the sway or a system in which ideas or polit¬
ical and economic relations are "encompassed" by and
subordinate to those or religion. His argument that
economic tacts are encompassed by and subordinate to
hierarchy may have prevented many scnolars from examin¬
ing the ritual aspects of trade and commerce in India.
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One possible implication of Dumont's argument for
the study of market activities is illustrated in Cell's
study (1982) of a weekly tribal market in central India.
Cell analysed the market's pnysicai plan and found that
it reflected the hierarchical order of Hindu and tribal
people and ideological values attached to the transacted
goods. He suggested that the whole spatial plan of this
market confers certain advantages on the tribal people
-t tne expense of their being made symbolically periph¬
eral.
It seems unlikely, however, that it is only hierar¬
chical values that govern the relationships between
tribal and Hindu people in this type of market, because
we cannot ignore the fact that in India political and
economic factors are not less important than hierarchi¬
cal values in establishing the dominance of Hindus over
the tribal people, in any case Cell's symbolic spatial
model cannot be relevant in the context of the Muzaftar-
nagar .vanai, as in this market all firms' offices
iarhats) are allocated by the government without any
consideration of caste, ideology, religion etc. Nonethe¬
less a rejection of Gell's Dumontian interpretation of
the relationship between caste and market need not
entail a rejection of the notion that caste ideologies
are implicated in market relationships.
A number of scholars at the University of Chicago,
for example, have been critical of the "Europo-centric"
approach of turopean scholars to South Asia. Since
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Dumont's homo Hierachicus was published in English in
1970, McKim Marriott and his colleagues and students,
who have carried out empirical studies in India ana
other parts or South Asia, nave rejected Dumont's ap¬
proach. However, on one point at least, Dumont and
Marriott agree: that Indian society can only be under¬
stood in terms of indigenous concepts and models ot
social life. They disagree nowever over what that moael
should be. Marriott (1959, 1968, 1976, 1977) specifical¬
ly criticizes the dualism inherent in Dumont's position
concerning the separation of status and power, and the
separation ot caste ideology on the one hand, and the
•empirical realms of political and economic power on the
other.
According to Marriott (1977:230-31), Hindu culture
is "monistic," that is, no common sense western dualis-
tic distinctions have ontological importance to Hindus.
There is no separation between person and action, nature
and law, or code and substance in popular Hindu culture.
By using the term "code-substance" Marriott means to
stress, for example, the Indian assumptions that a
person's or castes moral nature is inherent in their
bodily and non-bodily substances. Marriott has provided
many examples which show the monistic nature of Indian
culture. For example, Hindu medical books include ethics
and law and theological books include biology
(1977:230). In Moffatt's words (unpublished paper
1985:11), for Marriott:
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To see India as a land in which the 'spiritual' is
more important than the 'material* to make a trans¬
lation error, tor the spiritua1 and the material
are always monistically linked in India--what we
see as the spiritual is always ineluctably material
as weil. Thus a Hindu priest in dealing with a
Hindu god haggle with the being as though in the
marketplace. This is not some 'corruption' of
Hinduism; but it's essence.
In sum, the work of Marriott and his colleagues
grounds itself in several basic assumption about tne
nature of Indian society, and the proposition -.hat
Indian society can only be fully understood in terms of
multiple sets of indigenous concepts, categories, and
meanings. Marriott and his followers call this approach
"
e T. hnos oc i o 1 ogy * (For a recent statement by Marriott of
tne aims of enthnosocio1ogy, and a sample of the work
that has been influenced by him, see the special issue
of Contributions to Indian Sociology, vol.23, number 1,
1989).
The present study draws in several ways on this
body of enthnosocio1ogica1 work, in that it stresses the
importance of understanding indigenous concepts of the
marketplace, and in its focus on the continuities rather
than the disjunctions between religion and economic
life.
A number of scholars who have been associated with
Marriott's approach to Indian society have shown that
there are multiple sets of values, perspectives and
categories which are no less important in local under¬
standings of intercaste relationships than the supposed-
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ly fundamental opposition (according to Dumont) of
"purity" and "impurity". For instance, categories such
as "left-hand castes" and "right-hand castes", "hot" and
"cold", "auspiciousness" and "inauspiciousness" and so
forth.
ftaheja (1988a, 1988b), for example, found that in a
village about forty miles from Muzaffarnagar city in
Saharanpur District, the categories of auspiciousness
and inauspic1ousness are more important than notions
concerning purity and impurity in most intercaste ex¬
change relationships. She writes that in this village, a
jajman (donor, literally "sacrificer"I gives dan (ritual
gifts) to the Brahman and to Kamins, people of service
castes for achieving the auspiciousness of his family,
house and crops, through the transferral of sin, evil,
and inauspiciousness to the recipients. The recipient of
such prestations "digests" the sin, the evil and the
inauspicious of the jajman by accepting the dan. In
these contexts, it is the ritual "centrality" of the
donor, rather than his hierarchical position, that is
foregrounded. She suggests that in the case of other
types of prestations in the village, a value of "mutual¬
ity* may be the foregrounded value in the relationship.
In sum, Raheja has documented the significance or
prestations, and of values other than purity and impuri-
tv in the cons t ruction of intercaste relationships. But
she has ignored an important issue in her ethnography.
How far does participation in wider spheres of market
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exchange effect or constrain ritual transactions within
the village? When a lower caste or a Brahman family
becomes economically well-off to their jajman, or mem¬
bers of their families hold a high position in the
government, would they accept those types of dan in
which there is a danger that inauspiciousness, evil or
sin would be transferred to them by the jajman or domi¬
nant caste person? Or, do kisans continue to give ful 1
range of ritual gifts as they become increasingly ori¬
ented to market exchange? It is precisely this issue
that 1 take up in Chapter 3, where 1 discuss the ways in
which these conflicting expectations on the part of
jajmans and kamins are juxtaposed and negotiated in
particular situations.
In his study of a town bazaar in West Bengal, Ostor
(1982, 1984) has attempted to combine the perspectives
of Dumont and Marriott. He suggested that to study an
Indian market we need to apply a "holistic" approach
(1984:91=9). In India one cannot separate and abstract
the economic domain from the other domains of society.
The notion of duality between traditional and modern is
not appropriate when applied to Indian society or the
Indian economy. Rather this subject has to be approacned
keeping in mind two and half centuries of colonialism,
imperialism and capitalism. Gstor rightly points out
(1982:57) that the western nations of market, economy or
polity are not suitable to understand fully Indian
society, because they isolate interlinked forms. There-
fore, when analyzing a market place in India, we need to
take into account the interconnected local constraints,
religion, government and local culture.
How then do these various models of Indian caste
society help us to understand the relationships between
Hindu arhatis and kisans in the Muzaffarnagar mandil As
1 said earlier, according to Dumont there is no separate
normative model of behaviour for Hindu traders in Hindu
ideology. They must either be Subordinated to the domi¬
nant kisan castes or follow the priestly or Brahmanical
model of behaviour. Dumont wrote (1970:165):
One can say that just as Lin Hindu ideology] reli¬
gion. .. encompasses politics, so politics encompass¬
es economics within itself. The difference is that
the po1itico-economic domain is separated, named in
a subordinate position as against religion, whilst
economics remains undifferentiated within politics.
Beck 11970, 1972) and Heesterman (1973) have followed
Dumont's view that in south India the "right-hand
castes" (the agriculturalist castes) follow a kingly or
Kshatriya model of behaviour, whereas the "left-hand
castes" (the trading castes) follow the priestly model
of behaviour. Many Indologists and South Asianist an¬
thropologists, however, have rejected this notion that
there are only two normative models in Indian caste
society. David (1974:50-2), for example, suggests that
there are not two models but three: the kingly, priestly
and Vaisya. The kingly and priestly schemes, each of
which incorporates "bound mode" castes, and the Vaisya
scheme that incorporates "non-bound mode" castes. Trad-
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ing castes are non-bound castes because they emphasize
egalitarian transactions and short-term fleeting rela¬
tionships with other castes. Kshatriya and priestly
castes on the other hand emphasize transactional schemes
of interaction that differentiate castes as subordinate
and superordinate and they tend to engage in long-term
multi-stranded relationships with other castes. In his
study of the Kaikkoo1ars, a south Indian caste of
ar t i sar^merchants , Mines (1984) maintains that the norma¬
tive codes of this merchant caste group exhibit elements
of both the priestly and kingly models of behaviour in
that the caste controls their temples (in a variety of
ways), emphasizes its warrier pasfe and is independent of
the dominant kisan castes.
On the basis of his transactional approach, Marri¬
ott also suggests that in a village jajmani relation¬
ships, Vaisyas follow a "minimally transacting strategy"
in giving and receiving food which reflects their at¬
tempt to be separate and independent from other castes.
And dominant castes generally adopt "maximizing strate¬
gies" and engage in large-scale distributions or food
and gifts as part of their control of land and labour in
rural India. Moreno and Marriott's study (1989) of
particular varieties of south Indian temple worship
demonstrates that the ritual idioms of traders and
farmers are quite different with respect to the worship
of the deities Murukan and Mariyamman. And these differ¬
ing idioms are continuous with their differing strate-
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gies of exchange in everyday life.
I follow here Marriott's suggestions that there are
varying caste-specific models of behaviour focused on
modes of exchange, and further, 1 suggest that the
particular model of behaviour a caste will follow may
differ from one region to another. In western U.P.,
Hindu Baniya trading castes claim Vasiya origin, they
follow neither a Kshatriya model of behaviour nor a
priestly model. While some aspects of their ritual
behaviour are congruent with priestly ideology, their
ritual sphere is also permeated by concerns with trade,
the increase ot wealth, and other aspects or economic
actions. Baniya arhatis of the Muzaffarnagar mandi want
to maintain long-term trading relationships with their
clients (who come mainly from dominant kisan castes) for
gaining profit, but at the same time they prefer to
maintain distance from these clients.
1 will demonstrate in this thesis (particularly in
chapter 5 and 6) that Baniy5 arhatis of the Muzaffarna¬
gar mandi have many distinctive beliefs and ritual ob¬
servances as Vaisyas. 1 will also describe ways in which
some ot these beliefs are reflected in their economic
actions in the mandi. I have classified their main
$
religious beliefs and rituals connected with their
commercial activities and the marking of their Baniya
social identity into tour categories, first, one set ot
beliefs concerns the moral justification of commercial
pror i t-or lenteo activities, liecond, a set of beliefs and
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rituals is concerned with ensuring success ana protit in
trade. A third set of beliefs is related to the predic¬
tion or protit ana loss in traae. Ana finally a rourth
set of beliefs is concerned with the conversion of
inauspicious dishonestly earned money or protit into
Ausipious and productive money. None of these caste-
specific beliefs and productive performing rituals
conflict with their commercial activities. Rather, they
illustrate some ot the complex ways in which caste ana
Hinduism penetrate and inform economic behaviour.
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The Field Work
1 carried out my fie1d-research over a period of
fourteen months. During this period 1 lived in Muzaffar-
nagar city where the grain and sugarcane products' mancji
is located. The f i e1d-res earch was conducted in two
parts--first from June 1987 to June 1988 and the second
wnen 1 revisited the field for three months rrom Feoru-
j>ry 1990 to April 1990, in order to collect further
inrormation from kisSns and arhatis on some particular
points.
Keeping in view the aim of my research project 1
needed a town market where agriculturalist from Hindu
dominant castes sell their agricultural products to the
traders from the Hindu trading castes. For this purpose
I preferred the grain and sugarcane products' mancti of
Muzaf'farnagar city to any other place because 1 had
lived there for more than fifteen years and was pretty
well familiar with the local language ana customs and
geograpny of the area. However, even then, l faced
numerous difficulties in eliciting the relevant informa¬
tion from the ar/ia cjs and their employees.
Although I have discussed in detail the aim of my
research in the previous pages, l think it proper to
mention the outlines of some main points on which 1 have
collected the data:
1. What, from the perspectives of Hindu kisans, is the
meaning of land, production, distribution, jajmani and
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market exchanges, prestige and so forth, and how do they
manage their agricultural work? •
2. What role do the caste-ideo1ogy, social background
and occupational culture of Baniya traders in India,
play in their economic actions and relationships with
non-Baniya people?
3. What is the nature of relationship between religion
and economy in the Indian society and in this context
wnat beliefs and rituals of Hindu traders and kisans
from dominant castes affect their economic activities?
а. How and to what extent does the government influence
and control the agricultural marketing process?
5. Do the Hindu Baniya traders follow the kingly model
of behaviour or the priestly model or whether they
follow their own distinctive Vaishya model of behaviour;
and in this context what image do both the Baniya trad¬
ers and the kisans from dominant castes, have for each
other as caste group?
б. On what basis do the traders maintain their business
relationships with their clients, particularly the ki¬
sans ?
1 conducted my field research in this way:
1 reached Muzaffarnagar city in the month of June,
the period of secorching heat with mercury shooting well
above 35 c. Therefore, I spent the first six weeks trav¬
elling around Huzaffarnagar District familiarising
myself with the marketing organisation of the district.
During this period 1 also interviewed the government
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officials, directly linked to the rluzat f arnagar mandi
for general information and to obtain specific informa-
tin about government's administration and intervention
in tne mandi, and also to collect secondary data from
these officials.
After this initial familiarisation excercise, l
started my normal routine of fie1d-research for which 1
used to spend nearly nine hours a day, between 6.00 A.M.
to 7.00 P.M., in the mandi. Everyday after completing
the field work in the mandi, I used to visit at two to
three arhatis' residences for conducting their inter¬
views in the evening . On an average I was able to
interview seven to eight arhatis everyday. After this
gruelling day's work I used to write my field notes in
detail from the field-diary in the night.
Generally, I spent my weekends visiting the vil¬
lages to contact the kisans and service caste people and
collect information from them, in all I spent nearly
fifty days in eight villages where 1 already knew some
kisans personally. I collected data mainly through
structured and unstructured interviews, and semi-
participant and non-participant observation. The kisans
were very co-operative and also allowed me to take their
photographs in actions and record their interviews when¬
ever tne need was felt. As such I have used these tools
but unfortunately, in the course of my travels in the
district, my photographic material of village life was
lost. Usually, I interviewed the kisans in informal
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groups in the villages, however, some of the kisans and
kol hu operators from service castes were also inter¬
viewed in the mangii when they came to sel 1 their
products, sometimes in the presence of the arhatis and
sometimes in their absence as the situation demanded.
The kisans from Kshatriya castes expressed their views
about themselves and Baniya arhatis without any hesita¬
tion in the presence of their arhatis. In the duration
of my research I interviewed more than 100 kisans. Most
of these were Hindus from Kshatriya castes, but a few
were also from Hindu and Muslims service castes. I used
information from both the Hindus and the Muslim kisans
in my analysis of kisans' relationships with the mandi
and the arhatis, but collected information concerning
the ritualistic context only from Hindu kisans because a
separate study would be required to explicate Muslim
ritual practices.
In the mandi I began my field work by obtaining the
list of arhats registered with the DAPM committee office
and the arhatis association. Neither of these lists gave
me the accurate number of Srhats actually operating in
the mandi. So I had to prepare my own list by visiting
each of the 235 arhats which were in operation for
interviewing the arhatis and collecting general quanti¬
tative data (e.g. their caste, religion, place of ori¬
gin, specialization etc.) from them through a printed
interview schedule (see the appendix). 1 must admit that
in the beginning 1 faced a host of problems in estab-
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1 ishing a rapport with the arhatis and their employees.
They were not only suspicious about me that I might be a
government officer and rni^nt use the information, thus
acquired, against their business interests but also
because suspiciousness is a part of essential Baniya
occupational culture. Eventually, 1 was successful in
gaining the confidence of both, the arhatis and their
employees, with the help of two of my local Baniya
friends. They introduced me to their friends and kins
operating as arhatls in the mandi and these arhatls,
sudsequent1y, introduced me to others of their trade.
Tnus, 1 was able to conduct interviews of these people
by convincing them that 1 was conducting a purely aca¬
demic research and had nothing to do with the governmen¬
tal agencies and this will, in no-case, be deterimental
to their business interests. 1 was able to get their
permission to take their photographs whenever i felt the
necessity, but most of them didn't allow me to record
their interviews. In all the cases 1 prepared my notes
daily based upon the interviews, whether recorded or not
recorded, and wrote them in my diary. However, almost
all the hrhatls allowed me to attend their ritual per¬
formances at their Srhats without any hesitation.
To solve the problem of collecting information from
the employees of the arhatis I decided to interview them
mostly in the absence of their employers. Initially,
they were very reluctant to disclose anything about
their employers owing to their job morality or fear or
30
loyalty to their employees, however, 1 was able to
collect the information from them which was relevant tor
my purpose. They were easily forthcoming with informa¬
tion about themselves. 1 interviewed the pajleaars in
the evenings when they sat relaxed in small groups after
their day's labour, enjoying hukka smoking and chatted
freely. One of my friends from local post and Telegraph
department was very helpful in introducing me to the
palledars. While interviewing employees of the arhatis 1
made sure that those employees knew that their responses
would not be over heard by,'or revealed to, their em¬
ployees. I interviewed about fifty munims (traders'
business clerks) and about seventy palledars (grain-
porters ) .
In the text of the thesis 1 have changed the real
names of my informants to protect their identities
oecause 1 had promised them that I wouldn't disclose
their names if they wished so. But the names of places
as mentioned in the thesis are actual.
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NOTE TO CHAPTER ONE
In this thesis, i have chosen to use the colloquial Hindi
term Kisanfalso called kashtkar) instead of "peasant", "farmer" or
"peasant-farmer," because these English terms do not convey the
precise meaning of the Indian term. Webster's Third New Interna¬
tional Dictionary describes peasants as "one of a chiefly European
ciass that tills the soil as small free landowners or hired labour¬
ers*. "Peasant society" is characterized in this way: "based upon
and characterized by a simple agricultural economy (Asian socie¬
ties)." And a farmer is defined as "one who cultivates land or
crops or raises livestock; one that rents or leases land for culti¬
vation. *
In ordinary usage the term peasant in Europe has several
meanings but generally it is used to refer to a person who lives in
the country and works on agricultural land as a small tenant la¬
bourer or with limited landownership rights, and who in a cultural
sense, is uneducated, rough and occupies a low rank in society. In
the anthropological literature, the question of who should be
referred to as peasants or farmers has been something of a contro¬
versial issue. Generally, however, anthropologists follow the views
of Redfield (1956) and wolf (1966), who maintain that peasant are
those who produce agricultural products for their own consumption
and for whom agriculture is a way of life. Farmers are, in this
view, those who own land and produce for the market or have an
orientation to profit. Generally, anthropo1ogits prefer the term
peasant for third world countries. But in the Indian context, i
find it difficult to apply either of these English terms. In Indian
language there are no separate terms for peasant and farmers. Andre
Beteille has also explained how the terms peasant and farmer are
inappropriate in the Indian context. They are inappropriate, he
says, because *a definition of peasants formulated primarily on the
basis of Europian experience would reflect Europian reality, and
must therefore be used with caution in the study of Indian society"
(1974:45). He raises several questions regarding the applicability
of the term "peasant.* In the Indian context, he asks, are tenants
with occupancy rights peasants, and what about share-croppers, of
whomthere are several types even if a single state in India?
In north India, in colloquial Hindi, people differentiate
agriculturalists on the basis of size of landholding and also on
the basis of their weaith: bara kisan (agriculturalists with large
iandho1dings); chota kisan (industria1st with smaller
landholdings), dhani kisan (wealthy agriculturalist) and garib kisan
(Door agriculturalist). No linguistic distinction is made that
would, parallel the English distinction of peasant and farmer,
between those who produce for themselves and those who produce for
the market. In this thesis, 1 use the term kisan to refer to an
agricultural landholder who manages his agricultural work himself,
or with the help of his family labour, or with the help of hired
labourers. Whenever I use the English term "cultivator", I refer to
a person who cultivates land and who can tie a kisan, contractor
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MUZAFFARNAGAR DISTRICT: PAST AND PRESENT
In this chapter I will present a general picture
of Muzaffarnagar District, with a brief reference to its
geography, historical background and transport and
communication networks. Special attention will be paid
to the changing economic and socio-cu1tura 1 structures
of the district, and to the impact of these on activi¬
ties at the grain and sugarcane products' mandi. I will
be particularly concerned here with the question of how
these changing economic and social environment led to
transformations in the relationship between Kisans and
Baniya traders over the last century.
The Physicai Setting and Climate
Situated in tne fertile Gangetic plain, the dis¬
trict of Mutaffarnagar is one of the most prosperous
districts of India. It is located in the doab region
viand between two rivers) of the Gangs and Yamuna riv¬
ers, between the District of Meerut in the south and
Saharanpur in the north, in the north-west part of Uttar
Pradesh (U.P.) state. In the west, the Yamuna river
separates it from Karnal District of Haryana state, and
in the east the river Ganga forms the boundary between
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gular in shape. (See Map 2.) At its longest, from east
to west, it is about 98 kms., and at its widest, north
to south, it is 58 kms. It lies 273 meters above sea
level and the total area is 4176 sq. kms. (Smarika 1983;
Statistical Magazine 1987).
The landscape of the district consists ot four
fairly distinct tracts, to the extreme east, the river¬
ain tract of the Ganga valley or khadar (low-lying land
near the river) contains the whole of the pargana of
Gordhanpur and a small portion of the pargana of Jan-
sath. Next comes the tract between the Ganga and western
Kali rivers, through which runs the Ganga Canal. A large
part of this tract contains sandy soil. Just to the west
of the canal tract lies the doab of the Kali and Hindan
rivers, where land is high and very fertile. The last
tract is the western tract, and it compries that part of
the district which extends from the Hindan to the Yamuna
river; it is traversed by the Kirsani and the Katha
rivers and by the Yamuna canal (Nevill ibid.;1-12).
Most of the Jat villages are located in the more
fertile area (i.e. in the area of Hindan-Kirsan i rivers)
and Rajput and Gujar villages are located in less fer¬
tile areas. The eight rivers and five canals and their
tributaries cover the whole district for irrigation. The
plain of the upper Ganga Canal is one of the most highly
irrigated agricultural areas of India and irrigation ha3
played a dominant role in boosting its agricultural
prosperity (Nevill ibid. : 1 - 12 ; Stone 1984:102-4).
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The climate ot the Muzaffarnagar region is the
typical of the Gangetic plain. During the major part of
the year the climate of the district is largely influ¬
enced by the prevailing dry continental air, the summer
(from April to June) being intensely hot lapprox. 31c to
44c. ) and winter cool (about 4c-15c. ). Uithin this
general pattern, the temperature varies from month, to
month and from night to day. It is only during the
monsoon months (the rainy season) that generally starts
from the last week of June, that air of oceanic origin
reaches this region, bringing with it increased humidi¬
ty, cloud and rain. This monsoon season lasts until
about the middle of September. About 83% of the annual
rainfall comes in the rainy season. The average rainfall
of" the district is about SOOmms., and the pattern of
annual rainfall in the district as a whole is uniform
(Prakasarao 1976; Statistical Magazine 1987). The man-
soon rain is very important for the rice crop, which is
grown in the rainy season and requires very intensive
watering. Sugercane, which is the main cash crop of the
district, also needs Intensive watering. But business
becomes slack during this season, particularly in the
grain and sugarcane products' mandis.
These climatic conditions, the high quality of the
soil and intensive irrigation facilities mean first,
that the Kisans of Huzaffarnagar District are not only
able to grow more crops than most other parts of the
country, and second, that most of the kisans are able to
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produce surpluses for sale in the mandis.
Transport and Communication
The city of Muzaffarnagar, which is the District
head-quarters and the main market centre of the dis¬
trict, is situated on the De1hi-Deharadun National
Highway (Grand Trunk Road), 120 kms. north of Delhi, on
the east bank of the Kali river. The spatial distribu¬
tion of transport in the district is determined by the
parallel and north-south alignment of the Yamuna and
Ganga rivers. Muzaffarnagar District is served by com-
/
plex interconnecting train and road routes that provide
communication and transport within the district, and
link it to the districts of Meerut to the south and
Saharanpur to the north.
In the west of the district, secondary road and
train routes from Delhi to Saharanpur pass through the
towns of Shamli, Thanabhawan and Jalalabad. Cutting
almost at right angles across these north-south routes,
an east-west road runs from the eastern boundary of the
district through Muzaffarnagar city to the town of
Panipat across the Yamuna river in Haryana state to the
west. The villages and towns (kashas) of the district
are connected by metalled (pakka) and unmetalled (kach-
cha) roads. More than 60% of the villages in the dis¬
trict are within one mile of a pakka road and there is
no village which is more than five miles from any pakka
road (Praksharao 1976:133).
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Buses are the main form of passenger transport
within the district. On average a bus leaves for Delhi
from Muzaffarnagar city every half hour. Nowadays a
villager from any village of the district can visit
Muzaf farnagar city, and return the same day which was
often not possible four decades ago because of poor
transport facilities. Borne older residents of border
villages told me that in the past their walk to the dis¬
trict courts or other government offices used to take
eight to ten hours; and usually they had to stay over¬
night at the residences of their lawyers or arhatis if
they did not have relatives in the city. About forty
years ago, kisans transported their agricultural
products to the mandis by mules, donkeys, camel-carts
and oxen-carts, but now they use tractor-tro11eys,
buggis (carts pulled by male -buffaloes) and to a lesser
degree mule carts. In 1930, there were 449 camels in the
district (District Gazetters 1934:1) out nowadays
kisans seldom keep camels for agricultural or transport
work. Traders use trucks and trains for export-import
transportation. Although trains are cneaper to use than
trucks, trucks are generally preferred to trains because
they are safer and quicker.
Muzaffarnagar city and other towns of the district
now connected to other cities in India and most coun¬
tries of the world by a direct dialing telephone system
(ISTD). A telephone is now a ousiness necessity for
artyatis. In the last decade the number of television
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sets in villages has been increasing mainly because TV
is considered an important dowry items. To a villager TV
not only provides entertainment and contact with the
outside world but also provides information about modern
farming, agricultural technology, marketing and prices.
The district of Muzaffarnagar lies in the area of
the khari bo 1i dialect of Hindi la mixture of Hindi and
Urdu). Some tewenty-five Hindi and urdu daily newspapers
are published from the towns and Muzaffarnagar city.
These newspapers mainly contain local news and are an
important source of price information at different
".andis for arhatis and kisSns. The most popular ones,
The tluzaf tarnagar Bulletin and Dainik Dehat, are both
published in Hindi in Muzaffarnagar city.
The extension of transport and communication facil¬
ities has had several consequences. There has been, tor
example, greatly increased contact between villages and
towns, in the past a kisan was often forced to sell his
products to the local village Baniya trader and itiner¬
ant traders in the village at less than the market
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price. Thus, these new modes of transport and communica¬
tion have impacted directly on the relationships between
arhatis and kisans in the mandi. The spatial price
differences are nowadays minimal among the mandis within
the district. Once village people did not want to estab¬
lish marital ties more than forty to fifty miles from
their villages but now they are more willing to arrange
marriages' at greater distances because of improved
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transport facilities, another effect of increased trans¬
port and communication facilities is that increasingly,
disputes that would previously have been settled in the
villages through traditional panchayats are brought
before the courts in the towns.
A Brief History of the District
Regarding the history of the Muzaffarnagar Dis¬
trict, nothing is known with certainly until several
hundred years after the Muslim invasion of the 13th
century. The first great event related to the area ot
which we have any authentic record in the Persian histo¬
ries is Tamur's invasion which took place in 1399 AD.
During the Muslim period, particularly in the reign of
Akbar and his successors, this district was a favourite
pleasure resort of the nobles of the court; many of them
obtained jagirs (military land grants) here, and most of
these jagirdars (holders of military land grants) were
from the different branches of the Saiyid subdivision of
Muslims. In fact the early recorded history of this
district is the history of these Saiyid families, who
were the main landlords and jagirdars in this district.
(For details, see Nevill 1903:157-74; Bayly 1983:191-2.)
During the reign of Shahjahan, Saiyad Khanjahan-i-
Shahjahani obtained a jagir of forty villages in the
area of Khatauli and Sarwat, and the title of
"Abdul Muzaffar Khan". He began the building of a new
town on lands taken from Sujru and Khera villages and
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this was completed by his son who named it "Muzaffarna-
gar" in honour of his father (hevill ibid:167,295). From
1710 A.D. the region of Muzaffarnagar District was
invaded several times by Sikhs and Marathas who con¬
quered several parts of this district. After fighting
several wars with these Sikhs and Marathas, the British
conquered the whole doab area in 1803. In 1826, Huzaf-
farnagar was made a full-fledged district. After the
British moved into the district in 1803, its boundaries
were changed. Villages were transferred between it and
neighbouring districts and there were alterations to its
internal divisions.
In the beginning, under hast India Company ruie, it
was difficult for the Government to make any radical
change in the property rights laws and revenue collec¬
tion system because of entrenched interests. The big
Saiyid hereditary landlords (zamindars) and a Gujar
Raja, Ramdayal Singh of Landhaura estate (in Saharanpur
District), who held a large part of his land in this
district, were in full control of their tenants.
Local Social Structures
According to the first census of the District of
Muzaffarnagar, which was taken in 1847, the total popu-
lation of the district was 537,594 inhabitants. This
indicated a density of 333 people to 1.61 sq. km. The
district then contained 93/: inhabited villages and the
urban or town population was about 14% of the total
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population of the district (Nevill ibid. :73).
The decennial census of 1981 indicated that the
population of the district was 2,274,000, of which
1,234,000 were male and 1,040,000 were female (043
females per thousand males). Between 1971-1981 the
population increased 26.20% which is the highest in¬
crease ever recorded in the past. The urban population
in 1981 accounted for 21.72% of the total population
and, given the contemporary trend of migration to the
towns from the villages, we.can assume that this per¬
centage has increased over the last few years. The total
number of inhabited villages was 927, of which 863 have
been electrified. The density of the total population in
1981 was 554 per sq. km. ot the total population, 30.1%
were literate. I ma 1e literacy 40% and female literacy
17.5%). The population of Muzaffarnagar city was 172,016
and its geographical area was 12.4 sq. kms. Including
flvzaf farnagar city, eighteen places were classified as
"towns" in the census of 1981 (Census of India 1981;
Statistical Magazine 1987).
Hindus and Muslims comprise the two largest reli¬
gious groups in the district. According to the census of
1901, 69% were Hindus and 28.9% were Muslims. Some
villages and towns of the district are dominated by the
Muslims and some of them are dominated by Hindus. Sikhs,
Jains and Christians comprise the remaining 2.1% of the
popu1 ation.
Statistics on the current distribution of casts are
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unavailable because the Government prohibited the col¬
lection of such information after 1931. Kisans of Muzaf-
farnagar District belong to various Hindu and Muslim
casts. The main Hindu kisan castes are Jat, Rajput,
Gujar, Tyagi and Saini and the main Muslim castes are
Saiyid, Pathan, Sheikh, Mughal, Jat, Rajput, Gujar,
Tyagi, Johoja and Rai. The main Hindu trading castes are
the Baniya, Khatri and Jains. Whereas all Hindu kisan
castes groups of the district claim Kshatriya (warrier
varna) status, the Hindu trading castes and all sub-
pastes of the Jain religion claim Vaishya status. Almost
all Jains in Muzaffarnagar District claim that they were
originally from Baniya caste groups who adopted Jainism
several centuries ago. Almost all Jains of the district
belong to the Digambar sect and only a very small number
(less than 1%) who have migrated to this district for
business belong to the Shwetambar sect of Jainism. Most
of the Khatris are emigrants from Pakistan during and
after the partition of 1947.
The majority of the Muslims of the district belong
to the Sunni sect of Islam and four sub-division of
Muslims--the Saiyids, the Sheikhs, the Pathans and
mugha 1s--c1 aim descent from the Muslim invaders who
ruled India during the Muslim period. These four groups
consider themselves to be higher than the Hindus who
converted to Islam. The process of conversion largely
took place during the period of the Muslim emperor
Aurangzeb when he compelled Hindus to adopt Islam and
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introduced the jizza (poll-tax) on non-believers (see
Rizvi 1987:198; Pradhan 1966:52). These converted Hindus
still follow some of their original Hindu castes and
most of them still maintain caste-endogamy and clan-
exogamy and use their Hindu surnames with their Muslim
names. They even maintain a sense of the brotherhood
(bhaichara) especially in political elections and dis¬
pute resolving processes.
Memoers of the Brahman priestly caste are also
occasionally kisans in this district. Socially, not only
in this district, but in the whole western part of Utter
Pradesh, a Brahman kisan is considered higher than a
priestly Brahman. Generally, in north India. Brahmans do
not enjoy the high ritualistic position they enjoy in
the south. the Jats--who are the main dominant kisan
caste in the district--have little respect for a Brahman
priest because most jats are followers of the Arya
Samaj. They have abandoned many of the religious and
ritual performances which require the services of Brah¬
mans, as Pradhan also noted (ibid, :40):
Under the influence of the teaching of the Arya
Samaj other religious ceremonies have lost much of
their importance, and these changes in Jat reli¬
gious attitudes have had adverse economic effects
upon the profession of the Brahmans. Their services
are still needed, but only in the most important
religious and rites de passage ceremonies.
In Muzaffarnagar District, not only Jats but some
families of other kisan caste groups are also followers
.f Arya Samaj.
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Normally, one particular kisan caste group occupies
a dominant position in a particular village (although it
is the Chamar caste that often predominates
numerically). As a whole, kisan castes are socially,
politically and economically dominant in the villages.
There are usually only a few trading caste families in
the villages; most live in the towns rather than in the
villages. That is why trading caste people are consid¬
ered shahari log (urban people). The people of a partic¬
ular clan l gotra) of a caste group still occupy villages
in a particular territory (ilaka) in this district.
Pradhan (1966) has described in detail how among
the Jats of rtuzaffarnagar District, the concepts of clan
and clan-area (khap) have played a great role in politi¬
cal and social life for many centuries. Since 1985, the
hereditary chief of the Baliyan clan of Jats from Sisau-
li village, Mahendra S i n^< T i kayat, has become a politi¬
cal hero of the Jats of this district. He also gained
the status of one of most important and powerful kisan
leader at the national level when in 1987 he led the
longest kisans demonstration in Meerut city and in 1988
in Delhi when he led the biggest demonstration of kisans
'n the history of India against the government, in
favour of kisans' demands for fair prices for their
produce, loan rebates, and other concessions. Many
kisanss in western U.P. have since 1985 refused to pay
their electricity and revenue bills because Mahindra
Singh Tikayat asked them to do so. But before gaining
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this power he had first to establish a sound power base
within his own cl#an and caste group. He also settles
disputes among his own clan and caste people. Clan
solidarity plays an important role in political elec¬
tions, dispute settlement and marriage negotiations.
Each caste group is still associated with a partic¬
ular traditional occupation in the district but this
does not mean that all members of a caste or even a
majority of them do in fact always follow that occupa¬
tion. Even when they do, they need not do so to the
exciusion of other occupations. Some of the services or
kamin castes have more than one traditional occupation
and are also engaged in one capacity or another. For
example, Chamars have been engaged leather-work and as
agricultural labourers. Kisan caste people may prefer to
send their sons to government administrative jobs in¬
stead of keeping them in agriculture. They prefer to
keep daughters at home until they get married. Trading
caste people generally prefer that their sons either be
engaged in their family trade or join high earning
government jobs.
Jajmani relationships (exchange of services and
commodities between kisan castes and service castes)
still exist in most of the villages. Increasingly thougn
service castes are giving up their jajmani work in
favour of cash payment and formal contract jobs because
of the impact of market economy and industrialization.
The extension of transport, communication, and trade
46
have provided them with the opportunity to migrate to
the cities. Most of these service caste people are
engaged as labourers in the factories or as rickshaw-
pullers (three wheeled bicycle) in the towns where, as
they repeatedly told me in interview contexts, they
earn more money and experience more independence than
under the jajmanl system or agricultural labourers in
the villages. It seems to be the case than in general,
two classes or people are migrating to tne towns; the
laoour classes migrate for better jobs--or just simply
for jobs--and rich kisans migrate to the towns in searcn
of modern facilities, security, and for access to better
education and health facilities for their children.
The family structure in the region of liuzaf f arnagar
District is characterized by an parti1inea1ity, a nigh
percentage of joint families, caste-endogamy, patrilo-
cality, village-exogamy and clan-exogamy. Marriage
within the clans of the father and mother is still
generally avoided by Hindus, but among Musllim families
who have ancient Hindu origins, this practise has been
disappear1ng.
Economic Structure
The eoconomy of the district is dominated by the
agricultural sector which, together allied activities,
forms the most important source of employment and also
revenue for the government. According to the census of
1981, of the total population of the district, 41.7 per
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cent were agriculturists and 27 per cent were agricul¬
tural labourers; which means about 70 per cent of the
total population were involved directly in agriculture
sector. Over 73 per cent of the total land of the dis¬
trict was under cultivation and more than 30 per cent of
the cultivated area was double-cropped (do iasli),
wnereas in 1901 the double-cropped area was only 10.5
per cent of the total cultivated land (Nevill ibid. : 3 5 ;
Prakasarao 1976:21-22; Statistical Magazine 1987:28)
Canal Irrigation
An understanding of the history of the construction
of irrigation canals and transport facilities in this
o.rea provides a perspective on contemporary patterns of
agricultural production and marketing. At the beginning
of the 19th century, under East India Company rule, tne
administration began to face a great financial crisis.
Because of famines, droughts and floods, kisans were
unable to pay land revenue. To support its administra¬
tive, military and commercial activities, the East India
Company had to transform India into a more productive
country. To this end, it was decided to construct new
roads and a railway networks and to provide new means or
irrigation, new varieties of seeds and agricultural
technology to the cultivators. Extension of transport
and communication facilities made it easier to transport
agricultural products to and from manctis for Europe and
other places within India (see Cohn 1966:21; Marx
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1853:34-35; Stokes 1978:92 Stone 1984:4,294; Uhitecombe
1972:64). In U.P. state during the colonial period the
construction of roads, railways and canals was, on the
wnole, concentrated in the western part, wnere there was
already better irrigation, transport facilities and more
fertile land than in the eastern part. These new devel¬
opments widened the gap between the eastern and western
parts ot the state regarding the general prosperity of
the people, agricultural development and marketing
facilities (see Stone ibid. :285).
In Muzaffarnagar District, the Eastern Yamuna Canal
was originally dug by Firoz Shah and re-excavated in the
mid-17th century by Emperor Shahjahan and again re-
excavated in 1830 by the East India Company. A new
canal--the Ganga Canal--was opened in 185a. Stone
(ibid.) has discussed in detail how the canals brought
revolutionary economic changes to the doab area. The
cultivators started to move in some degree from a sub¬
sistence to a market economy. Canal irrigation facili¬
tated the extension of the cultivated area and double-
cropping land. The cropping pattern was also changed.
The cultivators started to grow more cash crops, instead
of staple crops. Wheat, which was the most important
crop, was gradually replaced to some extent by the cash
crop of sugercane during the first decades of the 20th
century in Muzaffarnagar District. Sugercane needed
extensive irrigation and, in Muzaffarnagar District, it
was regarded above all as a rent paying crop.
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After the opening of the canals, land revenue
demand was almost doubled but from the beginning of the
20 th century, cultivators became more able to pay their
revenues than in the past and in some degree agricultur¬
al indebtedness started to decrease. Total production of
crops increased rapidly and from about 1870, cultivators
put more and more land under sugarcane. Many small cane-
crushers were started by petty zamindars, rich kisans
ana Baniya money-lenders; and trade and marketing facil¬
ities particularly in sugarcane products (e.g.gur,
sakkar, khand, sugar) increased. Among the five sugar
factories now operating in the district, four were
opened between 1930 and 19a0 by two local Baniya money¬
lender and zamindar families and two panjabi Khatri
-.amindar families.
Some old kisans told me that after the improvement
of transport facilities, many cultivators were able to
take their surplus agricultural products to the nearby
town mandis to get the full market prices obtainable
there instead or selling below market price to the iocal
Baniya traders and itinerant traders in the villages.
However, the majority of cultivators were still unable
to store their surplus grain because of lack of proper,
storage and because of indebtedness. As Rothermund also
points out (1988:45):
The peasants rarely had access to a truly free
market because the cost of transportation and the
cost of storage and credit were too high tor the
individual producer, who could rarely afford to
hold on to his produce until he could sell it at a
good price in the best market. Most peasants had to
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sell their produce immediately after the harvest at
a price dictated by their creditors.
Only rich kisans and zamindars were able to hold
their products and sell in the mandis wnen prices were
high. In fact, it was the Baniya arhatis in the town
mandis who benefited more than cultivators from the
*
development of irrigation, transport and marketing
facilities. This was because Baniya arhatis had capital
and could afford to tie up their assets in storage
facilities and they could hoard grain until later in the
year when prices would be higher. Prices were particu-
lariy highest in the sowing season when the communica¬
tors needed grain for seed. Because of the extension of
transport facilities, however, the price differentials
between the different levels of markets, and from one
mandi to another, narrowed significantly; and this
benefited the consumer and the communicator, not the
trader or arhati.
Unlike Stone, who concentrated on the advantages of
the canals to the economy of western U.P. and tended to
down'—play their disadvantages, Whitcombe (ibid.:l-10)
and Bayly (1983:301) emphasized the ecological disadvan¬
tages of the canals to the doab region.
Whitcombe notes that the immediate effect of the
canals was to overburden the land with persistent heavy
cropping oecause of incentive to communicate cash crops.
This reduced the fertility of the soil. Auckland Colvin
(1878:135) also mentioned in the Settlement Report of
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Muzaffarnagar District that in the canal tract in the
area of Thanabhawan:
The chief danger in the canal area is over—crop¬
ping. The land is rarely allowed to rest. For
example, cotton is sown in a field in autumn, and
wheat follows as the next crop; cheri will oe sown
in the following autumn, succeeded by wneat, then
cotton as before and so on. The only crop for which
the land is rested is sugarcane and not for more
than one season. In ordinary villages this system
is kept within bounds; not more than iO per cent of
the cultivated area being 'do-fas 1i.But on the
canal, it is carried to excess.
Since canal irrigation was started the appearance
of balding earth, known as usar, and the appearance of
reh (an impure carbonate soda) on the surface of tne
fertile land began to increase. For a kisan who owned
his own well, water was free and he could use it whenev¬
er ne wanted. But now the kisans had to pay the compul¬
sory canal water-tax (abpashi) to the government and
also sometimes bribes to the canal officials. A consid¬
erable area of fertile land was taken up with roads,
railways and canals (see Nevill ibid.:2d; Whitcomoe
ibid. :93). Canals created humidity and moisture in the
nearoy canal area wnich spread malarial fever. uuring
tne year of 1879, more than 40,637 people died of malar¬
ia fever in Muzaffarnagar District (Nevill ibid.:20-21).
On the banks of the Ganga and Yamuna river, in
khactar areas, open areas which were used for grazing by
pastoral people and which were a resort for wild animals
oegan to disappear oecause of canal irrigation. The
Kisans started to cultivate these khaaar areas because
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of the impact of market economy: and little land was now
available tor gracing, kisans therefore started to put
part of their fertile land under the fodder crops. Since
canai irrigation, native wild animals like hog deer,
leopards and wild pigs have almost disappeared from the
khadar areas.
However, as a whole, canal irrigation and the
construction of railways and roads seems to have brought
more positive eifects than negative erfects in the doab
area of western Uttar Pradesh. Increased prosperity and
increased production of sugarcane as a cash crop orougnt
with it an increase in market and trading facilities in
the towns of the district.
Land Tenures and Land Revenue
To increase its income and to extend the social
base of its power, the colonial government made several
change in the legal system. These were mainly related
to civil law regarding property rights and revenue
collection rights. Now land was made transferable or
marxetab 1e--whien created a new type of proprieter. As
Rothemund 11986:47) also points out:
The British had passed all this legislation not in
order to improve Indian agricultural, but simply
for political reasons, as they wanted to preserve
and extend the social base of their power. Initial¬
ly, they had thought of the landlord as the most
suitable support of this kind.
Up to the end of the eighteenth century the Sayid
zamindars were the main hereditary landlords in Muzaf-
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farnagar District. But now Ban iyas - - ma i n 1 y money-lenders
and traders--etner ged as the new zamindars. nev 1 1 1
libid.:84) also mentioned this in the District Gazetteer
or Muzarfarnagar District:
in their Cthe Baniyas] capacity or money-lenders
they have acquired a footing in many estates
throughout the district, and especially west or the
Hindan. They are gradually increasing their land.
When a kisan or zamindar was unable to pay his land-
revenue imaiguzari) or loan borrowed from a money-lend¬
er, ne was compelled to mortage or sell his land to the
money-lender, who had capital to buy it. Nevill
libid. :117-18) has quoted the words of Auckland Colvin
and Cadell from the 1878 Settlement Report of Muzaffar-
nagar District. There remarks show now zamindars and
baniya money-lenders used to adopt many stratiges for
harassing tenants and debtors and taking their lands.
With the help of government officials and courts,
zamindars vacated the land from their tenants' posses¬
sion. On account of their poverty, kisans did not have
'lie capacity to purse litigation properly in the courts.
Cadell noted about the Baniya zamindars in particular
libid. : 119-20) :
It is only the smaller Baniya that have time tor
detailed oppression, and the worst of these are
certainly bad enough; they treat their tenants as
they do their debtors; their chief endeavour is to
get them more into their hands, to reduce the
occupancy tenant to the position of a tenant
-at-will.
Because most of the cultivators were illiterate
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were orten able to keep loose systems ot accounts and to
insert false figures in the bond-paper (rukka) and
retain redeemed bonds that should have been returned and
use them in the courts against "debtors*. Some non
-Baniya zamindar and rich kisans were also involved in
money lending; but kisSns generally preferred Baniya
money-lender to non-Baniya kisans and zamindars (though
non-Baniya Kisan money lenders' interest charges were
not higher). This was because a zamindar's position gave
him greater control over his debtors than a Baniya
money-lender, a situation that kisans tried to avoid if
possible.
Only a minority of cultivators (mainly large land¬
holders) were able to sell their products free of obli¬
gations to the local Baniya traders or to the Baniya-
arhatis in mandis. Because of their indebtedness many
cultivators were compelled to allow the Baniya money¬
lenders (who were generally grain traders as well) and
the zamindar-creaitors to take their crops from the
threshing floor at lower prices than the market prices.
The money-lenders charged very high rates of interest on
the basis of an indigenous system of interest called
cnakravardi-byaz (compound-interest) . The government did
not provide any credit agency for the cultivators.
Cultivators therefore depended on money-lenders for
loans to pay revenue dues, to pay for social and family
obligations, and to survive in times of famine and crop
failure. The situation which Darling (1947) descrioed
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regarding prosperity, agricultural indebtedness, and
money-lending in Panjab state was not different from in
Muoaffarnagar District.
Some older kisans told me that the following prov¬
erb was often heard in the period prior to 1950: "A
kisans is born in debt, lives in debt and dies in debt",
tkisan karj me payda hota hai, karj me ji ta hai aur karj
we hi mar jata hai ) . Whitcombe (ibid. :46-7) has dis¬
cussed the case of Diwan Singh, a Jat kisan from a
village of Muzaffarnagar District. Evidence from the
Famine Commission Report of 1878 indicates that after
paying his land revenue and loan to the moneylender, ne
did not have money or grain to feed his family for the
rest of the year. Of 164 cultivators in Diwan Sing's
village, only one was not in debt. Pradhan (ibid. :51 — 2)
also wrote ot the indebtednes of kisans and the influ¬
ence of Baniya money-lender s in the village of Muzaf far-
nagar District:
...The Jats or the khap villages were economically
dependent on the money-lender caste [the Baniya].
They took loans mostly at a compound rate or inter¬
est wnenever there was drought, cattle disease or
tailure or crops. There was serious indebtedness.
Illiteracy among the Jats helped the money-lenders
to falsify accounts and a custom soon developed by
which the money-lenders took the harvest directly,
from the rields, making their own evaluation. In
most cases the Jat farmers had to buy grain from
the money-lenders on credit, as the grain left in
their own store was not sufficient to see them
through to the next harvest. The Jats brought
household necessities like mustard oil, salt,
sugar, lentils, tobacco and rich from the money¬
lender's shop also on credit. In certain khap
villagers, notably Sisauli and Harsaul i the cast« ot
money-lenders become politically dominant. They
considered the Jats of lower social status and the
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Jats were not allowed to sit on the same cot as the
money-lenders except in a few cases of such influ¬
ential persons as the thok headman.
Ironically, while canal irrigation and improved
transport facilities tended to decrease the degree ot
agricultural indebtedness, at the same time, the British
revenue and landed property laws served to sustain
agricultural indebtedness and to increase the transfer
of agricultural land from the hereditary owners to the
Baniya money-landers through foreclosures. The new
owners ot ten had no interest in increasing agricultural
production and would not invest capital in improved
agricultural technology. The demand for rent and land
revenue helped to push the cultivators into the clutches
of the money-lenders.
During the Mutiny ot 1857, many kisans not only
attacked government buildings and offices but also
looted Baniya money-lenders' properties and burnt their
account-books and debt-bonds in Muzaffarnagar District
inevill ibid. :202). This indicates that their anger was
not only against the British government but also against
the Baniya money-lenders who had kept them in indebted¬
ness and took their hereditary land with the help of the
government's civil law. (see Stokes ibid, s163; Choudhari
1965:135-6). Those zamindars and kisans who did not co¬
operate or who revolted against the government were
suppressed; and their land or zamindari rights were
taken away by the government, for example, inayat Ali
Khan, Kaj i of Thanabhawn town, who raised the flag of
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islam and attacked trie government offices at Shamli town
during the Mutiny, nad his estate confiscated. (Neviil
ibid. : 91, 117 ) .
Those zamindars and moneylenders who were loyal and
supported the government during the mutiny were awarded
social titles and revenue-free land, and members or
their families were appointed to magistracies and other
high positions in the district administration. This is
clear from the list of Huzaffarnagar District Staff
members mentioned in the Supplementry Notes of the
fluzaff arnagar District Gazetteer (1934:11-12). The
Marhal. Muslim-Jat family of Karnal town and Lai Nihal
Chand, a wealthy Baniya banker and zamindar of Muzaffar¬
nagar city, supplied man power and money during the
Mutiny and were rewarded with landed property (Neviil
ibid. :91-115). In 1903, the main zamindar families of
the district were as follows:
Table 1: Chief zamindars of Huzaffarnagar District
(1903)
2amindar cas te No. of v i
Marhal family of Karnal Saiyid 86
Muzaffar Ali Khan of Jansat Saiyid 23
Asghar Ali Khan of Jansat Saiyid 21
Hashim Ali Khan of Jansat Saiyid 22
Mahandi Ali Khan of Jansat Saiyid 10
Abdullah Khan of Jansat Saiyid 8
Saiyid family of Bhandura Saiyid 28
Saiyid family of Tissa Saiyid 14
Saiyid family of Kakrouli Saiyid 11
Lala Keshodas of Muz. city Baniya 56
Baniya family of Chhapar Baniya 33
Lala Nihal Chand of Muz. city Bahiya 41
Chaudhri Ghasi Ram Jat 12
Widow of Landhaura Raja Gu j ar 12 '
Chaudhri Ghanshyam Singh Raj put 5
Rangar family of Khiri Mus1im Raj put 5
Two Bohra families of Muz. city B rahman 85
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It is clear from the above table that the Baniyas
and Saiyid Muslims were in 1903 the largest landlords in
the district. They were the most wealthy influential
people in the district. During the partition of the
country in 1947, about 20% of the total number of Mus¬
lims from the district went to Pakistan. Some members of
Muslim zamindar families also went to Pakistan and all
members of the Marhal family of Karnal migrated to
Pakistan at the time of Partition. The first prime
minister of Pakistan, Nawab Liaqat Ali Khan, belonged to
this family. Various Muslim ex-zamindars of Jansat,
Tissa, Kakrouli, Bhanuj-a and Kairi still have their
descendants in this district. None of them are involved
in trading activities in the mandi, and in fact none
have opted for industry or trade of any kind. They are
earning their livelihood from agriculture or income from
rented urban property. Many of them are relatively poor
on account of decreased amounts of the land in their
possession. Saiyid Mahandi Asgar, grandson of Mahandi
Ali Khan of Jansat family, has been actively involved in
district politics for the last twenty five years and he
had once been elected as a Member of the Legislative
Assembly. He told me in an interview:
Greediness and rationality are opposite of generos¬
ity and aggressiveness. Baniyas have the first set
of traits and we [Muslims] have kindness and anger
in our blood. Banyias' sole aim is to make money by
any means--cheat i ng, b1ack-marketing, i11ega1 hoard¬
ing etc.--but for us, maintaining our generosity
and social reputation (izzat) is more important
than anything else.
The descendants of ex-zamindar Lala Kasho Dass are
either government servants or they are dependent on the
urban property left by their predecessors. Successors of
Lala Nihal Chand are now divided into eight households,
and they emerged as big industrialists and possess
extensive urban property, some agricultural farms and
many industries in this district and other parts of the
country. At present these families are known as the
"Swarup family". Many members of these families have
received higher education, some of them abroad. They
nave developed their administrative, managerial and
enterprising skills through their family background and
education. Some of the members of these families were
top ranked government officials in the past. The remark¬
able feature of these families is that they co-operate
and collaborate with each other in new enterprises. When
I interviewed some members of the Swarup family, they
told me that none of their family members has oeen in¬
volved in any trade or arhat business in the mandi. For
them, involvement in trade or in the arhat business in
the mandi would certainly damage their social position,
""hey even like to maintain social distance from the
Baniya traders and arhatis. Some Baniya Srhatis told me,
however, that some members of Swarup family borrow money
from them for their industries and they do not hold a
good reputation among the Baniya arhatis in the mancti
* * <$
because of not paying their loans back in due time.
Among the descendants of two Brahman Bohra zamindar
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families, only three brothers are alive. These three
brotners are well educated and live separately with
their own families but they share three factories joint¬
ly. They have some landed property in Muzaffarnagar city
and none of them are involved in trade or mandi busi¬
ness. The descendants of Chaudhri Ghasi Ram of Ghasipura
village are divided into five families and have internal
rifts and rivalries. Some of the members of these fami¬
lies have opted for the legal profession. Others are
earning their livelihood from agriculture and rented
property in Muzaffarnagar city.
While exploring the causes of divergent trends of
the descendants of these ex-zamindar families, I sought
their own views on this issue. Most of them told me that
the most important reasons for the decline of wealth and
influence of Muslim ex-zamindar families has been their
orthodox attitude and aristocratic value system which
kept them away from entrepreneurial activities. Their
ascribed status orientation has been a carrier to their
achievement, according to local opinion, so they could
not emerge as new capitalists. The decline of Ghasi
Ram's family is thought to be a result of their internal
strife. The causes of the remarkable progress of the
Swarup family members are said to be their industrial
background, high educational and managerial qualifica¬
tions and co-operation.
6 1
Impact of Land-tenure Systems
In the tenurial systems known as pattidari and
bhaichara, landholders were liable to pay their revenue
through their 1ambardars--the representatives of partic¬
ular lineage groups within the village (Navill
■ bid. : 111 ; Pradhan ibid.34; Stoeks 1978:77), and land
was held by most members ot the dominant caste resident
in the village. In zamindari tenure, one person or
family established through a long standing grant, tradi¬
tion or purchase from the government or from kisans, the
right to be recognised as the sole proprietor of a
zamindari estate. The zamindar would lease the land to
tenants from who ne collected rent. The zamindar was
liaole to pay a fixed revenue to the government.
To a great extent, bhaichara land tenure enabled
J at kisans to save their land from the clutches of
Dan i y a money-lenders in rluzaf f arnagar District. In many
ways bhaichara tenure reflects the strong Jat brother¬
hood traditions. Shivcharan Singh, an old Jat kisan from
Chandhri village of Muzaffarnagar District told me:
During the British period my village was under
bhaichara tenure. Ue had a Jambardar, who was
legally responsible to pay revenue to the govern¬
ment on our behalf. Once, because of crop failure
and poverty, five or six kisans were unable to pay
their share of the revenue to the 1ambardar. Be¬
cause the Jamba rdar could not pay revenue to the
government in due time, he was arrested by the
police. Ue collected sjme money among ourselves and
paid the share of these five or six kisans. Our
iambardar was released from jail within three day3.
Ue had great respect for our 1ambardar.
In i860, among a total of 1,061 mahals lland-
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tenure villages) in the district, 4-97 were in bhaichara
tenure, 246 were in pattidari tenure and 258 were in
zamindari tenure. Gradually the number of zamindari
villages increased. Between 1860 and 1890, sixty thou¬
sand acres of land were transferred; and the chief
losers were the Saiyids and Gujars. The two groups
between them lost more than half of the total land
transferred during this period. After them Rajputs, Jats
iboth Hindus and Muslims) and Baluchi Muslims were the
main losers. The main gainers were the Baniyas who
increased their landholdings by over thirty thousand
acres. Their holdings rose from 16.5% of the total in
1881 to 24% in 1921. Next to them as gainers came
Sheikhs, the Muslim family of Karnal town and the two
zamindar families of Bohras, who were migrants trom
Rajasthan state (Neviil ibid.:112-18; Stokes ibid.:
_ 18).
Since Independence in 1947, the Indian government
has taken several radical steps regarding landed proper¬
ty rights and agricultural marketing. For example, in
the context of iand tenure, under the Zamindari Aboli¬
tion and Land Reform Act of 1951, the state government
abolished the old land tenure system and introduced new
tenurial forms. Under this hew system there are three
permanent types of tenure; bhumidari, sirdari and asami.
At present there are no sirdars or asami in this dis¬
trict. All landholders have become bhumldars. A bhumidar
has the exclusive possession right of his land and may
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use it as the pleases, sell it or transfer it in any
way. The bhumidar himself has to pay a fixed revenue
directly to the government. Because of the zamindari
abolition, agricultural land went back to the hereditary
landholders (i.e. the kisan castes) from the Baniyas.
After zamindari abolition, the kisan castes have
been gradually claiming greater and greater political
power over Baniyas, and to a lesser extent they have
been challenging the economic predominance ot Baniyas.
Among one hundred new brick-kiln units that were started
in 1990, for exampie, seventy are owned by rich kisans
and only twenty are owned by Baniyas. But still, Baniyas
as a caste group are the wealthiest group in the dis¬
trict. Baniyas are mainly confined to and predominant in
commerce, trade and industry; but refugee Panjabi trad¬
ers from Pakistan have been challenging their commercial
dominance in Muzaffarnagar city and other towns of the
district. The majority of Baniyas, who were engaged in
trade, shop-keeping, money-lending, and a small number
in agriculture in the villages gradually migrated to the
towns and started businesses there. The increasing
political and economic dominance of the kisan castes in
the villages has been the main factor which forced
Baniyas to migrate to the towns. Many Baniya i"r/ia t is
told me that Baniyas find it difficult to engage in
commercial activities and agriculture and live in the
villages, in many cases kisans have not settled Baniyas'
debts, and Baniyas' houses were often ransacked by
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burglars and thieves iaccording to some Baniya arhatis).
So zmindari abolition, insecurity in the villages, the
facilities in the towns and better opportunities for
trade are the main reasons tor Baniyas' migration from
villages to the towns. The majority of local Baniya
arhatis in the mancfi emigrated from villages of the
district in the last thirty or forty years. Some Baniya
arhatis' extended family members still live in the
villages where they are engaged in agriculture, trade
and petty shop-keeping. These village Baniyas are very
important for the Baniya ar/iatis in getting kisans as
clients, as I will discuss in Chapter 6.
Agricultural Production
In the doab region, the agricultural year (fasli
sal) is divided into three cropping seasons: rabi or
sadhi, or kharif or savani and ziad. The agricultural
year begins with the month of Asarh (June-July) when the
first monsoon rain falls and kisans begin to sow their
kharif (autumn) crops. The main kharif crops grown in
this district are: several staple crops (mainly rice,
maize, jwar, bajara, millets), pulses ( urad, masur,
mut), several vegetables and fodder crops, seasmum and
cotton. The sowing period of the kharif crops is r r om
mid June to the last week of July and harvesting is done
from mid-September to mid-November. The rabi(spring)
crops are sown between mid-October and mid-November, and
harvested from the month of March until the middle of
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May. The main rabi crops grown in this district are:
wheat, barley, peas, gram, mustard, arhar l a pulse) and
several vegetables and fodder crops. The third harvest,
ziad, is not considered an important harvest because
only maize, some varieties of melons, vegetables and a
few fodder crops are grown during this harvest and
because most of the fields are already sown in kharit
crops.
The sugarcane crop, which is the main cash crop in
this district, stretches beyond the confines of a single
agricultural year. It is a ten month crop which is
planted around February to March and the long operation
of harvesting is done from November to March. After
harvesting the first sugarcane crop, the roots are left
in the soil for germination for the next year. This
second crop of sugarcane--which is harvested in the next
agricultural year--is called munrha.
During the year 1985-86, the total land under
cultivation was 333.1 thousand hectares. Of this total,
200.3 thousand hectares were under more than one crop,
The total area of each main crop under cultivation, and
total crop production in this year as follow:
Table 2: Main Crops, Area under Cultivation and
Total Production during the Year of 1985-86
(Source: Statistical Magazine. 1987)

























































Oniy kisans with very large landholdings can afford
to put some of their land under orchards for fruit
-roduction for market. The climate and the nature of the
soil permit only a few fruit crops to be grown in this
district. The main fruit crops are mango, papaya, guava,
pear, plum, and peach. Only a small quantity of mangoes
and plums is exported from the district. While a large
variety of fruits-- mainly grapes, bananas, oranges,
pineapples, mangoes, pomegrantes, apples and nuts--are
imported from other parts of the country. The fruit
business in the district has been mainly in the hands of
Mus1ims.
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In the late 1960s tne "green revolution" programme
was launched by the central government. Under this pro¬
gramme new hybrid high yielding varieties of seeds were
distributed to kisans in all districts in the country.
This has made the country independent in food grain
production. At present in Muzaffarnagar District, most
of the kisans have their own diese1 -engine or electri¬
cally powered tube-wells for irrigation. This allows
year-round irrigation and frees the kisans from the
tyranny and uncertainty of canal irrigation and total
dependence on monsoon rains. Because of the tube-wells,
the kisans of Muzaffarnagar District were able to save
their crops during the 1986-88 drought period, which was
the iongest in the history of this district.
In the year 1985-86 there were about fifteen thou¬
sand privately owned tractors in use in agricultural in
the district. In the same year, the total number of food
grain stores owned by the central and state governments
was only twenty-seven in the whole district (Statistical
Magazine 1987; District agricultural office). This small
number of stores is inadequate to deal with amount of
foodgrain purchased from the kisans by the state and
central governments. Sugarcane, wheat, rice, potatoes,
onions and chillies are the main commercial crops grown
by the kisans of this district. Other crops are grown by
the kisans mainly for domestic purposes and for small
local markets. Small kisans and share-croppers (batai-
dars) grow vegetables and fodder crops tor commercial
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purposes which they sell in nearby town mandis.
During my interviews with kisans, I noted that
generally a kisan decides what to grow and what not to
grow by taking into account mainly the following fac¬
tors: the cost of in-puts (i.e. seed, irrigation, la¬
bour, fertiliser and so forth;, market availability,
transport costs, the nature of soil, and government
price policies. Sugarcane, for example, occupies land
for a long time, needs extensive irrigation, intensive
labour and much fertilizer. But kisans prefer to grow
this crop unlike cotton, peas, pulses, wheat etc., where
whole crops can easily be lost.
At the time when sugarcane is normally planted, the
government declares a minimum sugarcane price to be paid
by those factories with whome kisans have dealings. The
sugar factories make written bonds with kisans which
means that a factory must buy the agreed amount and
offer at least the price declared by the government to
kisans. This allows the kisans to plan ahead with a
reasonable degree of certainty. Another advantage or
sugarcane is that it does not have to be planted for the
following year. Existing roots will provide one further
crop.
According to many kisans 1 have spoken with, the
purchase price for wheat that the government has been
offering to kisans for the last two or three decades is
not very profitable. For tha last ten years the govern¬
ment has been offering a good price for rice, and that
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is why the area under rice is increasing. Crops of gram
and peas do not need very good soil and require very
little watering; but pesticides are not cost-effective
on them and heavy rain can easily destroy whole crops.
As a result kisans are not greatly inclined to grow
these crops in Huzaffarnagar District. Potato, onion and
chilli crops require very intensive labour and prices
of these crops are unpredictable at harvesting time.
These crops tend to be grown by small kisans who can
manage their small plots using only family labour. And
kisans are unable to store these produts for long be¬
cause of lack of cold storage facilities. So growing
these crops is very risky for them. If there is heavy
rain in March and April the ripening rabi crops can
easily be destroyed and such a rainfall pattern is not
uncommen.
Most kisans are reluctant to change their old
cropping pattern--rice, wheat, sugarcane and the general
rotation sequences of other cash crops for market. Their
financial situation do not allow them to take the risk
of dramatically changing their cropping patterns (inter¬
view statements made by Muzaffarnagar kisans; see also
Prakasharao 1978:27). Very good climatic conditions,
fertile land and extensive irrigation facilities facili¬
tate double-cropping and mixing crops le.g. onion with
sugarcane, mustard with wheat and so on); and some
kisans are able to grow four crops in a field in one
year in this district.
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Several state and centoiral government trading
agencies now trade in the open market to maintain prices
at a level suitable for producers and consumers, to
reduce distibution costs, to prevent speculative hoard¬
ing by traders and to maintain buffer-stocks against the
fluctuating supply and prices situation and natural
dissasters. The government trading agencies buy directly
from kisans at support prices and kisans are tree to
sell their produts either to the government trading
agencies of to the traders and arhatis in the mandis,
wnenever they get the highest prices. Marketing of
agricultural products in the mandi is the suoject matter
of Chapter 6.
Sugar Industry
There are five sugar factories in the District of
Muzaffarnagar, situated at Shamli, Khatauli, Mansurpur,
Rohana and Morna. The Morna sugar factory was started
around 1983 as a co-operative venture by the state
government. The other four factories date from the
colonical period. They were started by wealthy zamindars
from the trading castes, and their famalies still own
these factories. Because of its failure of pay its debts
to the government and kisan cane suppliers, the Rohana
factory was taken over by the state government a few
years ago. The crushing capacity of these five sugar
factories is inadequate to deal with all the sugarcane
produced in the district. In the year 1986-87 these
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factories produced produced approximately 15000 metric
tons (source assistant Sugar Commissioner's Office).
During my field work, there were about three hun¬
dred small raw sugar manufacturing lactones called
salphars or khandsari units (horizontal chain type cane-
crushing machines) and many small cane-crashing mills
called "crushers" in this district. These manufacture
raw sugar and other sugarcane products (i.e. gur, khand,
sakhar) . These salphars and cane-crushing mills are
owned by wealthy kisans and urban businessmen mainly
from the trading castes (among whom© a large number are
arnatis in the grain and sugarcane produce manois of the
district). A small quantity of the total production of
sugarcane is crushed by kolhus small vertical cane-
crushing machines powered by bullocks, a diesel engine
or an electric motor, a ko1hu can only make gur, khand
and sakkar. Kolhus are run by smaller kisans and non-
kisan people mainly from the service castes. These
people generally hire the kolhus for the season from
town traders and borrow the running capital from the
kachcha arhatis (to whom they are morally but not legal¬
ly bound to bring their cane products for sale). More
than forty thousand people are involved in these types
of sugar and gur manufacturing units during the sugar¬
cane harvesting period in Muzaffarnagar District
(source: District Assistant Sugar Commissioner's
Office).
The important feature of industrial development in
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Muzaffarnagar District is that almost all industries are
in the private sector and most of them are owned by
members of the local trading castes, among whome a good
number are grain and gur arhat is. A great deal of indus-
I * #
trial development has taken place only in the last
twenty years, since big traders and Muzaffarnagar city
grain and gur arhatis have become involved in the indus¬
trial sector. The new industrial and agricultural mar¬
keting policies of the government are mainly responsible
for encouraging ordinary traders and arhatis to enter
industry. (I will discuss this point in greater detail
in Chapter 4, when I describe the social backgrounds of
arhatis in the mandi. )
« r f
Since 1969, most of the private banks, which were
previously owned by wealthy people--many from the trad¬
ing castes— have been nationalised by the Central Gov¬
ernment. These banks now provide agricultural loans to
kisans, to landless labourers, and to industrialists at
lower rates of interest than would be provided on the
open market. The availability of low-interest government
ioans to people of Scheduled Castes is one important
factor influencing some of these people to abandon
village jajmani relationships. In 1986-87, there were
1^2 branches of these nationalised banks, 25 co-opera¬
tive bank branches, 6 land development banks, and 6 non-
nationalised commercial banks in the villages and towns
of Muzaffarnagar District (Statistical Magazine, 19871.
In summary, I have in this chapter tried to snow
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how in the colonical preiod agricultural production and
marketing facilities increased, but at the same time
several factors prevented kisans from moving rapidly
rrom a subsistence economy to a market economy. During
this period, people of Baniya castes become increasingly
involved in landholding and district administration.
Their landholdings increased at the expense of the
traditional landholding castes, who often became tenants
and debtors to these Baniyas. These new landholders, the
Baniyas, were not interested in investing capital in
agricultural; they were interested primarily in profits
from rent, trade, and money-lending. It was during the
colonical period that Baniyas became the most wealthy
and influential people in the district. 1 have explained
how, after independence, this situation changed. Land
went back to the traditional landholding castes, and the
influential status o£ the Baniya has declined in the
rural areas. In the last forty years, the majority of
Baniyas have migrated to the towns and have become
involved in trade and industry. Because of their tradi-
tional occupational status, entreprenurlal skills, and,
caste ideology, they dominate trading activities in
Muzaffarnagar city and other towns or the district.
CHAPTER THREE
NEGOTIATED MODELS OF V t LLAGE EXCHANGE
The kisans of Muzaffarnagar District exchange their
products with reterence to three different models or
exchange: a jajmani and kinship-based moral economy,
barter, and market exchange. These models of exchange
differ in the ritual and moral meanings assigned to them
by Irisans.From a kisans point of view, jajmani and
kinship exchanges are grounded in a ritualized produc¬
tion process and in moral values connected with izzat
t prestige) and social obligation; barter is grounded
partly in a moral economy(.and partly in matrket princi¬
ples; and their model of market exchange involves calcu¬
lations of profit and loss that are backgrounded in
their own understandings of jajmani and barter. Though
these three models are, from the kisans perspective,
distinct and defined with respect to widely divergent
values, in many contexts of village life these models
provide conflicting sets of expectations and may gener¬
ate dissension and disagreement among the parties to any
given exchange. I will in the following pages provide
many examples of such conflicts and negotiations that
are created when these culturally distinct models over¬
lap and are interwoven in actual practice.
The overlapping and negotiable nature of these
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models is not a new pnenomenon. Previous analysis of
jajmani relationships nave stressed their remoteness
from market exchange, yet it is likely that some aspects
of market exchange have exercised an influence on vil¬
lage social relationship for a very long time. Recent
social changes, however, have increased the relevancy of
marxet considerations and profit calculation in village
life. All kisans nonetheless invoke understandings of
jajmani relations in many situations, and when they
carry out agricultural rituals, these are concerned with
increase in production, social ooligation and social
prestige, and not with prorit.
Some Cultural Definitions of Land Agriculture
For an understanding of economic activities in any
society, it is necessary to take into account the cul¬
tural constructions (lodged in explicit statements,
metaphors, rituals ana so forth), the "local models"
iGuaeman 1986) in terms of which actors interpret their
own relationships ana behaviour, I discuss nere some
relevant cultural constructions in terms of which Muzaf-
farnagar kisans understand the various modes of econom¬
ic exchange in which they participate.
The kisans of Muzaffarnagar District do not see
tneir household economy as separate from the cash or
market economy. Nor do they use the term "economy". They
speak about the "economic conditions" <arthik dasha) and
about the "expenses of the household" (gharelu kharcna)
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ana the "expenses of agriculture" (kheti-badi ka khar-
ch5). They do not include their own labour or expenses
associatea with the input ot draught animals in calcula¬
tions of tne expenses of agriculture. They use the word
"capital" lpunji) only for their own cash and gold and
silver jewellery; they do not consider land as capital,
because market considerations have not fully penetrated
their relationship to the land they hold. Rarely does
any Kisan keep written accounts of his agricultural
expenses and profits.
In his analysis of the "cultural agronomy" or
Pakistani farmers, kurin (1983:283-94) described the way
in which these farmers see the process or crop produc¬
tion as analogous to different stages of human life,
they maxe metaphorical equations between seed and sperm,
soii and womo, irrigation water and mother's milk, and
fertilizer ana fooa.
For the Hindu kisans or Muzaffarnagar District,
iand is not simply an object for crop production, and it
is not simply related metaphorically to the human body,
it is also their "mother earth" (dharti mata) who
"feeds" and looks after them, as a mother looks arter
her children. The walls of the ghar (cattle pen and
men's sitting place) belonging to a Gujar family in the
village of Titron, for example, bear the following two
- ascriptions:
The earth is my mother, and I am her son,
The earth where 1 took birth, my mother, is greater
even than heaven.
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From another perspective important in western Uttar
Pradesn villages, land (bhumi) is worshipped under the
guise of the godling Bhumiya, "the one of the soil."
Khetrapal lor Khetpa1)--"protector of the fields".--is
another name of this deity. In some parts of Uttar
Pradesh, including Muzaffarnagar , Bhumiya is a male
-;odling, while in eastern U.P. it is a female deity.
Bhumiya is worshipped at a large village-wide annual
festival in the month of Savan, at the harvests, at the
birth or a male child, and the first milk of a cow is
offered to him.
In one indigenous classification of types of land
or soil (there is no differentiation between soil and
land in the local language); Kisans of Muzaffarnagar
District divide land into four categories: taktvar zamin
i "strong" or fertile land), dermiani zamin t"medium" or
average land), kamjor zamin ("weak" or less fertile
land) and banjar zamin (infertile land).
Kisans say that strong land needs less "diet"
(khurak) and gives greater yields than weak land. And if
the land is "fed" (khurak dena) very well or if a good
diet (i.e. water and fertilizer) is given to "her" she
wiii give good crops. She "eats" fertilizer and "drinks"
water. Kisans say that the fertility of the land, and
the generative power of the seed and "diet" are more
important than labour in the productive process. They
say that for crops and the fertility of the soil, rain-
ater is the most taktvar (strength-giving) water, next
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is canal water and river, and last is well water.
According to local understandings, compost ferti¬
lizer is better than chemical fertilizers for the land
because once the land is fed by compost fertilizer, it
has a sufficient diet for the next two years. In the
case of chemical fertilizers on the other hand, the land
gives more output, but fertilizer is required several
times in a year; and chemical fertilizers are thought to
carnage the natural fertility of the land. Also, food and
vegetables grown in chemically fertilized soil are
considered tasteless and unhealthy.
k'isans use the word "cutting" (katna) for harvest¬
ing. Cutting is not normally done at night because
kisans say that plants sleep at night and that it is not
right to disturb their sleep. They say that some crops
"pull out" Ikhinchana) more diet and strength from the
land then others, and make the land "weak" for the next
crop. Sugarcane for example is said to pull out more
diet and strength from the land than any other crop.
When crops are destroyed by over-feeding or lack of
proper diet, or because of natural calamity ie.g. flood,
drought, heavy rain), the crops are said to have died
\mar gavi). Also, when crops are destroyed in this way,
kisans frequently say that this is the result of the
actions <karma) of the individual, or the people or the
village or region, in this or previous lives. This
belief may be held both by those whose crops were de¬
stroyed and by those who witnessed or heard about the
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destruction.
With respect to tnese cultural constructions,
tnen--land as dharzi mata, land as Bhumiya, land as
possessing more or iess takat, and the intertwining or a
person's moral nature with that of the land--land is not
viewed simply as a source or profit or as an easily
transferrable commodity.
For identification and in everyday conversation,
kisans give individual names to each of their plots of
land. If a kisan acquires a plot from a man named Ram
Singh, for example, he land his descendents) might call
that plot ram singh waia khet, "the field of Ram Singh."
If there is a mango tree near a plot, it might be called
"mango tree field;" a field near a family ancestral
snrine is often called devata vala khet, "the field of
the ancestral deity." This individualization or the
land, and its integration into the history of a family,
aiso mitigates somewhat against its transformation into
an anonymous and saleable commodity. This is particular¬
ly true in the case of fieids in wnich ancestral shrines
a^e situated. Every kisan family in Muzaffarnagar Dis¬
trict maintains such shrines in their fields, and these
white-domed structures are seen everywhere as one walks
through the fields of any village. I was repeatedly told
oy Muzaffarnagar Kisans that a family would be extremely
hesitant to sell a rield in which a shrine is located, I
never came to know of such a case. But if this were to
occur, 1 was told, the new owner's rights to the land
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wouid be circumscribed by the tact that he would not be
empowered to destroy the shrine, and he would be com¬
pelled to allow the family to continue to maintain the
shrine and to make offerings there.
Issues or social prestige (izzat^also limit the
degree to which land is thought of as a commodity to be
sold for profit. From the point of view of others who
may evaluate the social prestige of a particular kisan,
it is or little importance how mucn prolit that kisan
makes or how much yield he receives from the land. The
most important consideration in this connection is the
^ize of his landhoiding. If a kisan sells even a very
small parcel of his land (no matter how great the prof¬
it I , he still loses considerable izzat. And at the time
or marriage arrangements, the most important factor
generally to be taken into account is the size of a
family's holdings, and not the profit they may extract
there from . Tekchand, for example, is a Gujar kisan who
holds the largest acreage in the village of Hathchoya.
He is heavily indebted, he manages his farm poorly, and
his prorit from his holdings is very low. But because or
his large holding, he receives a great deal of respect
in the village, particularly rrom service caste people.
In another case, the son of a Rajput kis&n of Kertu
village wanted to open an electrical shop in the city of
Muzaffarnagar. He asked his father, Nathu Singh, to sell
two bighas (about 2/5 of an acre) in order to finance
the cost. Despite the expectation of a high profit from
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such a shop, his father refused to sell the land, saying
that it was a question not just of losing the land, but
more importantly, of losing izzat in the village and
among their circle of relatives in the larger Rajput
community. But after the son threatened to separate from
the family if the land was not sold, the father agreed
to the sale. The father spoke to someone who he thought
might be in a position to purchase the land, but he did
not publicly spread the news that the land was to be put
up for sale, precisely because of the loss ot prestige
that was involved. Somehow, however, the people of his
lineage t kunba) came to know ot the proposed sale, and
they were angry at the fact that the offer to sell was
not made to them, because ot the very pervasive notion
that land should not be sold outside of the kunba. Two
men of his kunba offered the same price as the outside
purchaser, but they wanted to pay the full amount only
after one year. Nathu Singh was not happy with those
terms, because his son wanted the money for the shop
immediately, and so he sold the land to the first buyer.
A great deal of bitterness was thus created within the
kunba, over this issue ot whether land was to be treated
merely as a commodity to be sold for the greatest prof¬
it, or whether social ana more considerations should
have greater bearing than market considerations.
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Agricultural Distribution, Labour Arrangements, and the
Ritual Context of Crop Production
Some Genera J Considerations
Many aspects of agricultural production and distri¬
bution in rural Huzaffarnagar are embedded in an elabo¬
rate set of ritual considerations. While many of these
considerations are still of great importance to kisans
and their families, others are giving way in the face of
increasing urban influences upon consumption patterns
and education and employment opportunities, and an
increasing orientation towards the market economy. Vet
these ritual considerations still comprise an important
part of the cultural model in terms of which kisans
construct an understanding of their own social world. In
the paragraphs that follow, I describe several of these
sets of ritual considerations and the way in which tney
are interwoven with typical patterns of labour recruit¬
ment and crop distribution, and analyze the way in which
this "traditional" cultural model is often contested and
negotiated in village life, and the ways in which con¬
flicts are often generated when this model is juxtaposed
with market considerations.
Whereas Baniya arhatis perform a number of rituals
for financial gain (see Chapter 5), Hindu kisans perform
many rituals with the goal of increasing agricultural
production, to enable them to feed their families and to
give appropriate gifts to their kin (particularly mar¬
ried daughters and sisters), neighbours, and the kamins
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who are attached to them in jajmani relationships. In
other words, a Baniya arhati performs rituals primarily
t t
with the goal of accumulating wealth, while a kisan
pertorms rituals with the goal of increasing the means
of sharing or distributing what he has produced.
Kisans speak of the go a Indra as the lord of the
rains, who controls the amount and timing of the rain.
Crooke (1094:44) noted this in the late nineteenth
century.
In the Muzaffarnagar district if rain falls they
Ikisanl worship Raja lndra and read the story of
the Megha Raja, or the lord of the rain. In his
name they give alms to the poor and release a young
Dull or buffalo. Crushed grain is cooked on the
edge of a tank in his honour and in the name of the
rain god Khwaja Khizer Ca Muslim saint], and some
offering is made to Bhumiya, the lord of the
soil.
Nowadays, women sing songs-in praise of the god
lndra on certain festive occasions, particularly at the
Tij festival in the month of Savan(August) and request a
good rainy season for the crops. But in other ordinary
circumstances, lndra is not worshipped for rain. People
worship this deity and give dart to Brahmans and the poor
oniy when there is a severe flood or drought.
When a kisan has a very good crop in his field and
he fears that it might be affected by evil-spirits and
tne evil-eye, he hangs a black vessel or pot on a stick
in the field for its protection. When a kisan buys a new
agricultural machine, particularly a tractor, or cattle,
he performs a muhurat ritual for these things before
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using them, with the idea that after the muhurat ritual
these things will increase production and will bring
prosperity to the family. Some milk from the first milk
of cows and female buffaloes is offered to the family's
ancestral deities and to Bhumiya. The rest of the milk
is boiled, and this milk (khis, as it is called), is
distributed to the family Brahman priest, and then to
neighbours and kinsmen, with the belief that this will
increase the milk and keep the cattle well. Women of
kisan families sometimes sing songs as they sit compan-
ionaDle together and spin cotton, and on certain ritual
occasions, for the bountiiuIness of the fields and the
cattle. Once when I went to the village of Pura during
my fieldwork, for example, 1 observed the women of a
Tyagi kisan family spinning cotton thread at a spinning
wheel Icharka) in the courtyard, and singing a folk
song, the first lines of which were as follows:
Just as long as 1 spin the thread on the spinning
wheel may that be the length of the sugarcane in
our fields.
In the villages of Muzaffarnagar District, 1 ob¬
served that most production rituals are concerned with
the wheat, rice, and sugarcane crops, the main crops
grown in the district for both domestic consumption and
sale in the market. In the past, kisans considered 3ome
particular days inauspicious for ploughing. For example,
the nag panchami or snake festival day in the month of
Savan, and the fifteenth day of the month of Karttik,
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and certain day of every luner month when the earth is
said to s 1 eep. Kisans used to consult their family Brah¬
man priest to ascertain auspicious days for sowing,
planting, and beginning the ploughing. Many kisans still
will not start ploughing on the day of nag panchami. and
they consider Tuesday an auspicious day for any agricul¬
tural work.
Vheat and Rica Crops
The process of wheat sowing does not require a
kisan to hire labour or to ask for help from his neigh¬
bours. But when the crop is ripe in April, a kisan needs
labourers for harvesting. He normally obtains these
laoourers from his own village, but sometimes they may
also come from nearby villages. These labourers for
wtieat harvesting are called lava ("Drought"). Most lava
workers are landless persons who perform this work
regardless of caste considerations. Even Brahmans may
work in this way..This is because wheat is an essential
food commodity for every household's daily consumption
in western Uttar Pradesh, and payment for wheat harvest¬
ing is in the form of wheat. Landles people are very
eager to work in this way, even if they are emoloyed for
wages in a city. Once when 1 was interviewing the Dis¬
trict Agricultural Officer in his office, for example,
his peon came in and asked the officer to grant him
seven days' leave, so that he might return to his native
village and harvest the whest crop as a Java worker. The
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officer was reluctant to grant the leave because of a
heavy work-1oad in the office, but the peon insisted,
saying that he must return to the village, because he
wanted to obtain wheat tor his family. This peon, like
many daily wage-labourers, rickshaw-pullers and un¬
skilled factory workers, works each year in this way in
his village, in order to obtain wheat to feed his fami¬
ly. This is the only occasion on which city workers
usually want to return to their villages to work. This
attitude reflects a past situation in which wheat prices
fluctuated widely, and a city worker could not be as¬
sured that his daily wages would be sufficient to pro¬
vide wheat for his family in the event of a dramatic
price increase. This attitude that wheat should be
obtained directly persists today, even though wheat
prices have stabilized through government intervention.
In the wheat fields, each lava worker receives one
bundle of wheat (a puli) for every twenty to twenty-five
bundles he or she harvests. The bundles of wheat that a
labourer receives as his payment are called lai. In this
harvesting work, the poor, women, and landless people
from all castes do the same work together and receive
equal payments for work performed.
Sukhbir Singh, a Rajput kisan from the village of
Bhatu, told me of the following incident:
In the past there was no problem in obtaining lava
workers. Now, year by year it is becoming more
difficult to get lava workers for the wheat har¬
vest. In the past, a kisans used to distribute the
bundles or wheat to the workers himseif, but nowa-
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days the workers want to select their own Bundles.
And usually they make bigger bundles for them¬
selves, and this creates disputes. Last year when I
wanted to give two Chamars their 1 ai, they refused,
saying that they wanted to pick up their bundles
themselves. 1 objected and told them that this was
unfair, because they had made those bundles bigger
than the others. I told them that if they had made
all bundles of equal size, 1 wouldn't mind if they
picked up their own bundles. Ue argued for a while,
and they said that they wouldn't come to my fields
again. I said alright, take your bundles. Because
of this problem, that other kisans too nave been
facing, this year 1 have given the wheat harvesting
work out on a contracting basis to a Chamar family.
1 give them twenty kilograms of wheat for every
bigha that is harvested and threshed, and 1 also
give the straw from that twenty kilograms.
I found that a number of other kisans nave also
switched to this system, because of a shortage of labour
and because of the sort of demands that Sukhbir Sing's
workers made. Also, 1 noted that while in the past,
kisan families never did such harvesting work them¬
selves, (especially Gujar, Rajput and Jat kisans) some
kisan families have begun to do the harvesting work
themse1ves.
At the end of the harvesting, some wheat plants
are left unharvested in the east corner of each field.
This is part of a ritual called badha do ("increase"),
thought to increase the next year's crop. The kamins who
are attached to a kisan's family in jajmani relation-
snips, and even some who are not attached to him, visit
the fields during the harvest to receive a "handful"
lmutti) of unthreshed wheat. This rite is called "giving
the handful," mutthi dena. (See Raheja 1986:162-169).
Some kisans told me that in the past people from the Dom
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(drummer) caste la very low-ranked caste) used to go to
the fields with their drums, beating them and chanting
words in praise of the kisans, of this sort: "You are
our great jajman. You are a great donor. May god in¬
crease your grain." The kisans would give a handful of
wheat to each Dom who visited the fields with the idea
that such giving increases the amount of grain that is
harvested.
Regarding the rice crop, the work of transplanting
the seedlings requires a great deal of labour. There¬
fore, either a kisan hires daily wage labourers Imazdur)
who are paid in cash, or he can give his rice fields on
a contract to a person (normally a landless man from a
amin caste) who will manage all the labour and look
after the crop. According to their contract (called
batai, to share or divide), the contractor shares usual¬
ly one-third of the total expenses and gets one-third
share from the total amount of the rice that is harvest¬
ed. Higher caste people do not work as labourers in a
rice field. When 1 asked some kisans why that was so,
they said that it is a job of kamin caste people but
they did not give any further explanation.
The main ritual connected with the narvesting of
the rice and wheat crops is called chhaj lagana. This
ritual is performed when the harvesting, threshing and
winnowing of the crop have been completed.
The threshing and winnowing of the harvested grain
is done by the kisan himself, with the help of his
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annually contracted agricultural labourers (hali, from
haJ, plough), and sometimes, daily wage labourers Imaz-
aurs). These labourers are paid in cash and grain ac¬
cording to their contracts. After threshing and winnow¬
ing the harvested grain, the kisan sweeps up with an
unused broom a small space in the field and spreads cow
dung there to purify the space. He gathers the grain
tnere into a pile. Sometimes the kisan will ask a vil¬
lage Baniya shopkeeper to weigh the grain, but more
often, nowadays, he does the weighing himself. Generally
a Baniya does not have the courage to refuse to provide
this service to a dominant caste kisan. A Baniya may or
may not accept payment for this service, payment which
normally would be a portion of the grain that is
weighed.
Before weighing the grain, the kisan or the person
who will do the weighing performs the ritual of chhaj
langa on behalf of the kisan. First of all, a chhaj
iwinnowing basket) is placed at the south end of the
pile of grain, ana facing north, the man picks up the
chhaj with his right hand, turns it on its side, and
takes it around the circular pile in a clockwise direc¬
tion, marking the pile with small indentations with tne
chhaj as he walks. This is repeated in a counter-clock¬
wise direction, and finally clockwise once again. The
marks of the first circling are made at the bottom of
the pile. The chhaj is once again placed at the south of
the pile. Then the kisan faces north and performs the
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rite of ahoke mama with a handful of grain. Then the
grain pile is circled in a reverse way, first at the
top, then in the middle, and finally around the bottom.
Then the man returns to the south of the pile and again
does dhok mama. He then fills the chhaj with grain and
places it at the north of the pile. The mouth of the
chhaj should face east, the auspicious direction. This
chhaj filled with grain is kept there until the weighing
of the grain in the pile is completed. The grain from
tne chhaj is given later to the family Brahman priest,
as a prestation termed savadi. This savadj prestation
should never be weighed, calculated, or haggled over.
Aisans offer this savadi gift to the Brahman priest with
the idea that the harvest will be auspicious and bounti¬
ful and that any 1 nausp1ciousness in the grain harvest
will oe transferred to the priest in the grain that is
given. iSee ftaheja 1988a:163 for a detailed description
of tnis ritual).
Before the chhaj lagana ritual is performed ana tne
savadi given, a kisanls family neither consumes the
newiy-harvestea grain nor distributes it to anyone,
because of the necessity of first removing the mauspi-
riousness from the grain that it is be eaten or distrib¬
uted.
When the weighing of the grain is being carried
out, after tne ritual has been performed, a small amount
of grain is left unweighed for distribution among those
people who are present, as a gift called per. Children
y i
particularly enjoy receiving per at this time; tney
generally take this handful of grain to the shop of a
village Baniya, and excnange it tor some sweets or
biscuits, or perhaps a rew coins. Once when 1 observed
tne giving of per in the village of Hatchoya, 1 asked a
Gujar kisan there why he was distributing per. He re¬
plied that "1 am giving per for my own happiness. God
has given this grain to me and by sharing and distribut¬
ing this grain, god will give me more grain in the
future. 'Generosity in the giving of per is expected,
and if a kisan does not give generously, he may be
derided and called kanjus ("miser"). Sometimes a kisan*s
own ha Jis also expect to receive per, and it a kisan
oaiks at this, they may reel bitterness towards him.
In the past, up until aoout ten years ago, the
ritual of chhaj Jagana, ano the suosequent grain distri-
Dution, was performed by nearly all kisSns of Muzaftar-
nagar District at the wheat harvest. Now that most wheat
threshing is carried out by machine, the grain is no
longer gathered into heaps on the threshing floor. It is
taken in sacks directly to the mangli or government wheat
purchasing centres, and to the home or the kisan tor
consumption, distribution and for storage for future
sales in mandis. And so the ritual of marking the grain
heaps with the winnowing basket has fallen into disuse
in recent years. (But even when the ritual of chhaj
iagana is not performed, the savadi prestation is still
given to the Brahman priest by most kisans). But because
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machines for threshing rice are unavailable, the ritual
is still regularly performed at the rice harvest by most
kisans.
After the rice or wheat grain has been brought into
tne house in the village, the wife of the kisan goes
with the wife of the family's Brahman priest to the
shrines of the family ancestral deities in the fields,
ana to the shrine of Khetpal, the protector of the
village fields. There they offer some cooked food made
from the new rice or wheat crop, and gifts of food are
given to the Brahman.
After performing all the rituals related to the
fields and the grain, the kisan distributes a large
amount of grain to his annually contracted agricultural
iaoourers ihalis) and to the people of the kamin service
castes attached to his family in jajmani relationships.
Tnis payment of grain is called phaslanaifrom phasal,
crop) whether it is given to a haJi or to a kamin. This
pnasiana is given to the kamins specifically for tne
caste related services they have provided to the kisan's
family during the year le.g. to the Barber for shaving
ana hair-cutting, to the Washerman for washing clothes,
to the Ironsmith for repairing ploughs, and so forth).
This phasJana payment is completely separate from the
prestations made by kisans to kamins for performing
specifically ritual services at life-cycle and calendri-
cal rites during the year.
Asaram, a prosperous Gujar kisan in the village of
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Hathchoya, gives the following amounts to those attached
to him in jajtnani relationships. To the Sweeper, he
gives 100 kg. of wheat. 100 kg. of rice, 20 kg. of
unrefined sugar, and one meal every day. The Barber, the
Blacksmith, and the Carpenter each receive 40 kg. of
wheat, 40 kg. of rice and 10 kg. of sugar. Until very
recently. Asaram gave phaslana to the Washerman, 40 kg.
of rice, 40 kg. of wheat, and 10 kg. of sugar. Now that
polyester fabrics have replaced so much of the tradi¬
tional cotton clothing, and these are so easy to care
for at home, Asaram no longer gives many clothes for
washing to the Washerman, and so he does not give phas¬
lana for that work. If he does send some items to the
Washerman, he now pays in cash according to the amount
of work performed. The Washerman of Hatchoya are also
happy with this arrangement: several young men of this
caste now work at dry-cleaning shops in the nearby towns
of Kacchi Garhi and yn, and have little time or inclina¬
tion for much work in the village. Some older men do
however still wash clothes by beating them against rocks
at the irrigation canai.
The notion of "shares" (hissa) of the harvest is
frequently invoked in talk about jajmani relationships
and phaslana payments in Muzaffarnagar District (See
Raheja 1988a: 205), and kisans frequently say that it
is their moral duty to provide food for their kamins,
and the moral duty of the kamin tices to
them. These are important notions embedded in the model
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that kisans and kamins have ot their own relationships
within the village.
Although this notion or moral duty in the appor¬
tioning of 'shares" of the wheat and rice harvests is a
significant component ot this cultural model, it is not
an uncontested one. Drawing upon my fieldwork in a
number of Muzaffarnagar villages, I provide here several
examples of the way in which conflicts arise precisely
because of such contestations.
The following incident was related to me by Phul
Sfcingh, a man of the Chuda I sweeper i caste. Ulhen a son
was Qorn in the family of Asaram, Phul Singh's jajman
iwnose phaslana payments were described above;, the
family offered eleven rupees and five kg. of unrefined
sugar to Phui Singh according to their understanding of
the customary prestations made to kamins on this occa¬
sion, The general cultural understanding of these life-
cycle prestations is that they are not to be negotiated
and calculated. Phul Singh however refused to accept
these items. He demanded instead fifty-one rupees, one
woolen blanket and ten kg. of rice. The jajman family
refused this request . But the Chuda man pressed his
case, insisting that the Gujar family was not a poor
one, that he had a right to expect more from a wealthy
iajman, and further, that the work he was expected to
perform had increased over the last year. After an
argument, Phul Singh agreed to accept twenty-one rupees,
five kg. of sugar and five kg. of rice, with the under-
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standing that he would be given a blanket at the time of
the next phaslana payments. When that time came, Phul
Singh reminded Asaram about the blanket. But Asaram was
unwilling to fulfill his promise. Another argument
ensued, and Phul Singh threatened to break his jajmani
relationship with Asaram's family. He refused to work
for the family for about one week, until finally Asaram
gave him the blanket and asked him to resume his work.
Yashpal Singh, another kisan from the same village,
'old me of the following incident. He took his tractor-
trolley to his Blacksmith for repair. The repair was
carried out and the Blacksmith did not ask for any
compensation, and Yashpal Singh assumed that this work
was part of the Blacksmith's usual responsibilities, for
which he would be compensated with the normal phaslana
payment. When the time for harvest arrived and Yashpal
Singh gave him phaslana, the Blacksmith demanded an
additional cash payment for the repair of the tractor-
trolley, arguing that such equipment is a new innovation
and that this work is not to be considered a part of
jajmani services. Yashpal was at first unwilling, but he
finally paid the Blacksmith in cash for the repair. A
few weeks later, the Blacksmith went to Yashpah's fields
and asked him for a bundle of fodder, as he often had in
the past. But this time, Yashpal told him that he had a
shortage of fodder, and that in any case, he was not
bound to give fodder in their jajmani relationship. When
Yashpal recounted this story to me, he said that if the
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3 Iacksraith was going to "speak the market language"
(bazaaru jaban bolna) Ci.e. a language of calculation and
of money] in the case of the trolley repair, then he,
Yashpal, would not consider it his moral obligation to
supply the fodder, and he would "speak the market lan¬
guage" as well.
Another event was described to me by a Jat kisan
family in the village of Bhansi. Their Sweeper women,
they said, had a habit of demanding new saris at life-
cycle rituals. And further, she demanded more than her
"customary" share of the cow-dung cakes she made for the
family. The Jat family reported that they grew impatient
with these demands, and they severed the jajmani rela¬
tionship with the Sweeper woman. Now, they said, they
manage the work of making cow-dung cakes themselves.
Rafiq, a Muslim Washerman working in a dry-cleaning
shop in the town of Khatauli I in Muzaffarnagar
District), recounted the following story to me. Until a
year before, he had been washing clothes in his village
of Rampur Nagli, within jajmani relationships. Many
kisans, he said, had not increased his phasJana payments
for a number of years, despite the fact that he was now
using costly washing powder, and despite the fact that
many of the jajman families had grown and the number of
clothes to be washed had increased. Rafiq said that it
had grown increasingly difficult for him to feed his
family, and so he left the village and the jajmani
relationship, and moved to the town to take up paid
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emp 1 oymerit.
Isam Singh ana Rakam Singh are two Drothers, Brah¬
man kisans in the village of Jafarpur. When their joint
household was divided, the Sweepers and Barbers who were
attached to their family in jajmSni relationships de¬
manded from each household the same phaslana payments
that they had previously received from the single undi-
•ided household. The two brothers argued that the work
was not greater than it had been in the undivided house¬
hold, and that they should each, then, pay only half or
the total they had paid in the past. This dispute was
resolved with an agreement that the Sweepers and the
Barbers should receive approximately 70% of the original
total from each brother's household, thus increasing
their compensation by 40% following the division of the
household.
In the final case I will relate, Prithvi Singh, a
kisart from the village of Hathchoya, asked this Barber
to shave his sons using shaving cream and a safety
razor, instead of simply using water and an ordinary
razor. The Barber agreed to do this, but he charged an
additional cash fee for this kind of service. When the
Barber's son was about to be married, he went to Prithvi
Singh to ask if he could use his tractor-trolley to
transport the marriage party to the bride's village.
Prithvi Singh told me that he at first refused this
request, saying that the trolley was being used every
day in that season to transport sugarcane to the supply
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centre in tne nearby village of Titron. He tnen suggest¬
ed to the Barber that perhaps he could use the tractor-
trolley of another kisan in Hathchoya. But the barber
said to Prithvi Singh "you are my jajman and 1 am at¬
tached to you and not those other kisans, and so I have
to come to you and not to them when 1 have troubles and
difficulties." Prithvi Singh agreed with the Barber's
assessment of the moral obligations of a jajman, but he
pointed out to the Barber that if cash payments could be
demanded for a small service like providing shaving
cream, then the jajman is also entitled to calculate the
costs of providing fuel for the tractor and so forth
when he lends it to his kamin. Prithvi Singh finally did
provide the tractor-troI 1ey to his Barber, because, as
he told me, he somehow still felt a moral obligation to
his kamins.
in all of these cases, d iscord arises in jajmani
relationships when conflicting expectations are brought
to bear by jajmans and kamins in a given situation. The
examples of Yashpal Singh and Prithvi Singn are particu¬
larly interesting because they illustrate the striking
way in which one party in the relationship may insist
enacting on the basis of "traditional" moral impera¬
tives, while the other may insist that some aspect of
the relationship be grounded in market considerations.
It is also striking that these may not be fixed posi¬
tions; a kamin for example may in some contexts invoke
the "traditional* jajmani principles while in another he
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may invoke the principles of tne market.
Sugarcane
In the beginning of the twentieth century, Nevill
11904:41) wrote that in Meerut District a number of
ceremonies were connected with the sugarcane crop. For
example, kisans used to observe the direction of the
wind at the time of sowing. This was ascertained either
by dropping dust from an eminence or by elevating a rag
on a bamboo rod. Until the wind was seen to be favour¬
able the planting process was not begun. Another ceremo¬
ny was connected with the first ploughing, involving
offerings of turmeric ana rice to a brahman. Some kisans
told me that in the past they used to perform a ritual
called gyas on the eleventh day after the festival of
Diva I i. In this ritual, some sugarcane plants standing
in the field were worshipped, and then some stalks of
cane were distributed, with the belief that this would
increase the crop. After interviewing many kisans in the
istrict, however, 1 found that most no longer perform
rituals connected with the planting of the sugarcane
crop or the sowing of other crops.
in the months of March and April, a great deal of
additional labour is required by kisans for the planting
of sugarcane. A kisan generally obtains this labour
tnrough reciprocal exchange (bad 1 a) with the men with
whom he has friendly relationships in nis village,
typically the men of his own lineage (kunbaJ or his own
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neighbourhood. Sometimes men of different castes may
also cooperate in this way. The kisan may ask the men to
bring their own agricultural implements, tractors and
oxen for ploughing. These cooperative arrangements are
called dangvara. Each day during this cooperative plant¬
ing, the kisan's family provides a meal for each of the
men who come to help.
Although the sugarcane crop is ready tor harvesting
in October, it is considered inauspicious to harvest it
or to use any of it before the festival of Godhan ("Cow
Wealth") or Govardhan (the name of a mountain in Mathura
District associated with the god Krishna), kisans com¬
pare this festival with Divali, saying that while Godhan
is a festival for them, Divali is a festival for Ba-
niyas. The festival of Godhan is the most important
ritual associated with the sugarcane crop, ana it is
celebrated by all kisan families of western Utter Pra¬
desh.
On the day of the Godhan festival, kisans' wives
draw an outline of the Godhan deity on the floor of
their courtyards. The figure is picked out with fresh
cow dung and it is filled in with lines of wheat flour
and turmeric powder. Small cow dung representations of
the family cattle and their cowherd boy (baldi) are
placed within the outline. Fresh cow dung cakes desco-
rated with cotton flowers on sticks are placed around
the figure of Godhan, and several small clay disnes
containing puffed rice Ikhil) are placed at the corners.
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In the evening of the Godhan festival, cattle are
given a bath and decorated with henna paste. When all of
the men of the family return from the fields, earthen
lamps tilled with mustard oil are placed around the
Godhan figure. A bundle of sugarcane stalks, the first
to be harvested, are placed inside the outline, along
with the family's most important household and agricul¬
tural implements. A tray containing some tlour, unre¬
fined sugar, a few coins, and a meals of rice pudding,
rice and lentils is also put on the ground near the feet
of the Godhan figure. All the men of the coins. Then the
family's annually contracted agricultural labourers are
invited to a meaI.
In the morning of the next day, the items on the
tray are given as pujapa to the family's cowherd. This
is given for the protection of the household and the
agricultural implements that were placed within the
Godhan figure, and to remove 1nauspiciousness from the
sugarcane crop. After this pujapa is given to the baldi,
the sugarcane crop may be harvested and consumed. (See
Raheja 1988a.)
When a kisan is ready to harvest one of his sugar¬
cane fields, he usually calls his Sweeper or Dom to
announce in the village the day of the harvesting and
the location of the field. The Sweeper or Dom walks
through the village with his drum, asking people, on
behalf of the kisan, to participate in the harvesting
process lchhoi lagana) in such-and-such a field at such-
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ana-such a time. The people who come tor the chhol are
not paid in cash by the kisans. They receive instead the
green tips ot the sugarcane stalks to be used as rodder,
and by custom, a few stalks of the cane as well. Those
peopie who have cattle but little or no land, and who
are in need of fodder, go to participate in the sugar¬
cane narvest, regardless ot their caste status. These
people who provide their labour to the kisAn in return
for the todder are called chholas.
In the last few years, an important change has
begun to occur in the way sugarcane is harvested in
Muzaffarnagar District. Some kisans (mainly those with
large holdings) have started to turn over the harvesting
work to contractors, who are generally landless people
rrom service castes. These small-scale contractors
obtain laoour from among their own kin networks. They
receive from the kisan (during the period or my field
work) three rupees per quintal of harvested sugarcane,
along with one-fifth ot the fodder from the cane. 1
asked Roshan Singh a kiskSn from the village of Hatchoya
who has been giving his harvesting work on contract for
the last three years, about these arrangements. He told
me why he had abandoned the customary way or obtaining
harvest labour. First, he said, when the chholas he had
formerly engaged would cut the green tips from the
stalks, they would cut several segments of the cane
along with it, and in this way his own yield was being
reduced. But contractors are paid by the weight of cane
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tney cut, and so it is not in their own interest to
remove segments or cane along with the green tips.
Secondly, Roshan Singh has begun to calculate the losses
he suffered when the workers took the customary stalks
of cane from his fields, and this loss too had begun to
be tallied against the continuation of the traditional
practice. Thirdly, when a kisan receives a bond from s
sugar factory for his cane, he is obligated to deliver
the cane to the factory on a certain day, and if he does
not do so, he loses the bond and the factory may not
accept from him the amount of sugarcane that was due on
that day. But when many chhols are being carried out in
the village at the same time, it is sometimes hard for a
Kisan to obtain enough labour on a given day to meet the
deadline. Contractors, on the other hand, as Roshan
Singh explained, can be made responsible to cut the cane
in time to meet the factory deadline, and they are also
responsible, in like chhoJas, to load the bundles of
cane onto the tractor-tro11eys or buffalo carts. This
detailed sort of calculation of profit and loss repre¬
sents an increasing market orientation on the part of
Muzaffarnagar kisans.
Approximately one-half of the sugarcane processing
in the district is carried out in five large factories,
and the rest of the cane is converted into various
unrefined sugar products at the crushers, kohius and
saiphars found in the villages. Owners of the smaller
ko£lnjs, wno generally come from Hindu and Muslim service
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castes, buy cane from kisans within the village in
which the ko&ku is located. Much of the labour required
to process the cane at a kakku is obtained from within
the kin network or the owner or the kod^u operator.
Owners of the larger crushers and salphars are wealthy
kisans or Baniya traders rrom nearby towns, and labour¬
ers often come from Jhinvar (Water-carrier), Chamar
iLeather-worker), and lower Muslim castes. These labour¬
ers are hired on a contract basis for the sugarcane
processing season, and they are paid in casn. While
people of these castes are attached to these same kisans
in hereditary jajmani relationships that limit the
operation of market principles in some contexts of
village social life, in this instance the contractual
relationship between owner and labourer is governed by
market considerations. Thus both market and non-market
relationships are found within the village, and the
shift between the two is often observable between th#
same sets of actors.
Sometimes market and non-market considerations are
not easily separable in the village. While owners of
kohJus and saJphars would expect to be able to purchase
cane from kisans on the basis of kin ties, a kisan is
often reluctant, to sell cane to a relative if a better
price can be obtained elsewhere. Such conflicting expec¬
tations about the appropriateness of invoking market
considerations may provoke strains and tension within
relationships. Several years ago, tor example, Vir
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Singh, a wealthy Gujar kisan , oegan to operate a sal¬
phar in the Muzatfarnagar village of Phunsgarh in which
he was a landholder. He expected that his kinsmen from
surrounding villages would sell their cane to him. But
<:hen he offered a lower price than other salphars and
kohlus, his kinsmen sold their cane elsewhere. This
situation created bitterness within these relationships,
oecause of conflicting assumptions about the proper
connection between kin ties and market calculation.
Wherever the cane is processed, a muhurat ritual
is performed before the processing Degins. After the
ritual is performed, some food, money, and some of the
new sugarcane products are given as pujap'h to the fami¬
ly's Brahman priest. 1 was told by a Rajput kisan who
owns a salphar that this transfers 1nauspiciousness
from the cane-crushing machinery to the Brahman, pro¬
tects the machine from hindrances ibaaha), and increases
the yield of sugar products. From the first production,
some is distributed as prasaa among the people wno are
present at the muhurat ceremony; this prestation is
caiied malai. When the sugar production is completed,
and the kohiu or salphar is being closed, on that day
sugarcane juice is distributed to people of all service
castes in the vicinity.
When a kisSn has Drought grain and sugarcane
roducts from the fields, performed the necessary ritu¬
als and given phaslana and other prestations to nis
kamins and halis, he and his family members start to
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exchange their products with peddlers and petty shop-
Keepers in the viiiage, in order to acquire items tor
the household's daily use. They keep enough grain,
sugar, and other products tor seed and consumption, and
then if there is a surplus, they can either store it for
future sales, or they can go immediately to the manai or
to the government marketing agencies to sell the surplus
for cash. A discussion of the types of kisans who are
able to produce, store, or sell surplus grain or sugar-
will be given in Chapter Six.
In this chapter, 1 have'presented a discussion of
some of the cultural models in terms of which Muzarfar-
nagar District kisans characterize the production and
excnange, within the village, or wheat, rice, and sugar¬
cane. These models are grounded in distinct cultural
presuppositions about the naturel of village social
life. When they are differentially invoked by actors in
a given context, the meaning or the social relationship
in which they are involved maybe contested or renegoti¬
ated. It can be seen that an increasingly pervasive lan¬
guage of market relations (bazaarl jaban, in the local
idiom) has significantly increased the instance or such
conflicts in the recent past. At the same time, the
economic significance of the ritual exchange or agricul-
|
tura1 products has .dec 1ined, and the importance, for ki-
.





THE MU2AFFARN AGAR MAN P. I
This chapter provides a general description of the
markets of Muzaftarnagar District, loci of the extra-
village economic relations into which kisSns enter
when they sell their surplus agricultural products
or maKe cash purchases. The primary focus of this chap¬
ter will be the social organization or the Muzaffarnagar
sugarcane mancji itself, that is, the relationships among
the three main groups of people who work there: the
arhatis, munims, and palledars. In this discussion, 1
suggest that an understanding of the social background
of the arhatis, the bases upon which arhat is recruit
a 4 • *
employees and of the nature of the persisting ties
between employer and employee essential to an under¬
standing or marketing processes in the mandi.
Market Organization of Muzaffarnagar District
Many types of markets exist in Muzaffarnagar city
and in other towns or the District. There are weekly
markets ipaiths), permanent retail shopping areas
^ bazaars > , and permanent wholesale markets 1 mand^is i . A
number of religious and non-re 1igious fairs (melas) also
function as temporary oazaars in Muzaffarnagar District.





2 Shiv chouk bazaar
3 Nai-mandi bazaar
^ Iron mandi (Lohia bazaar)
5 Pttiaes & patatoea mandi (Aloo & dal mandi)
c Fish & meat mandi
? Fruit and vegetables mandi (sabzi mandi)
8 Timber & fodder mandi
I. Sugarcane.products and grain mandi ( Naveen mandi sthal)






entertainment, for the fulfillment of religious goals,
ana for Duying ana selling. Not only do local village
artisans and town traders visit these fairs to sell
their products, but traders also come from different
parts of the country as well.
Every town ana some big villages in the District
have their own special day for the pai^hs (weekly mar¬
kets) where village artisans, itinerant traders and
local traders go to sell their products. At some paiths,
particularly cattle paiths, buyers and sellers also
visit from surrounding villages, and two types of trad¬
ers ibuyers and sellers of goods) attend. Most of the
paiths include both wholesale and retail business. Some
paiths specialize in one particular item, while others
are more general. Bargaining and haggling are important
aspects of buying ana selling at paiths and melas. Most
of the paiths and melas are administered by local semi-
government administrative bodies who also collect mar¬
keting taxes from the traders. Arhatis of the Muzaffar-
nagar mandi do not play any role in these pai^hs and
meias, but the kisans who sell to them in the mandi also
buy and sometimes sell in these weekly markets and
fairs.
in Muzaffarnagar city there are several bazaars
(permanent general shopping areas), but two are consid¬
ered to be the main bazaars of the city. (See Map 3. )
One is in the nai mandi area in the eastern part of the
city, and the other, called shiv chauk bazaar, is in the
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renter of the city. This bazaar comprises about one
square km. around the shiv chauk. (Again , see Map.
3).The orficiai closing day for the nai mandi bazaar is
Monday, and Tuesday for the shiv chauk bazaar. Different
closing days allow the local people to shop every day of
the week. Within the city there are several types of
manais iwnoiesale market places) and specialized ba¬
zaars.
Usually a manai deals in one particular item,
though tnis is not always the case. At present, the
following important mandis exist in Muzaffarnagar city:
one for pulses and potatoes, one for iron, two for
fish and meat, three for fruits and vegetables, one for
timber and fodder, and one for sugarcane products and
grains. (See Map 3.) It is this last mandi that is the
subject of investigation of the present study. This
mandi is called naveen manai iNaveen = new) but for the
• 9
sake of convenience, I shall refer to it as "the Muzaf-
farnagar mandi* or just "the mandi" in this thesis.
Until 1981-82 the nai mandi, alongside the railway line,
was the main sugarcane products mandi, but it was closed
>-y the State Government and all cane products trade and
trading firms Iarhats) were moved to the Muzaffarnagar
mandi (i.e. the naveen mandi). It was founded by the
State government in 1976 but only became operative in
1982.
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MAP4 . THE MUZAFFARNAGAR MANDI
Not to scale
£3
B - Bank P - Police st ation
T - Tea shop C - Goldstorage
P**"""*] - Adats "FG- - Farmers guesthouse
RS - Retail shops
AP - Auction platform
CD - Cattle shed W- Warehouse
CP - Check post
D1 - DAPM Committee office
D2 - DAPM construction dep^
The Physical Location of the Mandi
The Muzaftarnagar mandi is situated on the bank of
a tributary (rajbaha) of the Gangas canal, on the east¬
ern boundary of the city. It is about three kms. from
the center of this city and it comprises an area of
about eighty acres of land surrounded by a brick wall
with four gates. In the precinct of the mandi, arhats
(business stalls) are situated in an orderly arrangement
of about ten lines. All arhats are similar in their
physical size and architecture. (See Map 4.) An arhat
consists of a veranda, a small enclosed room which is
ised as an office where the Strhati and his munim
(trader's business clerk) sit and deal with clients, a
guest-room or private room just beyond the office, a








Figure Is The Physical Structure of an Arhat
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These arhats are allocated on a monthly rental
» m
basis by a committee of the State government, the DAPM
(District Agricultural Production Mandi Committee).
This committee is also known in Hindi as the Zila Krishi
Utpadan Mandi Samiti. So the overall spatial organiza¬
tion of the mandi does not reflect prior social rela¬
tionships among the arhatis. when this mandi first
began, first preference was given to those arhatis who
had their businesses and arhats in the nai mandi.
In the precinct of the mandi, there are two na¬
tionalized commercial banks that provide banking facili¬
ties for the arhatis. There is also a semi-government
non-commercial cooperative bank that is used mainly by
the kisans who come to the mandi. There is a police sub-
Station, a government fertilizer shop, a guest-house for
kisans (which to date has not been used by them), one
central government and two State government warehouses,
a State government cold store (where arhatis keep their
stock of gur). Several cattle sheds, five auction plat¬
forms, a few tea and refreshment shops, several general
retail merchant shops (near the south gate of the
mandi), and two office buildings of the DAPM
committee--one office for construction and maintenance
work, and one for administrative and tax collection
purposes. (See map <+.) All business in the mandi is
—... •
done under the administration and control of the DAPM
committee, which represents the state government in the
mandi.
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The Social Organization of the Mandi
It is possible to isolate five main groups who
compose the social organization of the mandi: the arha-
ris, the munims (traders' business clerks), the palie-
aars igrain-porters), the government officials, and the
kisans who visit tne mandi to sell their agricultural
products. To facilitate the exposition, kisctns will be
discussed in Chapter Six, when 1 discuss the process of
buying and selling in the mandi, and 1 will discuss the
roie of government officials in that same context. I
focus, then, in this section, on the social backgrounds
and tne relationships among the Srfiatis, munims, and
pai Jedars.
The Arhatis
Tne colloquial meaning of the word arhati in Hindi
is a trading commission agent who has a business stall
\arhat), but the arhatis of Muzaffarnagar mandi are also
involved directly in trading. The local term arhat has
two different meanings in colloquial usage : the commis¬
sion ot the arhati and the physical site of his business
stall.
At the time of my field research there were i10
arhatis registered with the DAPM committee office : but
only 235 arhats were in actual operation. The rest of
tnem either belonged to those arhatis who already had
other a rhats and were using these extra arhats as their
warehouses, or they belonged to those arhatis who had
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not yet started their businesses in the mandi and were
keeping the stalls tor future use.
In the mandi there are two types of arhatis.
• ' •
k'achcha arhatis are trading commission agents who hold
annually renewable licenses from the State government to
seil agricultural produce to pakka arhatls on behalf of
trie producers, through open auction inside the mand^i.
ik'achcha = unripe, unfixed, cooked in water or roasted
rather than cooked in oil, made from earthen materials
rather than from brick or cement; pakka is the opposite
of kachcha. ) Pakka arhatls are trading commission agents
or traders, who also hold annually renewable licenses,
to ouy exclusively from the kachcha arhatis, and not
directly from kisans, and to sell to anyone, inside or
outside tne mandi. They generally sell to vyaparis. The
usual meaning of the term vyapari is simply a trader,
out in the context of the mandi, this term is used by
ft
arhatis for outsider wholesale traders who buy in the
mandi.
These two categories, pakka and kachcha arhatis,
"re not new ones. This distinction has existed for many
centuries in north Indian marketplaces. But in 1964,
the U.P. state government passed a law,- the Agricultural
Products Mandi Act (Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam) that
defined in iegal terms the functions and circumscribed
roies of pakka and kachcha■ arhatis. The secretary of
tne DAPM committee informed me that the government
sought to maintain this distinction in order to minimize
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any possible exploitation of kisans. Because the kach¬
cha arhati receives a commission based upon the price
the kisan himself receives, he will presumably strive
r.o ensure that the kisan receives the highest possible
price for his agricultural products. If however he were
to buy directly from the kisan, he would not have such
an incentive to ensure a fair price.
Some arhatis have both kachcha and pakka licenses
from the government. They are permitted to function in
both capacities, provided that they do not act as a
pakka arhati in relation to the same kisan to whom they
v *
nave functioned as a kachcha arhati. According to mandi
officials, the number of arhatis in the mandi who have
ooth types of license has increased somewhat over tne
last several years.
Both pakka and kachcha arhatis also have the legal
• <•
right to Duy and stockpile very limited quantities of
produce, in hopes of selling at a higher price at some
future time. In actual practice, however, they attempt
to maintain considerable stockpiles, in order to avoid
tne payment of taxes. I will discuss this issue at some
length in Chapter 6.
Since agricultural produce is sold by auction in
the mandi pakka and Kachcha arhati do not maintain
hermanent relationships with each other. I will discuss
the kinds of relationships that do exist between the two
types of traders, again in Chapter 6.
Besides kachcha and pakka arhatis, there are about
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twenty dalals Igo-oetweens) who work in the mandi on a
commission basis between kachcha and pakka arhatis do
not have stalls in the mandi because legally on one is
allowed to work as a dalal in the mandi. Their role is
to inform pakka arhatis of possible kachcha arhatis wno
have stocks to sell, and to inform kachcha arhatis about
cakka arhatis who are interested in purchasing produce
( «
from stockpiles. Because such stockpiling is illegal,
the names of the arhatis are not initially disclosed by
the dalaJ. He discloses the identities only when a deal
nas Deen agreed on by both sides. The dalal then re¬
ceives a commission of 1% from both sides. Such deals
are struck by dalals mainly in the mandi off season,
wnen stocks of sugarcane produce are not being Drought
into the mandi by kisans.
4
It was difficult to determine, from the records of
tne DAPM committee office, how many arhats were actual¬
ly in operation and how many of these were kachcha and
pakka arhats. This was because some arhatis who had
' • • #
licenses for kacncha arhat business were lllega 1 1 y
involved in pakka arhat business, and some pakka arhatis
were illegally serving as kachcha arhatis. The arhatls
wno nad both kacncha and pakka arhat licences were
principally involved in one or the other type of busi¬
ness. After 1 had visited each arhat to complete the
interview schedules, 1 subsequently checked with the
DAPM committee office records. I found that there were
eighty-seven kachchS arhats and forty-seven pakka arhats
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dealing exclusively in sugarcane products. The twenty-
six arhatis I have listed as both pakka and kachcha have
both types of licenses, although legally they are pre¬
vented from serving in both capacities vis-a-vis any
single kisan.
Besides these arhaiis, thirty-five arhats were
r i % o
dealing exclusively in food grains are kachcha and
pakka arhats, and twenty arhats were dealing in both
sugarcane products and food grains. There were also
seven arhats involved exclusively in bardana (packing
material, mainly jute bags), seven arhats specialising
in oil-seeds, oils, and spices, and six arhats were
• 4
selling just fertilizers and chemicals.
Table 3: Different Types of Arhats, Specialization
and Number
Type of Arhat Number in Mandi• * •
.Kachcha, sugarcane products 6
pakkS, sugarcane products 47
both pakkS and kachcha, sugarcane products 26
ootn pakka and kachchS, food grains 35
both pakka and kachchS, food grains and sugarcane 20
botn pakka and kachcha, oil-seeds, oils, spices 07
both pakka and kachchS, bardanS 07
ootn pakka and kachcha, chemicals and fertilizers 06
TOTAL 235
Among this total of 235 arhats, 126 are "local
arhatis." By local arhatls, 1 mean those who were born* * • <
in Muzaffarnagar District or neighboring districts, and
whose families have been living there tor at least three
generations. I derived this definition of a local arhati
from the definition used by arhat is themselves. Fifty-
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seven ardatis said that their families were immigrants
trom Haryana State, mainly rrom Hissar, Mehandargarh,
Mahim. Rohtak, ana Bhawani districts. Fifteen arhati
ramilies claimed to De immigrants from Rajasthan State,
mainiy rrom the districts of Jhunjhunu, Shekhar, Pali,
Cnuru, and Sriganganagar. The geographical area of
these districts corresponds to the region of Marwar, an
ola princely state in Rajasthan. Therefore, technically
aii residents of this region are called Marwaris.
During the past few centuries, many groups of traders
and money-lenders or Baniya sub-castes and of the Jain
religion have migrated from the Marwar region to many
parts of India. Because of this, in colloquial usage
outside Rajasthan,' the term Marwari is used to refer to
all immigrant businessmen from any part of
Raj as than.
Table 4: Places of Origin of Arhatis
State Main Districts Within State Number
U.K. Muzaffarnagar 128
Panjab Moga, Bhatinda, Rawalpindi, Lahore 35
haryana Hissar, Mehandargarh, Mahim, Rohtak,
Bhawani 57
Rajasthan Jhunjhunu, Shekhar, Pali, Srigang¬
anagar, Churu 15
TOTAL 235
The emigration of traders from Rajasthan to U.P.
dates from the last quarter of the eighteenth century.
(On Marwari traders, see Crooke 1696, vol.3; Timberg
1976.) In Muzaffarnagar mandi, the term Marwari is used
to refer to all immigrant traders from Rajasthan and
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B. Kisans sitting in a Jain adati& adat. On the wall, the four
lines of writing praise the deities Kali, Durga, Ganesh,
TrgVahmi and Mahvir and on the right is a Lakshmi yantra.
C. The Dashehra pujan ceremony being perpormed in a Bania
trader's house. -.-10 «
Haryana. In this thesis, I will also use this term for
immigrant arhatis from Ootn states, in conformity witn
iocal usage. Eecause there are no major difference among
tne insofar as their manai business activities are
concerned, both are considered as "outsider arhatis' by
tne local arhatis. Haryanvi and Rajasthani immigrant
arhatis prefer to speak their own respective dialects of
* *
Hindi among tnemselves. Thirty-five arhatis claimed to
be Hindu Panjabis who had migrated from Pakistan to the
Muzaffarnagar area during or since the 1947 Partition;
seven of them said they had migrated from Panjab state
witnin the last twenty years. Gut of a total of thirty-
five Panjabi arhatis, twenty-five belong to a trading
caste called Khatri. Khatris are the predominant trading
-aste in Panjab. Most of the Panjabi arhatis still have
either their main arhats or orancnes in towns' manais
in Panjab. These are most frequently operated by their
extended family members and relatives.
As Table 5 below clearly shows, the majority of
arhatis are from the Baniya caste (173 out of the total
of 235i; this is a traditional trading caste in northern
incia. Tne majority of the local Baniya arhatis are from
the Agarwal subdivision of the Baniya caste and a few of
tnem are from Besnoi, Maheshwari and Rustogi subcastes.
The main gotr&^ (clans) of local Baniya arhatis are Mit-
tai, Bansal, Singai, Garg, Tayal, and Goel. Some Ba-
niyas prefer to suffix their names with "Gupta" (a
common surname for Baniyas) instead of their clan names.
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According to one legend 1 heard in tne mandi, ali Ba-
niyas in U.P. and Haryana states are descendants of the
vaisya king Agrasain. Tne town of Agroha in Haryana is
said to have been his kingdom.
After tne local Baniya caste arhatis, the second
' *
and third largest groups or arhatis are Joins and arha-
tis of the Khatri caste; both groups hold twenty-five
arhats in the mandi. Jain arhatls belong mainly to the
Digamoar sect of the Jain religion and their subcastes
are the same as Baniyas. Marwari Baniya and Marwari Jain
arnatis Delong mainly to the Agarwal, Oswal, and Mahesh-
wari subcastes. As I have already said in Chapter 2,
most of the Jains in northern India are converted Ba¬
niyas. The Agarwal clan has long been the dominant clan
of tne Baniya caste throughout northern India. This is
wny most of the Jains in Muzaftarnagar District also
oeiong to the Agarwal subcaste. Jains ao not, however,
usually suffix their names with their clan or subcaste
names, oecause the Jain religion officially disavows
caste distinctions. Generally, Jains suffix "Jain" to
their names.
In Muzaffarnagar District the term Baniyalfrom
SansKrit vanija or banija. trader) is generally used to
rerer to people of Hindu and Jain castes whose tradi¬
tional occupations involve trade Ivyapar 1 and money-
lending <byaj or sud ka kam). "Vaisya" is their more
Sanskritic name, referring as it does to the Varna clas¬
sification. This term is often used by educated people
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in refined conversation. In Muzatfarnagar District,
Jains prefer to be called simply Jains and not Vaisyas
or Baniyas. in western U.P. as a whole, Jains are
mainly occupied in trade, money-lending and government
jobs, but in some parts or the country, they may be
found engaged in agriculture.
Table 5: Caste and Origin of Arhatis
Caste Place of Origin Number
Baniya Local, Marwar, Panjab 173
Khatri Pan jab 25
Jain Local and flarwar 25
Brahman Local anct .Marwar 03
Jat Loca 1 03
Mus1im Local 02
Ban j ara Loca 1 01
Sunar Loca i 01
Sikh-Jat Punjab 02
TOTAL 235
Reflecting local usage, I will use the term
"Baniys" for all arhatis and caste groupings whose
traditional calling involves trade--except where 1
specify them as Jain, Khatri or Marwari. All arhatis
c * .
from the Khatri caste belong to the Aroda subcaste, and
Mey commonly use Arora" as a surname. There are three
Brahman arhatis, and two of these migrated from riaryana• •
about three decades ago with their parents. Their fa¬
thers, who worked as government clerks in Muzaffarnagar
District, made contacts with some arhatis (who were from
• %
their home towns) and asked them to give their sons jobs
at their arhsts. In this way, the two Brahmans got jobs
as munims and later started their own Srhats in the
mandi., Three Jat arhatis are local and have agricultural
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land in their native villages. For them, agriculture and
trade are equally important. Two Muslims, one Banjara
ia lower itinerant trading caste) and one Sunar (Gold¬
smith caste) are also local arhat is. Two Sikh-Jat
A i
arhatis are from Panjab.
Some local Baniya arhatis have agricultural land in
the villages, which gives them profit in two ways.
They earn profit directly from agriculture, and aiso,
oecause income from agriculture is free from income-tax,
they can claim that part of their income from trade is
agricultural income. Having . land in the village not only
provides financial security in time of crisis for an
arhati, but also.facilitates contacts with kisans for
business. Almost all arhatis now live in Muzaffarnagar
city. More than 70% of the arhatis have their residences
in the nai mandi area of the city, that is , in the
neighbourhood where their arhats were previously locat¬
ed .
One of the questions that I put to al1 or the
arhatis 1 interviewed concerned the sort of investments
they made from the profits realized in the arhat. Most
of tnem were reluctant to discuss this issue with me.
The most common answer i received was that the arhat
ousiness is becoming a difficult and insecure one. This
is so, they said, because of increasing government
restrictions on trade in agricultural produce, and
because it is becoming increasingly difficult, in many
cases, to recover the loans they make to kisan cl ients.
So they prefer, they said, to start other businesses
■such as factories for which they can receive loans from
the government. Lala Goverdhan1 a 1, for example, holds
both pakka and kachha arhati licenses in the Muzatfarna-
gar mandi. He realized approximately two lakhs rupees in
profit from his arhat in the year in which 1 interviewed
him. He intended, he said, to reinvest only about 30,000
rupees in the arhat business, and to invest the rest of
• «
tne profit in an iron rolling mill in the city. He had
already applied for a license for this factory, and for
financial assistance from the government.
The arhatis of Muzaffarnagar mandi have two
rormal associations: the Gur Khandsari and Grain Mer-
•
chant Association, and the Jain SanatanSikh Chambers
Association. The offices of both associations are locat¬
ed in one building in the nai mandi area. The former
association is the main one in which all arhatis are
members, and the latter is part of the former, concerned
only with carrying out charitable work and managing all
cnaritable organizations set up by the arhatis. Most the
arhatis are members of both associations. Every year al1
e m
ordinary members of these two associations elect execu¬
tive committees. It was difficult for me to collect
detailed data on the internal politics of these organi¬
zations, because no arhati was willing to discuss asso-
ciational politics and disputes in any detail.
The main association was formed in 1962, mainly in
order to safeguard the economic interests of the arhatis
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against the government. Through their association they
lobby politicians, and protest and campaign against the
government whenever any law or policy affecting their
trading interests is promulgated. The lobby of the
arhatis of Muzaffarnagar manai is very influential in
district and state politics because they give large
donations to the politicians of the ruling party, and
they also give bribes to government officials. Every
year, arhat is are asked by the district administration
* *
to give donations (chanda) for the annual District
Agricultural and Industrial Exhibition. For personal
gain or favour, an arhati will approach a minister or
government official himself, but when arhatis' common
interests are involved, they approach officials through
the association . One arhati said to me:
' *
"We are an orange of the government; wnenever the
government wants juice [money], they squeeze us,
but they make marketing policies in favour of the
kisSns, and not in favour of us."
This perception on the part of the arhatis colours
their relationship with kisans, and often renders them
iess sympathetic to the problems of their kisan clients.
This image of themselves as bound and inhibited by.
government regulations, tax policies and bureaucratic
red-tape was played upon by a Baniya taxation lawyer
whom 1 interviewed. He had devised a poster illustrating
the problems of Baniya traders, problems that he, as a
taxation lawyer, was prepared to unravel. He uses this
poster to impress his many arhati and trader clients,
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and to recruit new clients. (See Figure 2.)
This image or traders is not, however, neld by
kisans. They view Baniya traders as experts in escaping
»rom and manipulating government regulations. Their
image of Baniya traders in such situations is expressed
in a proverb that I heard many times, particularly trom
Jat kisans: Baniya kisi raj me bhi kisi ke kabje me na
ave ("No matter who is the ruler, a Baniya will not be
constrained"). (For future discussion of kisans' views
of Baniya traders, see Chapter 6. )
The most striking event in the history of the
arnatis' association occurred in 1961. In that year,
the district administration wanted to move all arhatis
from the nai mandi to the mandi. Arhatis resisted and
# « » •
went on strike (dharna) to protest the proposed shift to
a new site. They closed their arhats for twenty days.
Six arhatis went to jail (and this was considered ex¬
tremely brave by the non-Baniya people of the city) in
the course of this dispute. Arhatis tried to use their
political influence with ministers and legislators at
the state level, and also to give bribes to some minis¬
ters ana to the District Magistrate of Muzaffarnagar.
iT'nese events were described to me by many residents of
the city and aiso by a few arhatis. ) The arhatis however
'
» • <
ere unsuccessful in their attempts to block the move,
because the District Magistrate and the Chief Minister
of the state were determined to make the change. The
arhatis went to court, but they lost the case, and the
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mandi was moved to its present location.
The arhat is had raised several objections to the
move, and they voiced these through their association.
They said that they would have to pay rent in the mandi,
to the government, whereas in the nai mandi, their homes
and arhats were generally housed in one building, ownd
by the arhatis themselves. (They used the ground floor
* «
as arhat and store, and the first floor as their living
quarters.) The second objection concerned the question
of insecurity in the mandi, as the manai was to be
located on the boundary of the city, far from their
homes, and they said that it would not be safe ror them
to return in the evening with cash to their homes. They
aiso oojected that kisans would hesitate to go there to
sell their produce. But a DAPM official told me that in
his view, the real reason involved tax considerations.
In the nai man<]i, he said, arhatis could avoid paying
full taxes, and they were able to hoard and store more
stock than was officially permitted. The physical struc¬
ture of the nai mandi area facilitated this, because it
%
is located in a combined residential and shopping area,
in an open space without walled boundaries or gates. By
contrast, the mandi has a walled boundary with gates, so
government tax officials can check on the quantity and
types of items Drought into and exported from the mandi.
In the end, arhatis were forced to move their arhats to
the mandi in 1982, and since then all kachcha and pakka
arhat trading of sugarcane products and food grains has
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been carried out in the mandi.
$
During my fieldwork, several situations arose in
which the arhatis' association represented their griev-
* *
ances to the government. In one instance, the associa¬
tion demanded that the State government spend 70% of the
total mandi taxes on improving mandi and arhat facili¬
ties for the arhatis, in accordance with a High Court
ruling. The government claimed that money was being
spent on the mandi, but this spending was not in accord¬
ance with the appropriations that the Sirhat is them¬
selves requested. The association was unable to press
further, and the case ended when the government refused
to comply with the arhatis' demands.
In other instance, the State government increased
the arhat rent and mandi taxes. Through their associa¬
tion, the arhatis protested these increase to several
government officials." As a result of this pressure
placed on the government officials, the increase were
resc i nded.
In their studies of traders in Indian towns, fox
11968) and Harriss (1981) both suggest that these are to
some extent isolated from the social life or communities
in which they work and live. Their social involvement in
public life is minimal and defensive. Harriss (ibid:9)
states that in several South Indian towns:
This is much more likely to be true where traders
differ from the rest of the by caste as well as
occupation...tT]he vast majority of merchants do
not participate in local social institutions...
LT3he frequency of participation increases with the
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size of mercantile firm. Again the traders of
commercial crops are more actively socially in¬
volved than are traders of food grains.
This is not the situation in liuzaffarnagar city
however. Here most of the puolic schools, colleges,
temples, social clubs, dharmsaha1 as (pilgrims' guest
house), and so torth have been established by Baniya and.
Jain arhatis and traders, and they control the manage¬
ment of these social and religious institutions. Most or
the Jain and Baniya traders, including the arhatis, play
an active role not only in the politics of their insti¬
tutions, but also in the politics of the city's Munici¬
pal Board (in which many Baniyas but virtually no kisans
participate). Through these institutions, they come very
much in contact with other sections of the society in
which they live. They do not however allow non-Baniyas
to interfere in the management of their institutions.
Arhatis play an important role in their caste associa¬
tions. Generally Baniyas give donations (chanda or dan)
to their own institutions and Jains give to their own.
in my survey of the manai, I did not find that the size
and type of arhat had any correlation with the arhatis'» m • r
rrequency of participation in social institutions in
Muzaffarnagar city. Marwari arhatis who have settled
recently in the city are only minimally involved in
tnese affairs however.
Harriss (ibid. :) found that in South India trad¬
ers' active participation in party politics is minimal,
i found the same to be true among the arhatis in the
128
manai. While their political views are well-defined and
consistent, and tneir voting patterns seem to follow
caste and occupational lines, they do not participate
nearly as actively as kisans in district and state level
politics. When 1 asked some arnatis why they do not like
to discuss politics and to participate in party politics
at the district and state level (in which kisan partici¬
pation is high), 1 was given two main explanation. The
reason, they said, is that the Baniya ethic does not
sanction involvement in party politics and disputes.
They said that politics is a dirty and risky business
and that involvement in party politics is a waste of
time without little financial gain.
Tne second reason is that they think that if tney
were to support any particular party or candidate openly
at the time of an election or openly express tneir
political views, then when power changed hands, it could
be harmful to their trading interests. In Muzaffarnagar
city, 1 was told by many people (including an important
Baniya political leader) that Baniyas in general and the
hrnatis in particular do not like to support political
parties or candidates in the Assembly and parliamentary
elections whom they think would be strong supporters or
kisans.
Caste, religion, and kinship are very important
factors in Indian politics, but, in Muzaffarnagar Dis¬
trict, if a Baniya stands in an Assembly or parliamen¬
tary election for a kisJn-dominated party or a communist
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party. Such a situation arose in the state Assembly
election ot iySO in Muzaifarnagar city, when, according
to Ramdhan Gupta (a Baniya pakkS arhati), Bhagmal Chand
Jain Ithe president of the arhat is' ma in association;
was the candidate of the Janata Party, headed by Charan
Singh was always considered to be a strong supporter ot
kisSns throughout India. (See Byres 1988:139-69 on
Charan Singh's policies and attitudes towards Baniyas.)
Bhagmal Chand Jain stood for the Janta party for person¬
al gain, according to Gupta and several other arhatis,
in the hope that his fellow arhatis would support him on
the basis of caste, and kisans would do the same because
of his connection with Charan Singh. But he apparently
received little support from either group, and he lost
the election.
Another example of Baniya's aversion to kisan-
aominated parties was described to me by the brother of
BaniyS kachcha arhati, who himself happens to be the
local correspondent for a well-known national newspaper.
In the 1971 parliamentary election, the communist party
and the Congress party had formed an electoral coalition
and Vijay Pal Singh, a communist leader, was the candi¬
date of this coalition. Baniyas were very unhappy with
this coalition because they oppose the Communist party
on ideological grounds. But because Charan Singh stood
against Vijay Pal Singh, the Baniyas ultimately gave
their support to Vijay Pal Singh. At the time of an
election, arhatis often give donations to all political
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parties, in order to safeguard their trading interests
whatever the outcome.
My interviews with Baniya a rhat is indicate that
more than 90% live in some sort of joint-family arrange¬
ment. 1 found that most Baniyas felt that it was impor¬
tant to maintain such joint families (joint according to
the local definition of an ikattha parivar, one in which
two or more married brothers, or a group three or more
generations snare common property, loss and profit!.
These family arrangements have important implications
for the running of their business, in relation to part¬
nerships (sajhadaris) in the mandi.
My survey or the mandi indicates that almost all
arhat is consist of forma 1 legal partnerships. But in
most cases, these partnerships are what 1 shall term
pseudo-partenershsip, in that are legally arranged
partnerships between members of the same joint family.
Such a measure reduces income tax liability because the
partners isaihjedars) pay as individuals, each with his
or her own exemptions. Partnerships are therefore for
many a^natis a means by which they reduce their overall
tax liability. This device is used by almost all arha-
t is .
1 found that there were only ten arhatis who were
actually in real partnerships (between non-family mem¬
bers). Among these ten actual partnerships, caste,
religion, and kinship were insignificant factors in
partnership formation. Most "real" partnership arhat3
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were formed because of one of the partners' lack of
capital ipunji), lack of sufficient clients, or lack of
expertise in trade. For example, two Panjabi arhatis,
Govind Ram and Ram Lai, are individually in partnership
with a local Baniya arhati, Surajmal, because, according
t *
to the two Panjabls' tney being "outsiders", could not
attract enough kisans for arhat business iarhat ka kam).
But they had enough capital to start the arhat business
ana they also had contacts with vyaparis in several
mandis in Panjab. Surajmal, on the other hand, did not
have enough capital and contacts with vyaparis to start
his own arhat, but because he is "local", he had a good
network of contacts with kisans. In another case, in
1983 a Baniya had capital and expertise in trade, but
he could not attract kisanss. So in 1984 he entered into
a partnership with a local Muslim kisan from the nearby
village of Sujuru, who had good social network in his
own community in many villages.
if an arhati has enough capital, contacts with
kisans, and expertise in trade, he avoids partnership
outside his own joint family, and he will particularly
avoid entering into partnerships with his rishtedars
irelatives through marriage ties). When 1 asked Lala
Khajan Chand, a kachcha arhati, why this was so, he said
that having partnerships with relatives means that
business relationships 1vyapar ka sambandh) and kinship
relationships Irishtedari ka sambandh) get mixed up
together, and both relationships would be damaged. He
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illustrated his point with the following example. An
acquaintance ot his, another arhati, had a shortage of
capital in 1984. So he entered into partnership with a
relative through marriage. After two years they had a
dispute regarding the disDursement of profits from the
business; they dissolved their partnership in great
bitterness, and after that they also broke off all
aspects of their kinship relationship as well. One
arhati said (in English) "business is business," meaning
that business should not enter into other sorts of rela¬
tionship, and that when one is in business, one should
only calculate profit and loss, and the businessman
should only calculate profit and loss, and the business
should not be constrained by any sort of kinship or
social obligation. And another arhati mentioned this
proverb: sajha ka kam tota ka kam ("partnership in
business means loss"); a potential business loss should
not damage a kinship relationship, in his estimation. 1
snouid ciarify the points that when traders speak in
his connection they are referring only to partnerships
between relatives by marriage; they do not speak in this
way about business relationships within joint families.
Many arhatis who live in joint families are able to
use another method of tax avoidance similar to that
pseudo-partnerships. They establish two or more legally
separate arhats within the business operations of a
single joint family. 1 found many instances of pseudo-
partnerships and-pseudo-ar/iats. The " pseudo-arha t" i3 a
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case in which more than one arhat or firm is owned by
the same joint family, with members of the joint family
as partners in all firms and arhats. Fox 11969:171-175)
also noted the existence of the same types of pseudo-
partnerships and pseudo-rirms among bazaar traders in
eastern U.P. town.
1 cite nere one example of the pseudo-partnership
in the mandi. Uma Devi, a seventy-two year old woman,
has two sons (B ana C) ana one married daughter (D> who
lives with her husband in another town. Uma Devi's
husband, who died about fifteen years previously, had an
arhat in nai mandi. Now her sons (B and C) have two
'
* •
arhats in the mandi and a brick manufacturing factory on
the northern boundary of the city. The oldest son (B)
has two young sons (E ana F) ana one teenage daughter
(G). Her youngest son (C) has two young sons (J and K).
Uma Devi lives with her sons, daughters-in-law and
grandchildren in one house in the neighbourhood of nai
mandi, and they cook in one Kitchen. All members of this
joint family share common property on the basis of the
customs and traditions of the family. But legally,
members of this joint family have divided themselves
into four nuclear families; and on this basis they have
formed three pseudo-partnership firms within the joint
family to avoid income tax and wealth tax. (See Figure
3. ) Uma Devi's two sons operate the two arhats and are
assisted by two of her grandsons. Two of her grandsons
operate the brick business. Her oldest son is the over-
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all head of the family and is in charge of all the
family's business. Profit (labh) from the joint family's
various business is never divided among the partners.
Each member of the joint family receives money from the
head of the family according to his needs.
1,2,3 end 4 ere naclear
families withen the joint famly.
Partners in three firms:
Firm 1: U,B,.T




Figure 3. Business Partnerships in Uma Devi's Joint
Fami1y
For an arhati, membership in a joint family has
more advantages than just tax avoidance. I noted that in
the mandi the arhati and or two of his young sons typi-
cally sit together on the arhat. Their relationships are
135
not founded on the basis of employer-employee ties or on
formal organization, but on familial ties. A son is
expected to respect his father at the ar.hat as he does
at home. No son would say "1 am working for my father."
No "salary" is drawn by the father or the son. In other
words, the business and domestic spheres overlap to a
great extent. For an arhati, having family members
working at the arhat means that he can be sure that
business secrets will not be disclosed to anyone outside
the joint family. •
Most of the young sons'of the arhatis, when they
come back from their colleges, spend the rest of the day
at their arhat assisting their fathers. From an early
« •
age they start their practical training in the family
trade. Several arhatis told me that they experience
great pleasure when their sons work with them at their
arhats because they are fulfilling their moral responsi¬
bility to teach, train, and help their children. In this
way, their children's future is assured.
Several scholars' findings on the role of the joint
family in Indian trading communities confirm my observa¬
tions of the Muzaffarnagar mandi. Timberg (1978) and
Ramu (1986), for example, have found that among Marwari
traders the joint family plays an important role in the
success of their businesses. On the basis of his compar¬
ative work in several societies (including India),
Burton (1968) explained how the multiple and reciprocal
relationships between a father and his son are important
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for the success of a family firm. For Indian business¬
men, "home" and "office" are often not separate spheres.
Interviews with arhatis in the mandi indicate that
• » »
the majority of them are educated only up to high school
standard. Their sons who assist them at the arhats,
however, are mostly graduates. Generally it is the
arhati who, after calculating their likely future earn-J *
ings and their ability to command larger dowries, de¬
cides what types of occupation would be best for his
sons. The general attitude is that an arhati wants to
have one or two sons in the family business, and he send
the rest of them to government jobs where they should
earn "good money" either by their salaries or by accept¬
ing bribes. But if an arhati has only one son he normal¬
ly wants to keep him in the family trade. For example,
Naresh Kumar Jain is a young son of a kachcha arhati who
had just completed his graduation in commerce with a
First Class degree from a local college. When 1 asked
him what career he would like to pursue, he replied that
he would like to become a chartered accountant, but
that the matter depended upon his father's decision.
When I asked his father about this, he said that he
would not have objections if he had other sons, but
since he has only one son, he wants to assist him in the
arhat business. Arhatis ma in preferences for jobs for
their sons are medicine and engineering, and they avoid
sending their sons into the police and the military
serv ices.
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With respect to the arrangement of marriages, for
Baniyas the marriage settlement seems to be far more
important in considerations of eligibility than other
Hindu castes. I observed that in some marriage arrange¬
ments in Baniya arhati families , the bride's and bride-
* *
groom's families directly and unabashedly negotiated the
amount of the dowry that was to be given. The general
trend, not only among Baniya a rhat is but among many
Baniyas in western U.P., is that a higher earning bride¬
groom is offered a higher dowry than a lower earning
bridegroom. Among Baniyas, a bridegroom who is a doctor,
an engineer, or a tax officer is normally offered a
higher dowry than, for example, a college lecturer. One
Baniya arhati said to me that "The 'rate' of a doctor
bridegroom is higher than that of a lecturer in our
caste. Dowry has become an evil among the Baniyas." Most
of the Baniya 5rhat is prefer to get their sons married
to girls whose families can offer the biggest dowries.
The qualities of the girls, their family backgrounds,
and their izzat ("prestige* or "honour") seem to be less
uaportant.
On one occasion, when 1 was interviewing a Baniya
arhat's marriageable son in the absence of his father, 1
asked him what type of girl he would like to marry. He
replied "beautiful and well-educated." When 1 asked him
"what about the.dowry?" he replied "The dowry is an
immaterial factor." Five months after 1 interviewed him,
he was married, and his father invited me to attend
138
reception and dinner party at his residence. At the
dinner party I listened to a conversation between two of
the guests. One was saying to the other that Shyamlal
(the arhati) had accepted an unattractive and poorly
* »
educated bride for his handsome and well-educated son,
because the bride's father is a wealthy businessman and
had given a huge dowry.
In another case, at the marriage of the daughter of
a Baniya arhati, I heard the following conversation
* •
between four or five Srhatis. One arhati said "I was
"urprised to read on the marriage invitation that Ram-
lai's Cthe father of the bride] daughter was going to be
married to an assistant district judge. But now I can
see how it happened." another arhati asked "How?". The
first arhati replied "I have found that the bridegroom
id from a very poor family in eastern U.P.; and you can
see that this judge is dark-coloured and short. So
Ramlal has offered a huge dowry to get this judge for
his high school passed dark-coloured daughter." Among
the dominant kisan castes, the social, economic, and
landholding position of the family is generally more
important than the dowry. While families in these castes
do indeed give and receive very large dowries, they seem
to do so more for reasons of prestige (izzat) than for
the acquisition of wealth.
When I asked some of the Marwari arhatis where and
f * *
whom they preferred to have marital ties, most of them
said they preferred to arrange marriages only in their
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subcastes in the region of their origin, or among those
caste people who have settled in towns and cities in
other parts of the country. When 1 asked them why that
was so, they replied that through marital and kinship
ties they were able to keep in touch with their culture
and homeland. Having marital ties in other towns and
cities of the country and their own caste people could
be helpful of their businesses, as the majority of
Marwari Jains and Baniyas are engaged in trade, wherever
they have settled.
Those Marwari arhatis who have settled in the city
# • »
within the last several decades generally feel them¬
selves to be "outsiders" in Muzaffarnagar. Outside the
Baniya arhati community, these Marwaris have very little
•
• «
contact with the local people of the city. Most of the
Marwari arhatis who have settled with their joint fami-
* # •
lies in Muzaffarnagar city for more than three genera¬
tions do, however, feel a part of local society. And
because of this, they told me, they would not hesitate
to establish marital ties with local BaniySs. Even so,
only seven Marwari families have established ties with
local Baniya arhatis' families in the last five years,
three marriages took place between Jain and local Baniya
arhati families. Panjabi Khatri arhatis only marry among
Panjabi Khatris. Subcaste is not a very important factor
for them in this context.
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Munias (Traders' Business Clerks)
Every arhati in the mandi employs at least one
munim for accounting work (hissab-kitab ka kam) . The
number of munims employed depends on the size of the
arhat and on the volume of business. An average size
arhat employs two to four munims but some big arhats
have five or six. A munim does not just do accountancy
work. He does many types of work for his employer. His
usual duties also include handling correspondence,
arranging loans to and from the arhat, entertaining
clients, guests, and government officials, executing
bank paperwork, going to government offices when neces¬
sary, and maintaining contacts with clients. A munim can
also be sent to other mandis in the country to collect
money from vyaparis and to promote his arhati's busi¬
ness. He can also be sent to the local villages to
contact kisans, both for soliciting new business and for
collecting loan payments. In some cases I observed that
arhatis had given authority to their munims to buy and
sell commodities without their specific permission.
Bhagmal Chand Jain, for example, is a pakka arhati who
had, one year prior to my fieldwork, opened a steel
factory in Muzaffarnagar. He spent most of his day at
that factory rather than at the arhat. His five munims
handled all of his business there, and even when Jain
was at the arhat, he always wanted to take his chief
munim with him to auctions where he would bid for sugar¬
cane products, because he had implicit faith in the
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abilities of this munim to judge the quantity of these
products and the appropriate prices. A munim also man¬
ages relations between an arhati and his palladars, and
he keeps their accounts.
Normally a munim arrives at the arhat at least an
hour before his employer, and he will normally leave at
least two or three hours after him. Before going to the
arhat, a munim usually goes to the home of his employer
to collect the keys to the arhat. After opening it, he
performs morning worship (puja) at the arhat on behalf
of his arhati. In the evening, he performs the evening
puja and locks the arhat. He then goes back to his
employer's home to turn over the keys. At the busiest
time of the mandi season (from November to April), and
at the time of the preparation of the annual balance-
sheet (the salana-chitta), the munim may stay at the
arhat or at his employer's residence for several nights.
An arhati can call on the services of his munim at any• #
time.
An arhati may either allot specific work to his
munims, or the chief munim (bara munim) may do it. There
is no set of formal qualifications for a munim to be
appointed as chief munim, but generally an arhati takes
three main factors into account when he appoints his
chief munimt his experience in the mandi, his expertise
in accounting, and his trutworthiness and honesty.
Almost all munims come from low-income family
backgrounds. The majority of them belong to the Baniya
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caste, and they also tend to come from the same sub-
castes as the arhatis who employ them. But very few
munims have marital ties with the arhatis, because
arhatis want to establish marital with their "equals"
• «
(in the economic sense) within their castes. Most munims
are educated upto the twelth standard and most of them
become munims either because their parents could not
afford to give them capital to start their own business¬
es, or because they were unsuccessful in getting govern¬
ment jobs.
Munims are generally employed by arhatis with the
understanding that it will be a continuing relationship,
but munims are technically employed on a seasonal con¬
tract basis. The contract is renewed either at the
festival of Divali (in November) or at the Dashehra
festival (in October), when the arhatis start their new
financial year. (I will discuss the significance, for
Baniyas, of these two festivals in Chapter 5.) According
to the customs of the mandi, munims' contracts specify
that they be paid a salary on a monthly basis. Neither a
munim nor an arhati can break the contract during the
"mandi season" between October and April. If a munim is
trustworthy, honest and expert in his work, no arhati
would want to loose him as an employee. So they usually
renew their contract from year to year, in any special
circumstances, when a munim wants to leave his employ¬
ment, it is considered his duty, according to mandi
custom, to provide a suitable replacement to his employ-
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er. When, for example, Rajaram, a munim, decided to
terminate his employment with his arhati in order to
open his own grocery shop in the city, he was asked by
the arhati to recommend a trustworthy and experienced
• *
munlm as a replacement. He recommended a distant rela¬
tive who had worked in a mandi in the town of Shamli,
and the arhati hired that man.
• •
When munims leave an arhat and join another at the
end of their contracts, this process is called munimo ki
adaia-badali ("exchange of munims") by both arhatis and
munims in the mandi. The main reson why a munim leaves
one arhat for another is to receive a higher salary, and
in such a situation, arhatis generally only try espe¬
cially hard to retain those munims whom they consider to
be exceptionally knowledgeable in the mandi trade, or
those munims who are especially privy to the business
secrets of the arhat.
_ *
A munim must have a good knowledgeable of the
hindi-mundi scripts, an indigenous business language, in
which accounts are kept in the' account-books (bahi-
khatas). Hindi-mundi is an ancient business language
used in ail parts of northern India. In some parts of
this region it is called mahajani (mahajan - trade,
money-lender). One old munim told me that hindi-mundi
originated in Bari town in Haryana long ago.
There is no formal government-recognized school or
institution in the city for the teaching of hindi-mundi;
there are two private hindi-mundi coaching centres. One
144
coaching centre is run by a Muslim teacher and the other
by a Baniya. The Muslim teacher told me that teaching
hindi-mundi is his family's traditional occupation.
(This teacher himself also dispenses charms for the
dispersal of ghosts and spirits, as he sits in his one-
room school on the main road halfway between the mandi
and the nai mandi area). Members of his family, he said,
had been teaching in this way for seven generations.
These two coaching centres attract a total of about
thirty students a year. The number of students at these
centres has been declining the past few years because
government tax-officers have started to insist that
arhat is should not write their accounts in hindi-mundi,
precisely because the officers themselves cannot read
this script. But for an arhati, keeping accounts in
hindi-mundi has several advantages. First it is simpler
and quicker to write in hindi-mundi than in Devanagri
script, because the style of writing is similar to that
of shorthand. Secondly, tax-officers cannot read their
hindi-mundi account books, which means that it is easier
for arhatis to conceal their actual income and trade
volume. Each person's hand-writing in hindi-mundi gener¬
ally differs so much from another's so that often the
jnim who wrote an account book can read it. It is
easier and quicker to do calculations in hindi-mundi
because it provides many specific formulae (qurs) for
rapid calculation without the use of paper and pencil.
For instance, the Muslim teacher told me how to calcu-
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late salaries for particular periods. He said that when
a munim needs to calculate three day's salary for an
employee, for example, he takes the monthly salary
figure, adds one zero, and then divides this by 100.
There are many such memorized formulae for calculating
salary figures for other time periods. There are also
formulae for converting traditional Indian units of
measurement to the metric system, and from one tradi-
tional unit of measurement to another.
Hindi-mundi courses cover not only script and
calculation, but also the making of profit in trade and
the running of a business. The Muslim teacher told me
that the first lesson he teaches to his students is a
mnemonic device incorporating the first four characters
of the Hindi script, k, kh, q, qh. Students, he says,
should bear in mind that these stand for the four essen¬
tial aspects of business activity: kam (work), khana
(food), qirhan (hoarding), and ghar (house). The meaning
of this formulaic device is that trading work produces
food, that a trader should purchase jewellery that he
can hoard and use as security in time of need (e.g.
during sickness or for the giving of dowry), and he
should also purchase a house in which to live and carry
out his business activities. Another such formula con¬
cerns the division of profits from trade: one portion
should be hoarded as cash, one portion should be used to
purchase jewellery, one portion should be lent out at
interest; and only one-quarter of the profit should be
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re-invested in trade.
A good deal of the teaching in these coaching
centres is accomplished through the use of proverb-1 ike
aphorisms. One example is pahaJe likho phir do agar kam
par jay to bahi khate se 1o. ("First write down every¬
thing tin the account book] and then give out [cash or
commodities]; if there is some problem, just check in
the account book.") A second telling example is this:
chahe beta bap ko de ya bete bap kO de hamesha ginkar
de-Je. ("whether son gives to father, or father gives to
son, always count first and then give-and-take.")
A very few young arhatis in the mandi are, however,
beginning to keep their accounts in English. These young
arhatis are often handicapped by an ignorance of hindi-
mundi (nearly all older arhatis know the script), and
further, they are succumbing to the pressure placed on
them by the government not to use hindi-mundi. Sanjiv
Kumar, for example, is a young local Baniya kachcha
arhati who keeps his accounts in English. He told me
that he does so because, since his father died three
years ago, he has been managing the work in the arhat
himself, and though he is a commerce graduate, he has no
knowledge of hindl-mundi. He employs only one munim, and
he enters many of his business records in his account
books himself, in English. But because he, like nearly
all other arhatis in the mandi, keeps two account books,
one for the use of the arhat, and one for showing to
tax-officers, he still has a means of keeping his actual
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business dealings a secret.
Nearly all munims still learn hindi-mundi before
taking up employment in the mandi. Learning hindi-mundi
takes about one year. After that, a student contacts an
arhat in the mandi to get an apprenticeship, which lasts
for six to twelve months. Sometimes an afhati himself
contacts a hindi-mundi teacher when he is in need of a
munim and he asks the teacher to recommened one of his
students. Upon the completion of the apprentieship, most
students accept employment at the arhat where they did
this training in munimgiri (the occupation of a munim).
Arhatis are very cautious when they hire a new
munim. Marwari arhatis, for example, prefer to have at
least one munim from their own region in their employ.
No arhat accepts any apprentice or munim without a
reference or personal acquaintance. Most of the arhatis
and munims, in fact, know one another in the mandi.
References are important to the.Mrhatis because they
fear that a person who works at their arhats could
possibly disclose the actual income, property, and
business secrets of the arhat to tax-officers or other
peop1e.
The relationship between an arhati and his munim is
of course an employer-employee one. But 1 observed that
in the mandi reciprocal respect and mutual trust, as
well as considerations of relative age, are also held to
be- very impor tan t elements in the relationship. No
arhati calls his munim, especially his older chief
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munim, just "munim". He always addresses him using the
ji honorific suffix, as 'munim ji.n An arhati must show
respect to an older munim, especially if the munim is
of his father's generation. An old Panjabi Khatri munim
told me about an event that happened in the nai mandi
1ong before.
About twenty-five years ago, an arhati's son came
back to Muzaffarnagar after studying for several
years in England. One day he set on the gaddi [the
sitting platform upon which an arhati and his munim
sit and which is considered by all Hindu traders to
be a "pure" place! without taking his shoes off.
The chief munim asks him to take off his shoes, but
he refused, and father also did not pay much atten¬
tion to the objection of the munim. After arguing
with the arhati and his son, the munim threatened
to leave his job because he felt insulted that
neither the afhati nor his son showed any respect
to his advice and to the gaddi. He decided to leave
the arhat, but the arhati refused to pay his full
salary because he wanted to break his contract at
mid-season. The munim then threatened the arhati
that if he was not going to pay the ful1 amount of
the salary that was due him, then he would disclose
the arhati's * nambar do ke khate* [the illegal
"second account books"! to the tax-officers. Be¬
cause of this fear, in the end, the arhati not only
give him the full salary, but apologised for his
and his son's behaviour.
Whatever the degree of distortion or elaboration
that has crept into the telling of this story after
twenty-five years, it still serves as an illustration of
attitude about the proper respect to be shown by arhatis
to their munims.
Some munims have been working for their arhati's
families for two or three generations. In some cases,
*"vo to three generations of a munfm's family have been
working for a particular arhat. In such cases of 1 on g -
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term relationships between an arhati and his munim, both
munims and arhatis told me that they feel like members
*
of an extended family.
There are about seventy-five arhatis who begin as
munims in the mandi. Some of them were reluctant to
discuss this matter in detail, because they didn't want
to disclose their previous financial position to me. A
very small number of munims are shareholders in their
arhats and some of them by shares in specific goods in
their employers' stock in the hope that prices will
rise. But usually an arhati enters into this type of
• 4
short-term partnership when he has a shortage of capital
to buy stock, or when he is not very hopeful that prices
will rise, munims who have made substantial profits in
this way, or who have obtained capital from their fami¬
lies, have sometimes started their own drhats in the
mandi. It is easier for ex-munims to get clients than
for inexperienced new arhatis, because they already have
a good knowledge of the trade, and ready-made contacts
with kisans and vyaparis. 1 give one example of how a
munim has become a successful arhati in the mandi.
• • *
Lala Ratanlal, a Baniya arhati, is about sixty
» «
years old. He was born in Pachanda village in Muzaffar-
nagar District, where his father had a grocery shop.
About thirty-five years ago, his father left the village
for Muzaffarnagar city because he had been harassed
several times by some Jat kisSns in his village, and
because some robbers stole his money and jewellery from
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there. When he move to Muzaffarnagar city with his
family, he opened a grocery shop there. Ratanlal has two
brothers. Both of them left school after their primary
school examinations, and started to assist their father
in the shop. Ratanlal passed the high school examina¬
tion, and then, because it was difficult for his father
to support his joint family on the income from the shop,
he advised Ratanlal to learn munimgiri. As soon as
Ratanlal got a job as a munim at a big arhat in the nai
mandi (about twenty-seven years ago), his father died.
A year after the death of his father, the three
brothers broke up the joint family and started to live
separately with their own families. At present the
oldest brother still runs the shop, and the youngest has
a mustard oil and seed shop in the city. Ratanlal worked
for about fifteen years as a munim in the mandi and
4
earned extra money by buying shares from his arhati on a
short-term basis, and from a grain-hoarding business.
Ratanlal has two young sons and a daughter. A few years
ago, they started a small khadsari factory (a raw sugar
manufacturing mill) in the village of Basera, in Muzaf-
farnagar District. They made such a success of it that
Ratanlal was able to leave his job as a munim and start
his own arhat in the mandi. Now this family has two
khadsari factories, and they have built a large house in
a upper-class area of Muzaffarnagar city.
tlunims do not have any union or formal organization
in the mandi. This is probably because some munims have
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partnerships with their arhatis, and also because there
is a good deal of variation in their salaries. Another
reason may will be that there is a widespread notion,
among Baniyas, that disputes should not become matters
of public knowledge, but should be settled privately
among the parties involved.. So when a dispute arises
between an afhati and his munim, they make every attempt
to resolve it themselves, or they call on other munims
and arhatis from the neighbourhood to use their influ¬
ence to settle the dispute-in an informal committee
< panchayat) .
An example of this sort of mediation occurred
during my fieldwork in the mandi. One day Sohanlal, a
pakka arthi, sent his munim, Suresh Kumar, to the bank
to deposit approximately twenty thousand rupees in the
arhat account. The munim returned after half an hour and
reported that a thief had grabbed the money bag from him
on his way to the bank. The arhati then told his neigh-
• 4
bouring arhatis about this incident, and they advised
him to go immediately with his munim to the police
station, to file a report. After this, the arhati began
to accuse the munim himself of taking the money, and
fabricating the story of the theft. The munim was very
upset at this accusation, and he asked several of his
fellow munims, and also several arhatis, to remind the
arhati of his good character and trustworthiness, and to
convince him not to blame his munim for something he
had not done. These munims and arhatis immediately sat
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in an informal panchayat to resolve the issue. Several
of the munim who were present said that if they were
going to be blamed in the event of such mishaps as the
theft, then they would not in future be responsible for
making deposits at the banks. The arhatis told Sohanlal
that he should not make accusations against his own
munim without any evidence. Sohanlal was for several
days reluctant to accept the advice of the panchayat.
Before a final resolution was achieved, however, the
real thief was apprehended, _ and the matter came to an
end when Suresh Kumar decided nonetheless to leave the
employ of this arhati who had accused him. It wouid
however have been difficult for Sohanlal, in any case,
to disregard the delibrations of the panchyat, and to
continue to accuse his munim. Several arhatis in fact
T.old me that both parties to such a dispute should
accept the verdict of the panchayat, according to the
customs of the mandi .
Palledars (Grain-porters)
Among the others that work in the mandi are the
palledar (from pal la, balance pan ). About two thousand
palledars work in the mandi during the mandi season.
Only about 20% of these workers are from the local area
(Muzaffarnagar city or nearby villages), and most of
these are from Muslim and Hindu service caste, 80% of
the palledars come from the nearby states of Rajasthan
and Haryana, where the Marwari arhatis also originated.
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Dispite the fact that they come from the same general
region, however, the Marwari arhatis come primarily from
towns; only a few come from villages, and all Marwaji
arhatis are Baniyas. The palledars one the other hand
come only from villages, and they belong, for the most
part, to the Gujar caste whose traditional occupations
r.ave been agriculture and pastoral ism.
Many of these Gujar palledars are small kisans in
their native villages. They told me of a number of
reasons why they come to the Muzaffarnagar mandi for
employment. One important factor is the chronic shortage
of water in their villages, for agriculture, and some
times even for drinking. They suffer frequently from
drought and famine. The soil is sandy and they have in
those areas only one crop season, from June to Septem¬
ber, in which they can grow only a few crops (particu¬
larly maize, jawar, bajara, grams, mustard) mainly for
domestic consumption. Whenever there is drought or crop
failure, increased numbers of these small kisans migrate
to western U.P., Panjab, and Delhi, where wages are
higher than in their home areas. They generally pre¬
ferred to work in the mandis, because they earn more
there than they would as ordinary wage labourers or
agricultural labourers. Equally significant perhaps is
the fact that their is a long tradition of Gujar migra¬
tion for work in the mandis, and consequently they are
apt to find that they are working in the mandi with many
or their caste-fe11ows, relatives and fellow kisans from
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neighbouring villages. There is also another reason,
connected with their perception of their izzat (pres¬
tige). These small Gujar kisans do not like to work as
labourers in their own villages and nearby towns because
they view themselves as members of a Kshatriya caste and
as such they have to maintain their prestige by avoiding
a daily public display of their labouring status. In the
mandi, Gujar palledars generally wear their traditional
dress: long shirt and dhoti, Marwari shoes and turban,
and large moustaches.
The majority of the Gujar palledars belong to joint
families in their villages, so to look after the family
and the fields, some mal-4 members stay at home while
other leave to take up jobs. The majority of these
palledars return to their native villages after the Holi
festival (in March) or at the end of the mandi season in
April. They told me this schedule enables them to work
on their agricultural land in the period in which they
ill have crops to tend. Thus, labouring in the mandi
complements rather than replaces agricultural activities
for the palledars. Many of these Gujar palledars have
been doing this work for ten to twenty years but some
only work in the mandi for two to three seasons and
after that never return.
Nearly all Gujar palledars leave their families
behind when they come to Muzaffarnagar to work. Only
fifteen of them had settled permanently with their
families in Muzaffarnagar city. When 1 asked other
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G. Kasans waiting at their kachcha adati's adat for the-
pakka adatia. The carts are loaded with gur.
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palledars if they would like to settle permanently in
Muzaffarnagar, they said that they feel they are living
in pardesh (a "foreign land*); they would not like to
leave their own desh ("homeland") for good. They said
that when they have amassed sufficient money to support
their families for the season, or sufficient cash for a
daughter's dowry, they always want to return to their
own land.
Shared ties to a common desh, and common villages
as well, come paricularly to the fore in the evenings
when the palledars sit together when the arhatis and
kisans have left the mandi. They smoke their hukkas,
sitting together in small groups bound together by
village and kinship ties. They sing their own folksongs
and talk about their families, kinship, affairs, and
also the difficulties they face living apart from their
families in a distant place.
Baniya arhatis told me that there are several
reasons why they prefer to employ Gujar palledars from
Haryana and Rajasthan rather than local palledars.
First, it is important for an arhati to have trustworthy
in the sense that they should not disclose to anyone his
business secrets, his stockpiles, or his actual assets.
Arhatis always fear that local palledars would have more
reasons and more opportunities to disclose business
secrets. As outsiders, Gujar palledars are regarded as
less likely to contribute to local gossip. There is also
far less likelihood that they will have loyalties to
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local kisans, and they would thus be less likely to
cheat the arhati for the benefit of kisans, as local
palledars might do. Another important factor is that in
the evening, when the Gujar palledars finish their work,
they cook, eat, and sleep at the arhats. In this way,
and arhati gets free night watchmen; and palledars are
also available work in the night or whenever work is
required by the arhati. A local palledSrs would of
course return home after finishing his work, and the
arhati would not have this.option. Perhaps the most
important reason why arhatis prefer to employ these men
is they are considered to be more hardworking and loyal
o them than local people. Several kisans who come to
the mandi told me that some palledSrs do not even hesi¬
tate to steal and give short measure to them if they are
asked to do so by their employers. (The palledars howev¬
er denied this when I asked them about such practices.)
In Muzaffarnagar District itself, the local Gujars
are mostly prosperous kisSns with high social status and
a great deal of political influence. 1 interviewed a
number of local Gujars about their views concerning the
Gujar palledars. These local Gujars have no wish to
establish social or marital ties with the Gujar palle¬
dars. In Gujar villages in the district, most kis&ns do
not know that their own caste people from nearby states
are working in the mandis as labourers, even though they
see them whenever they go the mandis to sell their
«
products. Gujars of Muzaffarnagar District strongly
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prefer not to work as labourers because it is contrary
to their own notions of izzat to do so; unlike the
Gujar paliedSrs from Rajasthan and Haryana, their own
land is productive enough to enable them, for them most
part, to avoid having to do so.
There was one instance, however, in which local
Muzaffarnagar Gujars were eager to establish a relation¬
ship with the Gujar palledars, During my field research,
I came to know an official in the District Telegraph
Office who is a Gujar from Saharanpur, the district
immediately to the north of Muzaffarnagar. He has been
working in Muzaffarnagar city since 1983, and he knows
many Gujar palledars because they use his office for
dispatching and collecting mail and telegraphs for their
arhatis. In our conversations, he told me how the Gujar
* *
kisan palledars had faced a dilemma of divided loyal¬
ties, between their employers and their caste-fe11ows,
during the previous parliamentary election. He described
the event :
For the first time, 1 was able to mobilize Gujar
paliedSrs to support a local well-known Gujar
candidate. They did support him, but their employ¬
ers—the Baniya Sfhatis--were very displeased.
They expected them to support their candidate as
they used to do in the past. And it was a very
critical time for palledars because on one side
there was a candidate from their own caste, and on
the other side there was the candidate of their
employers. We wanted them not only to cast their
votes in our favour but we also wanted them to
participate actively in our election campaign. But
they told me that while they would cast their votes
in our favour and would give chandS (financial
contribution) to the Gujar candidate, it would be
impossible for them to participate openly in the
election campaign, and to confront their employers
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openly on a political issue. The result was that
most of the Gujar palledars did not participate in
the election campaign of their own caste man. They
simply cast their vote for him and gave chanda to
him secretly and told their employers that they
cast their votes for their candidate.
I confirmed the truth of this account in conversations
with some Gujar palledars, though they were as a rule
reluctant to discuss the business and political activi¬
ties of their employers.
Gujar palJedars are employed by arhatis through
their own labour-contractor called a lambardar. (The
usual meaning of this term is "headman of a village or
community"). They are employed on an unwritten contract
basis for the whole mandi season. So the 1ambardar is a
middle-man between the arhati and the hired palledars,
and it is his duty to ensure that neither party breaks
the terms of the contract. If a palledar does not work
properly, or the arhati is unsatisfied with him, a
lambardar can dismiss him, but the arhati is generally
considered by all in the mandi to lack the authority to
do so himself. During my fieldwork, for example, Laksh-
mandas (a kachcha arhati) complained to his 1ambardar
that one palledar was lazy and not working properly. The
lambardar asked the arhati to give the palledar another
chance, and he warned the palledar that he would be
dismissed if didn't begin to perform his work properly.
The arhati complained to the lambard'ar again after a few
days, and so the 1ambardar asked the palledar to leave
the arhat.
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The lambardar's authority rests on his power to
Jismiss any palJedars, and also on the fact that he is
usually older, and respected in his own home village. He
therefore is able to draw on both his "contractual" and
his "traditional" authority at the arhat. I witnessed
one example of this sort of overlap during the course of
my field work. Jai Singh, a Gujar palledar employed by
Amba Parshad (a kachcha aphati), was quarreling with the
arhati over the payment of wages. His 1ambardar, Bhoj
Ram Singh, took the arhati's.part against the palledar.
Jai Singh was forced to accept the lambardar's judgment
in the matter, but he told Bhoj Ram that he would not
have accepted the judgment in the arhat if it had not
been the fact that the issue was a gaon ki bat, a
"village matter" in which Jai Singh owed deference to
Bhoj Ram because they were from the same village, and
because the latter enjoyed a senior kinship position
there.
Thus, palJedars pay respect to a 1ambardar on the
bases of their village customs and relationships. They
feel that even if he sides with an arhati in a particu¬
lar instance, he is still their own man (apne admi).
If a palledar has to leave his job for any reason,
it is the lambardar's responsibility to provide another
palledar in his place. Both a palledar and his employer
are morally bound not to break their unwritten contract
until the end of the season.
palledars are expected to work from 7:00 a.m. to
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4:00 p.m. in the mandi, but they are obliged to work at
other times as well, if required by the arhati. They
provide many kinds of services to their arhatis: They
load and unload carts and trucks; They weigh and pack
arhat'is' stock; they arrange kisans' products in front
of the arhats in attractive displays (this is called mo-
handi lagana, which literally means "to apply makeup");
and they often provide arhatis with domestic services as
servants, messengers, and errand-runners. 1 found five
cases in which 1amhardars were sent to the morning auc¬
tion by their pakka arhatis, to buy products on their
behalf. In each of these cases, the iambardar had worked
for the arhati for a long time and was considered suffi¬
ciently knowledgeable and trustworthy to perform this
task.
Up until 1988, contracts normally specified that
palledars would receive between 500 and 800 rupees per
month, and wages were indeed paid as such fixed sum
amounts. According to the DAPM committee rules, however,
a pal 1edar was supposed to be paid according to the
total amount of produce loaded and unloaded at the arhat
in any given day. But the arhatis had simply been put¬
ting false figures in the wage and labour account books
that were kept for government taxation purposes, and
they continued to pay their palledars lump sums accord¬
ing to the unwritten seasonal contracts. The palledars
received somewhat lower wages because of this, but they
tolerated the situation for some time because they were
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nonetheless earning higher wages in the mandi than they
could earn as agricultural labourers. But in 1988 they
confronted the arhatis, saying that either their sal¬
aries should be increased, or they should be paid ac¬
cording to the volume of work, as specified in the DAPM
committee rules. Their demands were not acceptable to
the arhat is, the palledars stopped working, and as a
result business in the mandi was completely paralyzed
ior two days. The arhatis were thus forced to negotiate
with the palledars, and an agreement was finally reached
that the latter would be paid 80 paisa per quintal of
produce handled in the arhat. It was also agreed that
palledars would be free to solicit work from other
arhatis in their free time, when there was no work at
their own arhat.
" «
Although there is no formal union organization of
the palledars in the mandi, they have a strong sense of
unity among themselves. If lambardars call their fellow
lambardars and palledars to go on strike, as in the
above example, they always get unanimous support from
them. In the last five years they have gone on strike
three times: twice against low wages and once when a
colleague was insulted by his employer. During these
strikes, arhatis were unable to carry on their trading
activities and in consequence they suffered great finan¬
cial 1osses.
There are about twenty-five local female labourers
who work in the mandi on a daily wage basis. They are
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from local service castes, and they have, for the most
part, migrated from surrounding villages. They are
employed to perform such tasks as stitching and marking
bags, straining and winnowing grain and sweeping the
ground beneath heaps of grain and sugarcane products,
and they receive the same wages as males who might be
hired on daily wage basis.
In this chapter, 1 have examined the relationships
among the afhatls, munims, and paiiedars of the Muzaf-
farnagar mandi. I have focused especially on the social
identities of these""three groups, and how aspects of
these identities are relevant in mandi social organiza¬
tion. I have suggested that it is not possible to ana¬
lyze this organization only in economic terms that would
focus simply on employer-employee identities and con¬
tractual relationships. Rather, a broad panoply of
social identities and social interests converge in the
mancji, and these must be considered in any analysis of
this marketplace.
I have provided the most detail on the arhatis in
mandi, as necessary background to Chapter 6, which will
focus principally on relationships between kachcha




RITUALIZING THE MARKETPLACE: THE ARHATIS' V1EW
The subject of this chapter is the ritual dimension
of t is' commerc ial activities, and the associated
belief system. In Chapter 3, I suggested that in many
transactions in which kisans engage, pronounced con¬
flicts between the morality of the market and their
"traditional" morality of exchange are clearly observa¬
ble. But in the case of the Baniya arhatls in the mandi,
the demands of their ritual lives do not generally
appear to be in conflict with the demands of commercial
exchange. This is not because they are able to "com¬
partmentalize" two spheres of their activities (as
Singer 1972 has suggested in the case for Sough Indian
Brahman industrialists) rather, it is because the par¬
ticular occupational culture (the distinctive values,
beliefs and social institutions associated with a par¬
ticular occupation; (see Singer ed., 1973) of these Ba-
niyas explicitly values, endorses, and promotes the
pursuit of profit in the marketplace, and because these
Baniyas tend to represent the workings of the market as
being directly associated with some ways, to a ritual
sphere. In the case of Baniya a^hatis of the Muzaffarna-
gar mandi, we do not find the short of conflicting
expectation that characterize kisans' relationship to
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the sphere of market exchange.
In order to demonstrate the impact of the cultural
aspects of Baniya a rhat is* representations of market
activity upon their behaviour at the mandi I describe
four main analytically distinct categories of belief and
ritual practice. Some of these are deemed important by
all Baniya arhatis, while other may be variously debat-'
»♦
ed, doubted, or rejected by some of them. 1 shall indi¬
cate, in the following descriptions, the degree to which
each belief or ritual practice is embraced by arhatis in
the Muzaffarnagar mandi, and the degree to which they
actually influence economic action. The analytical
distinctions 1 will make are concerned with the func¬
tions of these beliefs and rituals in the lives of
Baniya arhatis. 1 will first discuss the beliefs and
rituals that function as moral justifications for com¬
mercial activity. Secondly, 1 describe a set of beliefs
and rituals that, from the arhatis' point of view, func¬
tion to ensure success and profit in trade. Thirdly, 1
discuss beliefs concerning the prediction of profit and
loss in the marketplace. And fourthly, 1 analyze, an
important set of beliefs concerning the conversion of
inauspicious dishonestly earned money into auspicious
and productive money. For all four of these categories
of cultural beliefs, 1 will point out the ways in which
they also function as markers of Baniya social identity.
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Moral justification of Commercial Activity
I asked some Baniya arhatis why a majority of
arhatis in the mandi are from the Baniya community. One
Baniya arhati said :
There are some special traits (gunas) in our blood
which are necessary for a person to be a trader.
These traits are tolerance, politeness, simple
living, accumulation of savings and a risk taking
attitude in trade. People of other castes lack
these traits. Ue believe that for us, a customer is
a form of the goddess Lakshmi Cthe goddess of
wealth]. So even if he abuses us we must tolerate
him.
Another Baniya arhati responded to my question in this
way :
Trade is a Baniya's dharma [religious duty]. Ac¬
cording to the varna system every caste has its
dharma. In doing trade, we fulfill our duty for
society. We have been involved in trading activi¬
ties since ancient times. It was Shiva who gave us
this occupation. "
He told me a story in this context.
Once Shiva was offering dan ["gifts in blessings"]
to people from every caste. A Baniya went to him
last because he had patience to wait. But Shiva had
nothing left to give him. So Shiva said to him,
"Now nothing is left but 1 can offer you my gaddi
[the sitting place, trader's sitting place] on
which I am sitting. It will always keep you pros¬
perous and wealthy." The Baniya accepted the gaddi.
Since that day all BaniySs consider trade to be
their occupation, and they consider their gaddis to
be pure places. They must maintain the purity of
their gaddis.
A third young Baniya arhati said:
Because Baniyas have been engaged in trading activities
since ancient times, and we are born and grown up in
trading atmosphere, we obviously know better than other
people how to do business. Agriculture is not in our
blood. Trade is more profitable than any other occupa¬
tion. We are not skilled in other occupations but
modern occupations like medical and engineering, we
prefer as much as trade.
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Dhan Prakash Jain, a kacheha arhati told me that in the
Jain religion all those occupations are forbidden for a
Jain in which the taking of any form of life is in¬
volved. This is because Jains espouse the doctrine of
ahinsa (non-violence). For a Jain, the most respectable
occupation is trade and agriculture is considered the
least desirable occupation.
From the above remarks made by Baniya arhatis, it
is clear that, in their view, their caste dharma and
their inbornbodily dispositions foster a skillful en¬
gagement in trade. The Baniya arhatis to whom 1 posed
the question of how they would morally justify involve¬
ment in commercial profit-making activity generally
responded that they were in trade only for the purpose
of realizing profits. They told me that while making
money from money-lending was morally acceptable, amass¬
ing profits from hoarding, tax-evasion, overcharging,
and so forth are theoretically morally wrong. But be¬
cause of the burden of government regulations, and the
level and complexity of taxation, they feel, they told
me, that earning money through these practices is seen
as acceptable, if they remove the evil consequences
through the giving of dan from the money made in this
way. Parry has also written of such ritual disposal of
sin by traders, and of the fact that:
"...although everybody would agree that such prac¬
tices are morally reprehensible, their condemnation
generally seems to lack real sense of outrage"
(1989:77).
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Ensuring Success and Profit in Trade
In western U.P., it appears that Baniya traders
perhaps perform Brahmanical rituals more diligently than
any other caste group except perhaps the Brahman
priests. The BaniyS arhatis in Muzaffarnagar mandi
perform many rituals at their arhats for insuring suc¬
cess and profit in their trade. In the following pages 1
describe those beliefs and rituals which are commonly
held by many if not all Baniya arhatis.
For a Baniya arhati, his arhat is not just a place
where he carries out his commercial activities but also
where Lakshmi (the goddess of wealth and prosperity) re¬
sides. If Lakshmi is unhappy and does not reside in the
arhat, a Baniya arhati would not be successful in his trade.
Therefore, Baniya arhatis must keep their arhats pure
« • * r
tpavitra or sudha) and auspicious Isudh). MurariLal, a
kachcha arhati told me that when the mandi was opened in
1982, he was allotted the last arhat, on the north side
of the mandi by the secretary of the DAPM committee.
Because the front of the alloted arhat was wider than
« *
the back(i.e. snake-shaped), it made MurariLal sad
(there are only two arhats of this shape in the mandi)
because he believes that it was a dwelling place of
Sheshnag (the snake god). And because Sheshnag should
not be disturbed, he thought that to start a business in
that arhat would be inauspicious and would bring him a
loss. He asked the secretary of the DAPM committee to
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allot him another arhat but he was refused. Then Murari-
«. t
Lai consulted his family pandit to find out some solu¬
tion to the problem. The pandit advised him that in
order to remove inauspiciousness from the arhat, the
space should redivided into parts and that Sheshnag
should be worshiped in the arhat immediately prior to
the commencement of any business.The pandit worshipped
at the arhat on an auspicious day and time. Since then
Murari Lai has been keeping an idol of Sheshnag (a
snake-shaped piece of iron) in his arhat for pleasing
the god, and he worships it every day. Additionally he
offers some dan to a Dakaut (a lower ranked Brahman sub-
caste) as he was advised by the pandit. A Khatri arhati
who was alloted the second arhat of the same shape told
me in an interview that he performed the same rites as
Murari Lai did.
Another important belief which is held by all
Baniya arhatis in the mandi is that before starting any
trade in a new arhat or shop they must perform a muhurat
ritual at their place of business, for removing inauspi-
ciousness and pollution IasudhatS or apavitrata) from
the place and for soliciting blessings from the deities,
particularly Lakshmi and Ganesh (the god of wisdom and
auspicious beginnings) that will ensure auspicious
profit (subh-Jabh) in their trade. Before performing the
muhurat ritual a Brahman pandit who has astrological
knowledge would be consulted. The pandit would suggest
an auspicious day and time, auspicious for that particu-
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lar endeavour, on the basis of the arhati's birth horo¬
scope (janam-kundali) , and the locations and movements
of the nine planets {grahas),
During my field research, a number of muhurat ceremo¬
nies relating to arhats took place in the mandi, and 1 was
able to observe three of them. 1 describe here on muhurat
ritual performance which 1 attended. Before starting his new
arhat, Lala Mul Chand, a BaniyS fiakka arhati, first consult¬
ed Sita Ram, his family pandit, for ascertaining an auspi¬
cious day and time (subh ghari) for the performance of the
muhurat ritual. After telling him the auspicious day and
time Pandit Sita Ram asked Mul Chand to bring him some
samagri la mixture of some spices and food that are used
for worship) and other items required for the muhurat
ritual at the arhat. 1 asked the pandit why he suggested
» * *
those particular items for the ritual performance. He
told me that among them some were for removing inauspi-
ciousness and pollution and some of them were the signs
of some particular deities. For example, dubara grass
Ipao cynosuroides)is a favoured item of Ganesh and it is
also used for purification. Basil is closely associated
with the worship of Vishnu (the husband of Lakshmi). The
leaves of the siras tree are a powerful charm and Laksh¬
mi and Ganesh reside on the leaves of the mango tree.
Water from the Ganga river (ganga jal) purifies every¬
thing.
In the early morning, before Sita Ram reached the
"■fhat for the ritual performance, Mul Chand cleaned his
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arhat and spread cow dung paste on the gaddi (with a
belief that cow dung has the ability to remove pollu¬
tion). He then spread out a clean white sheet on the
gaddi and waited for the arrival of the pandit and the
invited guests. Sita Ram arrived a few minutes before
the auspicious time and hung a festoon of f reslyinango and
siras leaves over the front door of the Srhat. After
*
o
hanging the festoon of leaves, Sita Ram asked his jajman
(i.e. Mul Chand) to put images of Lakshmi, Ganesh and
Shiva, the samagrl and all account books (which were
going to be used for the whole year) on the gaddi.
Sita Ram began reciting mantras (ritually effecious
speech) from religious books in praise of Lakshmi,
Ganesh and Shiva, and set fire to the pieces of wood
(which were kept in a iron bown). During the mantra
chanting Sita Ram continually threw the samagri in the
fire (called havan karna) and asked Mul Chand to do the
same. At the same time Sita Ram put some silver coins
'symbolising Lakshmi) in charanamrit ("pure" liquid made
of five ingredients ganga jal, basil leaves, yogurt,
cow's milk and honey). Sita Ram told me later that this
action was a sign that Lakshmi had taken a bath and was
ready for the meal (bhog). After this rite Sita Ram put
some food items on the mouths of the idols and asked Mul
Chand to do the same. Sita Ram then wrote " subh labh
(" auspic i ous-we 1 f aire-prof i t" )', SriLakshmi namah' (Sri is
another name of Lakshmi) and "Sri Ganesh namah' (namah
means worth salutation) on the first pages of all the
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account books ibahis) with the paste of camphor, sandal¬
wood and turmeric powder applied with his little right
finger. He put some betel leaves, dubara grass, betel
nut, gur, dry coriander and roli (a mixture of turmeric
and lime powder) on the first three pages of each ac¬
count book. 1 was told by Sita Ram that it was a sign
that the deities have taken their meal.
All Baniya arhatfs leave the first three pages of their
account books blank, because, they say, they believe
that these three pages represent abodes of the deities
Lakshmi, Ganestyand Shiva. One Baniya arhati also gave me
a practical explanation of this rite: during the finan¬
cial year, if an account book is filled up, these first
three pages can be used, to avoid starting new account
books and no account book can be opened without perform¬
ing basana-bada1na) the ritual of opening new account
books and closing old ones), which is performed only at
the beginning of the new financial year.
Sita Ram put a red thread on the right wrist of the
arhati and the arhatT put a red thread on the right
wrist of the pandit. Then, on the wall above the gaddi,
Sita Ran^drew a large yantra (a mystical diagram) and
wrote words similar to those he has written on the first
.'ages of the account books.
1 noted in some Baniyas' arhats that images of Lakshmi,
Ganesh and Shiva were drawn, and printed pictures of these
deities were hung alongside yantra on the walls inside of
the arhats. The yantra figure, which is called the Lakshmi
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yantra, consists of nine squares in which numbers are writ¬
ten in such a way that vertically, horizontally and diago¬
nally the total of the three squares should be fifteen and
the grand total of the squares should be forty five (see
figure 4).
Figure 4: Two Lakshmi yantras
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Mul Chand told me that this yantra ensures that the
business of the arhati would result in auspicious profit
because it has vashikaran sakti (the charm or power of
attraction) for attracting customers. And it also pro¬
tects the 9rhat from any bury najar (evil-eye) that can
adversely affect profit and prosperity. 1 noted that
some arhatis had drawn other yantras as well which were
given to them, as 1 was told, by astrologers and their
own qurus(persona 1 religious guide).
At the end of the muhurat ceremony, Sita Ram asked
flu 1 Chand to keep the silver coins (symbolising Lakshmi)
in the safe and wrote 'Subh V Labh' on it. This meant
that from that day Lakshmi was going to stay forever in
the arhat. After completing all the rites of worship
(puja) , Sita Ram distributed charanamrit, gur and dry
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coriander as prasad to ail the people who were present.
When I asked one invited Baniya arhat why these particu¬
lar items were given in prasad. He said, "Gur is a sign
of mithas (politeness: sweetness) and coriander is a
sign of thandahi (gentleness; coolness). This reminder
us that we should deal with our customers with polite¬
ness and calmness to gain auspicious profit in our
trade". At the end of the ceremony the pandit received
some rupees, cloth and sweets from the arhati in dakshi-
na, payment or fee for the performance of the muhurat
, i tua1.
Hardwari Lai, a Marwari Zrhati, told me that in the
past there were two important customs in the mandi
regarding the muhurat ritual. After the performance of
the ritual the arhati would expect invited guests to
give some business that day and also invited arhati
guests would be expected to lend some money to their
host without interest for an unlimited period in order
to give financial support to a fellow arhati. The arhati
is expected to return this money only after making a
profit in his business. When 1 asked Mul Chand why
Baniya arhatis do not follow these customs anymore, he
said that because gradually the feeling of co-operation
and brotherhood has been decreasing and the feelings of
individualism and competition has been on the increase
among the arhatis.
MSrwari Baniya arhatis perform the muhurat ritual
in the same way and with the same beliefs as local
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Baniya arhatis expect that they included a whole coconut
covered with red cloth ( a symbol of Kubar, the god of
possession and distribution of wealth). They keep this
symbol of Kubar in their arhats. Also Marwari and Khatri
arhatis hang whole yelow limes and red chillies on the
main door of their arhats at the time of this ritual
performance. When 1 asked some of these arhatis why they
hang these items on the doors of their arhats, 1 was
given three different explanations. One Panjabi Khatri
arhati said that the line's yellow colour represents
Lakshmi (yellow is a favourite colour of Lakshmi) and
the red colour of the chillies represents the god Hanu-
man. A Marwari pakka arhati said that these two items
t ' ►
are hung on the doors for protecting arhats from opari-
hav£ (air-borne ghosts) and evil-eye. A third arhati
told me that lime and chillies purify (suddh-karna) air
that enters in the arhat.
Jain a^hatis perform muhurat in a slightly differ¬
ent way but with virtually identical beliefs about the
efficacy of the ritual. They call their own pandits for
ritual performances at their arhats. Among jain arhatis
the ma in objects of their ritua1 per f ormanees are their
Jain tirthankaras ("ford makers" who conquered worldly
passions). They use flowers, fruits, and rice, and they
read Jain religious books in the rite.
The Jain religion discourages the worship of
images, particularly those of non-Join deities, but in
the mandi all Jain arhatis worship Lakshmi and Ganesh
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along with their tirthankara. and they hang pictures of
these deities on the walls inside their achats. A Jain
arhati told me that because of a shortage of Jain pan-
Jits in Muzaffarnagar city, Jain arhatis often call
Hindu pandits to perform rituals at their arhats. These
Brahman pandits perform the rituals for Jain arhatis in
the Jain manner. In one case, in which a local Baniya
and Sukhmal Chand Jain, a Jain arhati are partners in a
kachcha arhat, first a Brahman pandit performed the
muhurat ritual and the Jain partner participated along
with his Baniya partner. When the Brahman pandit left
the 5rhat a Jain pandit came and performed the muhurat
ritual according to the Jain religion. I asked Sukhmal
Chand Jain why he performed the ritual in the Hindu way
and why all Jain arhatis keep images of Hindu deities in
their arhats and worship them, despite the fact that the
Jain religion discourages such worship. He replied:
Yes, we do not believe in worshipping Hindu images,
but when a person is in trade he does not want to
take any dharmik sankat (religious risk) which may
be bring loss in trade. Maybe Lakshmi and Ganesh
will also bring profit to us, like our own tirthan-
karas. Therefore, I do not think that there is any
harm in worshipping these Hindu deities. Also,
1 like to respect the feelings of my partner as he
respects mine.
A similar answer was given to me by Yogendra Singh,
a young Jat kachcha arhati:
Ue [Jatsl do not believe in performing all these
•Baniya rituals" at our arhat and in worshipping
Lakshmi, but we perform all the main Baniya rituals
and keep images of Lakshmi and Ganesh because when
we have entered into this community [Baniya] and
are doing stheir occupation then we have to do
things as they do to show them and our customers
that we are not different from these Baniya arhatis
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in our beliefs and actions.
Another important ritual called basana-badaJna
(changing the account books) is performed on the first
day of the financial year byall Baniya arhatis at their
arhats, with the belief that they will gain profit and
be successful in their trade. This ritual is focused on
the closing of old account books and the opening of new
ones; and its name comes from the bag used for keeping
account books (basana) and the Hindi word for changing
Kbadalna). Only those new account books which have been
worshipped at this ritual will be used for the coming
year. The Hindu calender year starts in the month of
Kartik (in November), on the day of the Divali festival.
Most arhatis start their financial year either from' «
Divali or the day of the Dashehra (or Vijayadasmi)
festival which is celebrated in the month of Aswani (in
October). Baniya Srhatis in the mancii consider these two
festive days to be the most auspicious days to start new
business and the new financial year. During my field
research, I noted that on the days of Divali and Dasheh¬
ra, pandits were hurriedly running from one jajman's
arhat to another for performing the basana-badaJna
ritua1.
The official financial year in India is from 1st
April to 31st March, and taxation officers have begun
insisting that all traders start their new financial
year according to the official calendar, for taxation
reasons. Therefore, nowadays, some arhatis have started
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their financial year according to the government finan¬
cial year and celebrate the basana badalna ritual on the
1st of April. The ritual of basana badalna is performed
in the same manner as the ritual of muhurat, but in
addition to the rites of the muhurat ritual, some other
rites are also performed in the basana badalha ritual.
At the end of the financial year, Baniya arhatis,
with the help of their munims, prepare the final bal¬
ance-sheet (pakka chitha) for calculating taxes, for
ascertaining their actual profit and loss (labh hani),
and for celebrating the ritual of basana badalna in
which they request the goddess Lakshmi to come and
reside in their arhats. I attended several performances
of this ritual in the mandi. 1 describe one performance
here which I observed at the arhat of Ganga Ram, a
Baniya pakka arhati.
Ganga Ram called his pandit for the performance of
basana badalna at his arhat. During the ritual perform¬
ance, the pandit wrapped up all account books in a red
and white piece of new cloth measuring one and a quarter
yards (sawl g^j). Ganga Ram told me that white was a
sign of "purity* and cleanliness and red was a sign of
the god Hanuman, the protector from obstacles. On one
corner of the bundle or bag, a hole was left through
which some betel-nuts, gur, flowers, turmeric, Indian
u,adder Imajeet), dry coriander and some coins (a symbol
of Lakshmi) were put by the pandit. The pandit explained
to me that these items were used because it is believed
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that they are a meal for Lakshmi, who would be persuaded
to stay in the bundle. After this a pandit drew swastika
signs <y»> and wrote "Sri Subh Labhn on the inside of
the corner of the hole with the paste of camphor, san¬
dalwood, and turmeric powder. Then the pandit asked
Ganga Ram to give him the new account books. On these he
wrote and drew signs in the same way as in the muhul&t
ritual performance. In may conversation with Ganga Ram,
he told me that Baniya traders perform this ritual with
the belief that they will gain profit in their trade.
At the time of worshipping in both the muhurat and
basana badaina ceremonies, greeting cards are also put
before the images. Later, these greeting cards are sent
to vyaparis. Below is the translation of a greeting card
which was sent by Ganga Ram to the vyaparis at the time
of the basana badaina ceremony at his arhat:




Sri (name of the vyapari)
Ue hope that you along with your.family are well
and business is going very well. We have celebrated
basana badaina on an auspicious day [the name of
the day] and time and from this day we are going to
deai in food grains also. In this year, sugarcane
crop is very good in Muzaffarnagar District and
hopefully prices of gur and sakkar will be low in
the next month.
From today our charges for our services will be as
foilows :
Name of the service Rate
••••••••••••••••••• ••••••
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Ganga Ram & Sons
The language of this greeting card shows that it is
not just a greeting card but also an advertisement for
business and a formal price or rate guarantee for the
vyaparis. On the day of the basana badalna ceremony, the
contracts of munims and palledarsf are also renewed and
new contracts are made in the mandi.
Vishnu Pandit, who is considered the most knowl¬
edgeable and popular pandit to perform the rituals for
the Baniya arhatis in the mandi, told me that the number
of account books used by arhatis for their business must
be an odd number. Odd numbers are considered auspicious,
because even numbers are considered "perfect" (sampuran)
and no human being is perfect. It is the god Brahma who
is "complete," who created the whole universe. Therefore
to keep account books in even numbers is inauspicious.
But Baru Mai, a Baniya pakka arhati gave a different
explanation to me, that account books in odd numbers
indicate that the accounts and profit should not be
"complete," but continually increase. This is fact is
the more generally accepted interpretation of the use of
odd numbers in such matters. Also, the covers of the
account books should be red because red is a symbol of
Hanuman, the god who removes obstacles and who bestows
success in the work of human beings. Thus red is a sign
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of auspiciousness.
As for any Baniya trader anywhere, for the Baniya
arhatis in the mandi his business place (arhat) has a
^ k • r
ritual significance. It is a pi ace financial gain is not
separated from religious practices and beliefs. The
gaddi (a platform covered with a white sheet on which a
arhati and his munims sit, and on which the money box
and account books are placed) is "pure" (pavitra) for
Baniya arhatis (see Fox 1969:59). They say that they
should maintain its "purity". In the past no member of
an untouchable caste or non-Hindu person was allowed to
sit on the gaddi because of fear of polluting the gaddi.
On the gaddi, .the arhati and munims sit in particular
places and nobody else is allowed to sit there. Any
object or activity that can make the gaddi impure must
be kept away from it. For example, nobody is allowed to
sit on the gaddi while wearing shoes, smoking, drinking
alcohol or eating food, because these items and activi¬
ties will pollute it. One Baniya arhati told me that
when an arhati and his munim are sitting on the gaddi,
they must sit in the lotus position (which is the sit¬
ting position of lord Shiva) and not in a relaxed posi¬
tion which would indicate that they were not prepared to
welcome the goddess Lakshmi. Lala Baldev, an old Baniya
arhati told me:
Now the times have changed. I can not forbid a
service caste person to sit on the gaddi if he
brings good business to me and also, it is illegal
to forbid a service caste person to sit on the
gaddi. The government has given many rights to the
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service caste people. But I do not allow smoking,
eating and so forth On my gaddi. 1 also do not like
it when somebody sits on the gaddi in a lazy posi¬
tion.
Usually Baniya arhatis arrive at their arhats at
about 7 a.m., after taking a bath, worshipping Lakshmi
and having breakfast at their homes. At the arhat,
before doing any business, a Baniya arhati touches his
gaddi with the finger-tips of his right hand (called
nachkarna), and then touches his forehead as a gesture
of respect to the gaddi. Then he worships the images of
several deities, particularly Lakshmi, Ganesh and Shiva.
Munims are also expected to perform the same worship.
After finishing the worship ai;hatis open their business¬
es. Before closing their arhats in the evening, Baniya
afhatis worship again in the same manner as in the
morning and leave a light on in the arhat, because they
believe that the goddess Lakshmi never stays in the
darkness. They avoid the use of these words: "Close the
arhat" or "close the account books" (arhat bandh karris'
or bahi bandh karna). They will say instead, "arhat
barhana' and bahi barhana' (barhana - to increase or
prosper).
Baniya arhatis believe that their safes of money
boxed should never be left empty. One Jain arhati said
to me, "If there is no money left in the safe, it is a
sign of inauspiciousness because it indicates that
Lakshmi has gone" (as money is a symbol of Lakshmi).
Baniyas also consider it very inauspicious for their
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weighing scales to be empty at any time. To prevent this
happening the arhati ensures that, even when their
scales are not in use, a weight is left in one of the
pans.
Banarsi Dass, a Baniya arhati first told me, and I
confirmed the point from many other arhatis as well,
that for a Baniya trader it is very important that the
first transaction of the day involved receiving cash,
even if it is only a small token amount. This event, the
first transaction of the day, is called bohani karna. In
this context, cash represents the goddess Lakshmi and
the acceptance of cash by the Baniya trader is a sign of
the arrival of Lakshmi at the arhat. The giving of
credit in such circumstances would cause all the day's
transactions to be of a similar kind and this would be
bad for the profit of the arhat. It is also inauspicious
for the trader if the first customer does not make a
purchase or give business. Also, arhatis can use this
custom as a device not to give money to people as they
often do in the mandi. For example, one day in the
morning when I was interviewing a Baniya arhati at his
arhat, a local cloth merchant came to him and asked the
arhati to pay his credit. The arhati said to him that it* " »«•
was a time of bohani and he had not done any bohani yet.
Therefore, the cloth merchant either should come in the
evening or the next day to collect his money. The cloth
merchant said that he would come the next day and he
left the arhat. After half an hour, a kisan client came
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there and asked the arhati for a short-term loan, but
/ •
the a^hati gave him the same answer. But I noted that
the arhati had received a large amount of money from a
• *
pakka arhati before these two people visited him.
Throughout North India, the festival of Divali
("festival of lights") which is celebrated on the new
moon day of the month of Kartik (in November) is an
important Hindu festival. But it has a special signifi¬
cance for Baniya traders insofar as their commercial
activities, financial gain and identity as Baniyas are
concerned. The general belief among Hindus for celebrat¬
ing Divali is that on the day of Divali, Rama (an incar¬
nation of the god Vishnu, the husband of Lakshmi) re¬
turned to the kingdom of Ayodhya after rescuing his wife
Sita from the evil king Ravana and killing him in a war.
Rama was appointed the king of Ayodhya, and in celebra¬
tion, the people of the city decorated their houses with
lights and set off fire-works. From that day people
celebrated this day every year. In the following pages,
1 will only described those rites and beliefs related to
the Divali festival, which are particularly observed by
the Baniya arhatis of Muzaffarnagar mandi.
On the day before the Divali festival, on the 13th
day (teras) of the month of Kartik, the festival of
Dhanteras (dhan = wealth) is celebrated by Baniya arha¬
tis. Pawan Kumar Goel, a Baniya arhati, told me that for
Baniyas this day is a sign that Lakshmi is one the way
to their houses and business. Therefore on this day,
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they must clean and whitewash their houses and business
premises and decorate them with lights. After worship¬
ping Lakshrai, the female members of Baniya families put
a few flour paste lamps (called kachcha diva) in drains
and in other dark places in their houses and make sure
that the members of the family should not see them. They
believe that all inauspiciousness, evils and ghosts have
been removed from the house through these lamps, if
members of the family see these lamps then they would be
affected by evils and ghosts. Baniyas believe that it is
auspicious to buy new cloths, brass pots and jewellery
on this day.
On the days of Dhanteras and Divali, Baniya arhatis
prefer to sell only for cash and not on credit; and they
will not give money to anybody. Banarsi Dass told me
that this is because on these two days they must only
•receive" Lakshmi coming to their houses and shops.
Spending or giving money to anybody would mean that they
are refusing Lakshmi; and a BaniyaT should never refuse
Lakshmi. (In daily conversation, not only Baniyas but
non-Baniya people.also use the word "Lakshmi" as synony¬
mous with money). Getting money on these two days is
considered auspicious. Because of this belief, no cash
transaction is done by most of the Baniyas arhatis in
the mandi on these two days. Lala Gordhan Das, a Baniya
arhati who has an iron rolling mill in the city, told me
that every year, on Divali day, he always sells his
products only by cash and at less than market prices for
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attracting customers. So Lala Gordhan Das is willing to
.orego the profit he would make by selling on credit, in
order to increase, for ritual reasons, his intake of
cash on these particular days.
In a year when Divali falls on a Tuesday (there is
no fixed solar date for Divali because its occurrence is
calculated according to lunar reckoning), Baniya arhatis
perform muhurat and basana badalna rituals on the day
of the Dhanteras festival, not on Divali itself. Tuesday
(related to the planet Mangal) is the day of the god
Hanuman and theoretically no business should be done on
this day (although, in fact it often is). Tuesday is the
day for giving dan to the poor. In the evening, on the
day of Dhanteras, Baniya arhatis worship Lakshmi, Ganesh
and Shiva at their arhatis and after that ali members of
their families perform worship of these deities again at
their homes.
On the day of Divali, Baniya afhatis distribute
sweets to poor people and to their employees, to obtain
the blessings of the goddess Lakshmi, and they send
Divali greeting cards, sweets and fruits to their
friends, clients and relatives for good wishes. One
baniya arhati told me that on this occasion, Baniyas can
offer bribes under the guise of Divali gifts and then
get favours more easily from those government officers
who might otherwise be difficult to approach.
At the arhats in the mandi, the Divali pujan
(worship) ceremony is performed by the family Brahman
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puro/jits of the arhatis. I terns used in trade are cleaned
or washed for •purification' before the pujan. All
measures, weights and scales are also worshipped at the
time of the pujan along with the images of Lakshmi,
Ganesh and Shiva. After the pujan, lighted lamps filled
with mustard oil are kept everywhere inside and outside
the arhats for the whole night. When 1 visited the mandi
in the evening to observe the Divali pujan, the whole
mandi was illuminated by lamps. Then 1 visited the homes
of two Baniya and one Khatri arhati to observe the pujan
ceremony in a domestic context.
After performing Divali pujan at the arhats, the
pandits performed the pujan again in the same way at the
homes of the arhatis in the late evening, at an auspi¬
cious time. At the Panjabi Khatri arhatis home, 1 noted
that after the Divali pujan some rupees were given to
all the women of the family by the a'rhati. When I asked
' *
him why he gave the money to women, he explained to me
that it was auspicious to give some money to women in
jPrasad because women are a symbol of Lakshmi, and to do
so increases the family's prosperity, wealth and profit
in trade. At midnight, some Baniya traders secretly
worship Lakshmi in their houses and put all their money,
jewellery, account books and other valuable items before
an image of Lakshmi and sprinkle ganga jaJ (water from
the Ganga river ) on them with the belief that this rite
would remove all inauspiciousness from the valuable
items and would increase the wealth (as 1 was told by
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some Baniya arhatis). When 1 visited the home of Mitra
Sen, a Baniya arhati, to attend the pujan, he told me
* r
that during the whole night on the Divali day the homes
and business places of Baniya traders should be
illuminated by lamps because Baniyas believe that
Lakshmi wanders in the night and she will stay only
where there is light. In this context, 1 was told three
different versions of a single story, one by Mitra Sen,
one by a Brahman priest and one by a Jat kisan. These
three different versions show how Baniyas think that
Lakshmi (in other words wealth) is so important for them
and how non-Baniya people think of the prosperity and
richness of the Baniyas in relation to their own moral
values. The story which was told to me by Mitra Sen is
as foilows :
Once the god Vishnu (husband of Lakshmi) visited
mrityu-lok ("world of death," i.e. this world on
earth) from the akash-lok (world of sky or heaven)
with Lakshmi and said to her, "1 am going on tour
to the south (which is an inauspicious direction)
and you should not follow me because it will be a
sign of inauspiciousness. But as soon as Vishnu
started to walk south, Lakshmi started to walk
behind him. On the way, Lakshmi saw a mustard field
and then a sugarcane field; and she stopped at the
sugarcane field. First she ornamented herself and
then she picked up sugarcane from the field without
the permission of the field's owner and started to
chew it. When Vishnu returned from his tour, he saw
Lakshmi eating the sugarcane and he became very
angry with her because he had asked her not to
follow him and because she had taken sugarcane from
the field without the permission of the farmer.
Vishnu placed a curse on her so that she would have
to serve that farmer for the next twelve years.
After cursing her, Vishnu went to pate 1 -/ok
(the underground world, below earth and sea) and
Lakshmi was left to stay in the house of the farmer
for the next twelve years. During that period
Lakshmi made the farmer very wealthy and prosperous
as she is the goddess of wealth. After twelve years
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in the house.of" the farmer, she was liberated from
the curse and was ready to leave the farmer's
house. The farmer asked her not to leave his house,
and when Vishnu called to take her back with him,
again the farmer requested Vishnun not to take her
from his house. Then Vishnu said to the farmer, "I
am giving you some small stones. Go to the Ganga
river, and throw them inand take a bath there. I
will not take Lakshmi until you come back". As soon
as the farmer threw the stones inthe GangS river
and took a bath, a woman with four hands holding
the stones in one of her hands apeared before him
from the river. The farmer asked her, "who are you
and how did you get the stones which I threw in the
river"? She replied, "I am the goddess of Gangs,
tell me where you got these stones from." The
farmer answered that a man and woman who were
staying in his house had given them to him. Then
Ganga said to him, "Those two people who are stay¬
ing in your house are the god Vishnu and his wife
the goddess of wealth. You should not allow them to
leave your house for if they leave you, you will
become poor".
After listening to Ganga the farmer went back
to his house to ask Vishnu not to take Lakshmi with
him from his house. Then Lakshmi spoke, "Oh farmer,
if you really want me to stay in your house, then
1istencarefu11y. Today is teras (the 13th day) of
the month of Kartik. I promise you that 1 will come
to your house on the same day next year provided
you clean and decorate yourhouse with lights before
my arrival. I will come in the night and you must
worship me with a lamp of ghee (clarified butter)
as 1 never stay in darkness. But now 1 must go with
my husband". The farmer responded, "All right, I
will wait for you on this day next year". After
telling this to the farmer, Lakshmi then disap¬
peared with her husband. One year later, when
Lakshmi came near the farmer's house, she did not
see any light in his house because the farmer
forgot about the promise of Lakshmi. Lakshmibecame
angry with the kisan. She saw light in a house
which belonged to a Baniya and she asked the Baniya
if she could spend the noght in his house. The
Baniya welcomed her and became rich in just a few
days. Since then Baniyas worship Lakshmi.
Vishnu Pandit, a Brahman priest of many arhatis' fami¬
lies told me a diferent version of this story.
Once the goddess Lakshmi was wandering on the earth
on the 13th day of the month of Kartik. It was
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night and she was looking for a place to stay. She
saw light in a Brahman's house and knocked on his
door and asked the Brahman if shecould stay over¬
night in his house. But_^ the Brahman refused, saying
to her, "You are a parj/strl (another man's wife).
So you can not stay in my house". Then she went to
a another house where she saw light. The house
belonged to Baniya. The Baniya allowed her to stay
in his house and after that he became a wealthy
man. Since then all Baniyas celebrate this day as
the Dhanteras festival (the arrival day of
Lakshmi).
When I asked a Jat kisan about this story, he gave a
different explanation. He said that first Lakshmi went
to a kisan's house, not a Brahman's house, and the kisan
refused to let her stay in his house saying that it was
against his moral values to have somebody else's wife in
his house without her husband. Then Lakshmi went to a
Baniya's house and he welcomed her; and that is why
Baniyas are now a rich people.
The differences among these three tellings of the
Divali story illuminate an important aspect of the
distinctive understandings of wealth and its accumula¬
tion held by Baniyas. In Mitra Sen's telling, it is the
non-Baniya who "forgets" (an important moral "fault" in
many Hindu ritual texts.) to follow Lakshmi's injunc¬
tions, while the Baniyaf (wittingly or unwittingly)
carries out her order. In the Brahman and Jat tellings
however, the Brahmanand the kisans retained fastly
adhere to aspects of their dharma (not allowing an
unaccompained woman to stay in their houses). It is
because of their adherence to a moral order that they
are unable to accumulate wealth. In all three stories
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however, no moral rule is invoked nor prohibits the
Baniya from welcoming Lakshmi into his house. The accu¬
mulation of wealth is thus seen as completely comparable
with the moral code of the Baniya, while the kisans and
Brahman moral codes are seen to be in conflict with such
accumu1 ation.
Dashehra or Vijayadashmi, another important Hindu
festival in north India, is celebrated on the 10th day
of the month of Aswani (in October). For Baniya traders,
Dashehra festival has special significance regarding
their trade and profit. Here, I am only concerned with
those rites and beliefs which are held by the Baniya
arhatis of Muzafarnagar mandi.
1 observed the Dashehra ritual at the homes of
three Baniya arhatis. At the house of Mangal Sen, a
Baniya arhati, on the day of the Dashehra festival, the
* •
wife of the arhati drew a picture of Rama with flour and
turmeric powder in the middle of the courtyard of their
house. On all corners of the picture the women placed
covered clay cups of puffed rice. On the feet were
placed similar cups containing a few coin. In the middle
of the picture the arhati placed all the account books,
weights, scales, measures, pens, and so forth, which
were brought from the arhat for this ritual. Then a tray
of fruits, rice, gur, radish, some coins and singaras
'water chesnuts) and some sugarcane were put on top of
the picture. On one side was placed a picture of Lakshmi
and on the other side one of Ganesh. Then, at about 10
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a.m., the family priest came to perform the pujan rite.
At the end of the worship all male members of the family
walked around the design once and threw a mixture of
some uncooked rice, gur, and grain at the face of the
•»
layout (as a sign of offering food to the deities).
During the worship rite the priest asked Mangal Sen
the current prices of gold, silver, wheat, clarified
butter and iron, and wrote them on the first pages of
all account books. This was done so that Mangal Sen
could compare prices of the previous year with the
coming year so that he could assess his profit and loss.
The priest also wrote the names of al1 men who were
present at the time of the worship in the account books.
The items on the tray were given to the priest as his
pujapa (items offered to a deity and later given to
someone) and eleven rupees were given to him in dakshina
(as his fees for the ritual performance). Puffed rice
and some cooked food were given as dan to the family's
Bhangi (Sweeper) and to the beggars who came to the
house of Mangal Sen. Finally the priest asked Mangal
Sen. the jajman, to take the coins from the clay cups
and keep them in the safe of money-box for the whole
year, as the Baniya arhatis believe that these coins
represent the goddess Lakshmi. 1 was told by Mangal Sen
that the Dashehr'S ( V i j ayadashm i ) festival is celebrated
because Rama defeated the evil king Ravana on this day.
The word Vijayadashmi is made up from the words for
vi jay ivictory) and dashmi (the tenth day of the month).
192
Therefore the day of Dashehra is a day of victory. He
said:
We Baniyas believe that to start any new work or
business on this day would be auspicious and suc¬
cessful. Because of this, many Baniya arhatis
perform muhurat and basana-bada1na rituals on this
day and go to disavar (business trip to the other
parts of the country).
Baniya arhatis prefer to make formal marriage
engagements for their children on this auspicious day
with the belief that-the marriage will be successful.
kisans observe Dashehra purely as a celebration of the
victory of Rama on this day. They perform no rites at
all connected with the increase of wealth. A similar
ritual, however, is performed by kisans castes people
for increasing sugarcane yields at the festival of
Godhan (this ritual was discussed in Chapter 3).
1 conducted extensive inquiries about the extent to
which Baniya arhatis in the mandi did in fact carry out*
. •
some particular rituals (namely, muhurat, basana-bada1 -
na, bohani, Divali and Dashehra pujans and daily worship
of Lakshmi). I did not find even one case in which^n
arhati failed to carry out these rituals in his arhat.
When 1 asked Radheshyam, a Baniya arhati, about why he' r
performs these rituals, and about what would happen if
he failed to carry out them out. He replied that such
rituals of the marketplace are for Baniyas, as essential
part of their business, that business can not be trans¬
acted if the rituals are not performed. Similar answers
were given to me by al1 arhatis to whom I posed this
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question-
Some arhatis also perform vows for reducing feel-'
*
ings of lack of control over financial success or
failure and for gaining wealth. Generally vows can be
classified in two types: conditional vows and uncondi-
tiona1 vows.
The conditional vows involve the assistance of
deities in achieving a specific goal or benefit. Each
conditional vow usually takes a specific form, such as
fasting, offering special worship, sacrificing an ani¬
mal, and giving ritual gifts and donations to charitable
institutions after achieving the particular goal. This
typs of vows are called mannat or bolna ("to speak") or
prasad bolna in western U.P. Mannat or bolna is a condi¬
tional type of vow because in these types of vows the
taker of the vow makes a "contract" with a deity. He
promises that if his desire is fulfilled by the deity,
he will offer dan or other types of promised gifts to
the deity. The person who performs such a vow specifies
the nature and the quality of the gift when the "con¬
tract" with the deity is made. If the deity fails to
fulfil the "contract," or in other words, if the taker
of the vow dies not get suecess in his objective, then
he is not under any obligation to offer anything to the
deity. In this situation the taker of the vow feels
resentment against the deity and may stop the worship of
that particular deity. Sometimes, the vow taker even
crosses the boundary of his sect and religion in this
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process isee Rao 1969:8).
When I asked arhatis if they perform mannats for
material gain or for recovering from a loss, most of
them were reluctant to tell me and some of them wanted
to tell me only about their fellow arhatis' stories of
mannats. One Baniya arhati told me about his fellow
Baniya arhati, Vishnu Swarup. He said that, that arhati
has several times taken mannats with the goddes Kali for
material gain or for other purposes. He built a Kali
temple at the local cremation ground on the riverside
few years ago, which he visits every Saturday (the day
of worshipping Kali) at midnight, and offers liquor and
meat (favourite food of Kali) to the deity. When 1 asked
Vishnu Swarup about it he told me that a few years ago,
after suffering heavy losses in his cane-crusher mill
for two years, he took a mannat with Kali that if he
would recover from the loss he would worship her every
Saturday. He said that the godess fulfilled her promise
to him, and whenever he asked any favour from the god¬
dess she granted it. Therefore, he has become her devo¬
tee. But he denied that he offers liquor and meat to
her, perhaps because a Baniya is not supposed to consume
or touch these items.
Lala Jaipal, a Baniya arhati, told me about his own
experience of mannats. He said that in 1975 he hoared
wheat at harvesting time in anticipation of higher
prices in the future. He made a mannat with daloo deva-
ta, a local deity, that if he got at least 25% profit he
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would give 5% of the profit in dan to the temple of the
deity, another 5% as dan to a local charitable hospital
and he would also offer a meal to eleven Brahmans. But
he got only 10* profit, and therefore he did not feel
obliged to fulfill these promises to the deity. Again,
in 1976, he made the same vow, but in that year he
suffered a loss. Then, in 1977, he started an iron
rolling factory in the city. One of his friends told him
that a local pir (Muslim deity) was very effective at
fulfilling any mannat. Lala Jaipal followed his friend's
advice and made a mannat with the pir that he would
worship at the deity's grave (called majar) every Satur¬
day (which was the day for worshiping the pir) and if he
. ould earn a good profit in his iron business, he would
spend one thousand rupees for building a boundary wall
for the grave of the pJr. But he did not realize a
satisfactory profit in the iron business and he stopped
visiting the deity's grave.
In 1979, Lala Jaipal was very worried about finding
a suitable bridegroom for his marriageable daughter. He
did not have enough money for a large dowry and his
daughter was not considered beautiful (which would have
made it easier for him to get a bridegroom for her with
smaller dowry). One day he visited a local temple of the
goddess Durga for a blessing before going on a business
trip to Rajasthan. In the temple he spoke (bolna) to the
goddess with these words,
Oh Durga Devi, I have been suffering from many
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problems. Please help me. Today I am going on a
business trip. If I get a good profit that will
enable me to arrange a good dowry for my daughter,,
and if she gets married within the next six months,
then I will offer (charhana) two thousand rupees to
you. Also, 1 will make a pilgrimage to the Vaishno
Devi temple in Jammu".
Within a month of coming back from his business
trip, Jaipal got a huge profit from his iron business
and was able to arrange his daughter's marriage into a
rich and respected family. He not only fulfilled his
promise to the goddess but also built a small Durga
temple in his neighbourhood. Since then he has been
visiting Vaishno Devi's temple in Jammu state every
year. Since 1980, he has been gaining very much profit
in his iron factory and arhat business. Now he is con¬
sidered a rich man in his community in the city.
The second type of vows are called vrats. (On varts
in north India, see Uadley 1983:147-62; Raheja 1988a:71-
92. ) Some arhatis told me that they general ly do not
keep vrats particularly for asking a deity for material
gain. Only female members of their families keep vrats
for the general prosperity of the family and for materi¬
al gain. The main elements involved in a vrat are usual¬
ly fasting, reading or telling a story (called katha)
about the efficacy of the particular vrat and the giving
of gifts (dan) at the end of the ritual. Vrats are
different in several ways from mannats. For example, in
a vrat, the vrat performer can only ask the deity for
help and the performer has to follow all steps connected
with the particular vrat, whether the request is granted
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or not. I interviewed five female members of Baniya
arhatf fami 1ies about this matter, and they told me that
* r
they keep mainly four vrats for gaining wealth and
profit in their families' trade. These vrats are brhas-
pati vrat (performed on Thursday), dhan vrat (performed
on the first day of the month of Maghshir), mahalakshmi
vrat (in October) and sripanchmi vrat (in March). In all
these vrats, women fast for the entire day and worship
Lakshmi for material gain. These vrats are performed in
nearly all of the Baniya afhatis' homes.
During my field research, a preceptor of the Ra.ma-
yana epic from South India visited Sukartal village in
Muzaffarnagar District. Many Hindus went to listen to
him from the city but among them a large number were
from Baniya arhati families. I asked one Baniya arhati
t t * e
who went to listen to the preceptor why he went there.
He replied that listening to the epic gave him religious
"profit" (dharmik Jabh) that would result in profit in
his trade and also would improve his conditions for the
next life.
Predicting Profit and Loss
Whereas all baniya arhatis perform the rituals
described in the preceding section, there is another
category of rituals and beliefs, concerned with the pre¬
diction of profit and loss, that is widely though not
universally adhered to.




an evil that certainly would not only bring financial
disaster but also would damage their social reputation.
Gambling on the day of Divali, however, has a ritual
function. Among Baniyas, it is widely believed that the
profit or loss experienced on the day of Divali will
continue for the whole year. 1 noted that some Baniya
arhat Is gamble mainly by playing cards through the night*
*
on Divali. I observed that on the night of Divali festi¬
val, in the Meheta club (which is run by Baniya arhatis
and traders) in the nai mandi residential area, some
*
Baniya arhatis and other traders were gambling by play¬
ing cards for the whole night. When 1 asked one Baniya
arhati who was gambling there if he gambled very often,
he said:
We are all friends and we never gamble except on
the night of Divali every year. Because we believe
that if we can make profit through gambling today
it is an auspicious sign of good fortune for the
coming year. Therefore, whatever business we will
do, it Should bring profit. For those who lose
money on this day it is an inauspicious sign and a
warning that Lakshmi is not happy with them. There¬
fore, they must be careful in their commercial
activities in the coming year.
A well-educated Baniya arhati gave another inter¬
pretation . He told me that:.tJgl
To gamble on Divali day gives a trader the feeling
that he must make an effort to make and accumulate
money. But it depends on luck whether he is going
to be in loss or in profit. For a Baniya, making
money on Divali is an auspicious event and losing
it in gambling gives him a lesson in courage that
loss and profit both are parts of trade and life.
So he must be strong enough to bear loss in his
future trading activities.
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Sagar Mai, a pakka arhati, told me that the previ¬
ous year, he lost one thousand rupees in gambling on
Divali night, and after that for a couple of months, he
was careful to buy gur for stocking for future sale
because the thought of losing money in gambling on
Divali haunted him. However, this thought could not stop
him from buying and stocking gur. In the end of the
financial year, he found that he made a very good profit
in gur trade. 1 asked Sagar Mai if he had gambled in
this year on Divali. He told me that he had won at
gambling, and was planning to invest money in gur stock¬
ing for future sale. A fourth Baniya aphati told me:
1 won some money in gambling on Divali last year.
In the same year, 1 had profit in my arhat business
but 1 had a great loss in futures trade. So 1 do
not think that losing or winning on Divali affects
my loss or profit in trade. To me it is just an
amusement, to gamble with a little money with my
friends on Divali.
There are many auspicious and inauspicious signs
and situations arhatis interpret as indications of
future profit and loss. Some arhatis believe in disasul
(from disa- direction), any inauspicious planetary con¬
junction for bidding departure from or to certain direc¬
tions on certain specified days. Nand Lai, an old pakka
arhati who carefully observes considerations of disasul,
told me that whenever he goes on a business trip to
other parts of the country ( disavar) , he always take
into account the thought of disasu1. He gave me one
example. a few months before I spoke with him, he ur-
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gently needed some money for payment to his clients and
to buy a truck. So, he went to Surat city to collect his
payment from his two vyapa'ris. But he could not get
money from them because one vyapari was seriously ill
in the hospital, and another one told Nand Lai that for
some reasons he was not in a position to give money and
promised that he would pay in two or three weeks. Nand
lal became worried and he realized that it was Friday
and on that day he should not have gone on business trip
because it was a disasul day. Nand Lal listed for me the
unauspicious directions for each of the days of the week
which are as follows:
When I asked Surendra Kumar, A young Jain arhati,
if he observed disasul, he said that he did not believe
in it but whenever he goes on business trip, his father,
who believes in disasul, always tries to remind him
about it. He says that whether he gets loss or profit,
he never pays attention to his father's advice on this
i ssue.
Most of the arhatis believe that if anybody sneezes
before or in the middle of any work, it is an inauspi¬
cious sign for getting success in that work, and for
Table 6: Disasul










removing this inauspiciousness they should stop the work
for a moment. For example, one day, when i was inter¬
viewing a kachcha arhati, at one point his munim was
giving some money to one of his clients, when one la¬
bourer sneezed. Immediately, the arhati asked his munim
to stop counting money and to give it to the client for
a moment. I asked the arhati why he said that, and he
replied that doing any work during a sneeze is inauspi¬
cious. I observed such instances during the course of my
field work.
Kalash Chand, a BaniyS arhati, told me that he
believes that in a year when the mango crop is very
good, the market prices of sugarcane products will be
poor. Also, he believes that if the Divali festival
falls on a Tuesday or Saturday it is a sign that the
whole year will be poor for the traders. In this con¬
text, he told me this proverb: san i var k i Divali harts e
kisan roye pansari ("if Divali falls on a Saturday
kisans laugh and shopkeepers cry," i.e. kisans will
profit and shopkeepers will suffer losses). He gave me
some examples how in the past, keeping in his mind these
two beliefs, he was careful to stock gur and wheat for
future profit. But twice these beliefs did not help him
and he suffered losses, and in these situations he
thought that either it was a effect of his karma or he
had bad luck. When I asked one another arhati about
• i
these two beliefs, he said that he did not have any
knowledge about them. But he holds two another beliefs
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that if market prices are high (tej) in January, it is a
sign of a poor market for the whole year, and if he sees
red wasps on the piles of bags of sugarcane products it
is a sign of good market for sugarcane products. He said
that his economic actions are affected in some way by
these two beliefs. He gave One example that two years
ago when he saw many wasos on gur bags at his arhat, he
thought that the prices of cane products would be high
in the following months. Therefore, he immediately
decided to stock gur and also bought some shares in the
gur futures market. Later,-he said, he got very much
profit from these two trading activities.
Some arhatis believe that after a solar eclipse
{surya grahan) prices will go up, therefore they should
hold their stocks at this time. Kalash Chand arhati told
me this 'saying* (kahaavat) in this context, 'Aya nahan
kurukshetra ka rahe gaye sau ke sattar, jisne kari samay
uski ho gai kamai* . It means that, at the time of a
solar eclipse, when people bathe at Kurukshetra, prices
go down; therefore traders should keep patience to keep
their stocks at this time and sell in the future which
will bring profit. But some a^hatis said that they did
not believe in this saying and they mainly take into
account market principles. Dip Chand arhati told me that
when on the night of Holi festival a large pile of wood
is set on fire, many Baniya arhatis used to put a hand-
i r •
ful of green ears of wheat in the fire (with the root
held in the hand) and watched the colour and the direc-
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tion of the fire and from this, they used to predict
whether there will be high or low wheat prices for the
whole year. He said that now times have changed and
mostly arhatis have given up money other traditional
9 »
beliefs connecting with commercial activities. However,
most of the Baniya arhatis, including Dip Chand himself,
believe that on the day of Dashehra festival, seeing a
blue necked jay (crocias indica) is thought of as an
auspicious sign for success in trade for the whole year,
because the jay is a symbols of Vishnu who is the hus¬
band of Lakshmi.
Many artjatis consult almanacs, astrological manuals
and astrologers for knowing whether they will suffer a
loss or earn a profit, and for recovering from a loss in
their trade. When 1 went to interview the two astrolo¬
gers who were most famous among the arhatis, 1 found
that among their clients some arhatis from the mandi
were also present there for consultation regarding their
trades. One astrologer was suggesting to one of his
arhati clients that he must give some dan to recover
from his loss of futures trade of gur. The astrologer,
also gave him one yantra (amulet for hanging on the wall
of his arhat to ward off loss). One arhati told me that
the ring with a topaz stone which he was wearing was
suggested by an astrologer for his feelings of lack of
control over financial, loss.
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Converting inauspicious Profit into Auspicious Profit
In the mandi, almost all Baniya arhatis deduct some
percentage from the payments which they make to their
clients for the purpose of giving dan. And they call
this deduction dharmada (religious gift). One Marwari
pakka arhati reported to me that in the past, most
Marwari arhatis used to write in the first pages of
their account books the percentage of their profit they
would give in dan to religious and charitable institu¬
tions.
In Muzaffarnagar city, most private educational and
charitable institutions (e.g. hospitals, hospices etc. )
and temples are built and managed by Baniya traders, and
Baniya arhatis of the mancji have been particularly
active in these institutions. In the nai mandi area,
two hospitals, one cow-tending centre (goshala), several
hospices, and several educational institutions are built
and controlled exclusively by Baniya arhatis. Almost all
baniya arhatis give dan and donations to these institu-
» #
tions from their business profits. Many arhatis make
vows at the beginning of their financial year about what
percentage of their profit will be given as ritual gifts
and donations to the charitable institutions, Lala Gir-
dari Lai, a kachcha arhati, told me three rules which a
Baniya trader should follow and among his three rules
one was that a Baniya trader must give in dan some
percentage of his profit because if in any way money has
been gained through committing sin, then without giving
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dan this pap ka dhan ("sin wealth") would diminish
auspicious wealth (subh dhan. )
In their detailed accounts of the giving and re¬
ceiving of dan in rural and urban north India, Raheja
(1988a) and Parry (1989:64-93) have suggested that dan
is given only in ritual contexts with the intention of
transferring inauspiciousness, evil, sin and illness to
the recipients for the well-being of the donors. My
issearch has found that dan is given for other reasons
concurrently; hence dan may be given for many purposes.
Haynes (1987:339-59) for example, has demonstrated that
during the colonial period Hindu and Jain traders of
Surat city were involved in a wide range of gift activi¬
ties. Within their community they built up their social
reputation and economic credit largely by offering
philanthropic gifts to educational and charitable insti¬
tutions and religious gifts to temples. Rudner
(1987s:361-79) has also described how during the 17th
century traders from the Nakarattar trading community in
south India used to offer religious gifts to their
temples which were thought of, in part, as "licence
fees" and "financial investments". This was because any
trader could borrow money from the temple for his trad¬
ing activities. Offering religious gifts to the temple
also meant that the donor would receive special honours
before all other devotees.
Why are Baniya arhatis or Baniya tracers in gener¬
al so conspicuous as dan and donation givers to the
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religious and other institutions, more conspicuous than
any other caste groups in Muzaffarnagar? I noted that
there are several reasons. For example, Indian income-
tax law provides that money given in dan and donations
to religious and charitable institutions is deductable
from the income-tax. The Baniya arthatis who are the most
wealthy people in the city prefer to donate a portion of
their taxable income to charitable and religious insti¬
tutions rather than to pay income-tax to the government,
because giving dSn to religious and charitable institu¬
tions is not only a way for them to earn religious merit
(dharam Jabh) for achieving moksha (salvation) for the
next life and to convert their dishonestly earned money
into auspicious money, but also this action improves
their sooial reputation ( izzat) , not only in their own
community but also in the public view. Surajmal, a pakka
arhati told me that in the previous year he made a very
good profit in his trade, and as per governments' in¬
come-tax rules he had to pay a large amount as income-
tax thereon. He wanted to give in dan some part of it as
was his usual practice. This time he had choosen the
local Leprosy centre for this purpose. When I asked him
as to why he had chosen only the Leprosy centre, he said
to me that by giving dsn to this centre he did earn not
only religious merit and social prestige but also struck
a bargain. He contacted the manager of the centre and
told him that as money was given in dan to the centre
v*s exempt from income-tax he would give him some money,
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and after deducting a certain percentage of the amount
for the centre, the manager would return the money to
him. The deal thus profited him in more ways than one.
And he was able to save quite a good amount of money
from going to the income-tax department.
In another case, a pakka arhati, told me that some
members of the managing committee of a local Jain char¬
itable hospital contacted him for dan few months ago. He
agreed to oblige them but on two conditions that he
would give them ten thousand rupees in place of five
thousand rupees demanded provided he was accomodated on
the executive committee of the charitable hospital. His
second demand was that as the dan to the hospital were
exempt from income-tax provisions he would give them
sixty thousand rupees and they should return him fifty
thousand rupees of it. The members agreed and this way
the arhati earned a prestigious seat on the committee of
the management of the hospital and also huge financial
gain by way of saving from the income-tax.
Generally BaniyS arhatis avoid becoming involved in
party politics but they participate very actively and
openly in the politics of their religious and other
institutions. The degree of political power a Baniya
trader or arhati has in the management of an institution
largely depends on how much he has given in dan for
donation to that institution. Lala Gulsan Rai Jain, a
wealthy arpati, is a very respected person in the local
Jain community and he holds the chairmanships of several
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Jain institutions in the city. This is not just because
he is vary wealthy but also because he gives more in d5n
to Jain institutions and to poor people than anyone
else. He gives at least 25% of his profit in dan (as he
told me) to Jain temples and charitable organizations
every year. When 1 asked him why he gives dan, he said:
When we are in business we can not be honest,
mainly because of the heavy tax burden and competi¬
tion. For earning our livelihood we consciously or
unconsciously make money by illegal means and by
committing sin. And this inauspicious money may
bring any type of harm in this life or in the next
life. Therefore to get rid of this problem we must
give some percentage of- our profit in dan.
Another Baniya arhati who is engaged in oil and
spice trade told me :
I used to make a very good profit in my trade
through adulteration until 1986. My mother had
always insisted on me that 1 must give some dan
from the profit money to the local Durga Devi
temple. But I never paid attention to her advice.
In 1986, ray young son died and in the same year 1
had great loss in futures trade also. 1 felt that
it happened because 1 did not give any dan to the
temple. Since then I have started to give dan every
year and stopped adulteration in the spices and
oils.
Most of the Baniya arhatis go on pilgrimage at
least once in a year. They do so for gaining religious
merit but also for converting their inauspicious money
into auspicious money and for material gain. The shrine
of Vaishno Devi in Jammu and Kashmir state in a very
popular pilgrimage place among the arhatis. During my
field research, some young Baniya arhatis went there. 1
asked one among them why they visited there. He told me
that some of them went there for religious merit and for
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gaining profit in their trade from the deity. Some of
them visited the deity asking her to forgive them if
they have made some evil money in their trade. One day,
as soon 1 had completed an interview with Kesho Ram, a
Baniya arhati at his residence, he left immediately for
o t
a pilgrimage to Vaishno Devi. 1 stayed there for a while
talking to his younger brother. A few minutes later,
Kesho Ram came back with a broken elbow. He told his
wife that he had fallen from the rickshaw on his way to
the railway station. She replied that it seemed to her
that Vaishno Devi was unhappy with them for some reason
and she did not want her husband to visit the deity at
that time. Kesho Ram said that he thought the deity was
unhappy with him because he forgot to give one thousand
rupees in dan for the construction of the local Vaishno
Devi temple before he decided to go on pilgrimage, as he
promised her last year when he visited the Vaishno Devi
temple in Jammu.
Hindus consider the Ganga river to be the holiest
river in north India and there is no greater "purifica¬
tion" than bathing in it. Haridwar is an ancient holy
city through which the Ganga flows and it is the most
important such site in the vicinity of Muzaffarnagar.
Many BaniyS arhatis go on pilgrimage to Haridwar every
year. I asked one Baniya Marwari ar,hati who goes on
pilgrimage to Haridwar every year why he goes there so
regularly. He replied:
It is auspicious for any Hindu to go on a
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pilgrimage to Haridwar and to take a bath in the
Ganga river. But for us [baniya traders] it is very
important because being in trade we tell many lies
and co11ect .money by cheating customers, evading
taxes and by money-lending. Interest earned by
money-lending is certainly evil money if some part
of the profit is not given in dan. All dishonestly
earned money is "evil wealth" Cor "the wealth of
sin"] (pap ka dhan) which certainly one day will
bring some harm to the family in this life or in
the next life and in trade. Evil wealth never
brings good results (pap ka paisa kabhi nahin
phalta). Look, Bhagwan Das declared bankruptcy last
year in order to avoid repaying loans to his credi¬
tors and now because of this sin he has suffered
twice from heart attack and his oldest son was
arrested a few months ago for transporting rice
illegally from liuzaf f arnagar city to Delhi for
sale. I always fear that maybe unconsciously I have
gained some money in my trade my wrong means.
Therefore, I believe that I must visit Haridwar and
take a bath in the Ganga for washing my sins and
evil away and become "pure" for salvation (moksha) .
When I visit Haridwar I offer some dan to the
temples and to beggars. This action gives me a
feeling that I have converted all my evil wealth in
auspicious wealth (subh dhan).
The Baniya arhatis believe that money gained
through dishonest means is inauspicious money and any
inauspicious money would certainly bring harmful conse¬
quences for them. This notion that money gained through
sin is inauspicious or harmful in some way, has a paral¬
lel in the beliefs of Colombian peasants. Taussig (1980)
found that these people have a belief that if money is
gained by a secredt contract with the devil in order to
increase their production and for earning better wages,
brings harmful consequences to those who acquire and
spend this type of money for their lives and when it is
used as capital. For the Baniya arhatis of the Muzaffar-
* •
nagar mandi, sin and evil-money not only damage honestly
earned money and bring harm to the trade and to the
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family in this life but they also damage the next life.
Therefore, inauspicious profit or money must be convert¬
ed into auspicious money (subh labh) by using proper
methods. The most common methods which are used by the
arhatis are giving dan and donation to the poor and
religious and charitable institutions, going to pilgrim¬
ages, and performing vows.
Many Baniya arhatis sponsor several charitable work
(e.g. eye operation camps, free drinking water facili¬
ties at the public places) not only for religious merit
but also some times for multiple purposes (e.g. for
gaining social prestige, political power and financial
gain. In Muzaffarnagar city, people have to ask these
Baniya arhatis to get their children admitted to the
educational institutions and to use the facilities of
the charitable institutions funded and run by them.
When arhatis are asked to sponsor a charitable work
by government officials, they can expect some favour
from the officials regarding their commercial activities
if they comply. In this context, I cite an instance of
Agya Ram, a wealthy Baniya pakka arhati. He told me that
two years ago, when he was president of the arhatis' main
association, he was asked by the District Magistrate
(D.M.) for providing finances to arrange a musical
programme organized on the occasion of the district
agricultural aiV industrial fair. Agya Ram agreed to bear
the responsibility and, in return, he asked for a. favour
from the D.M. He sought D.M.'s help in the disposal of
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his sales-tax case pending with the sales-tax depart¬
ment. The D.M. promised to help him and spoke the con¬
cerned sales-tax officer. In this way Agya Ram earned
social prestige by organizing the musical programme and
also got favour for his commercial activity.
I have shown in this chapter that there are many
beliefs and rituals in the cultural model of Baniya
-irhatis which facilitate them in earning profit, pre-
' m
dieting loss and profit and converting inauspicious
money into auspicious one. These Baniya arhatis also
believe that they have some distinctive attributes
(gunas) in their blood which act as an inspiration for
them to be in trade and earn profit. So, they see a
connection between their bodi1y-substance and codes of
conduct^ as/ Marriott and Inden (1977) and their some
students have also suggested.
I have made cleared that the Baniya arhatis, while
giving dan may have many things in their mind. Parry
(1989) and Raheja (1988a) have suggested that Hindus
give dan only to transfer their sins, evils, illness and
inauspiciousness to the receiver but 1 have shown in the
context of Baniya arhatis that they give dan not only
for the above purpose but for many others as well--such
as for social prestige and material gain--depending on
the context and their purpose. In such situations they
preferred to treat the dan as an "investment", both
short-term and long-term gaatw. This indicates the multi¬
plicity of the values of Hindu culture.
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In summary then, the ethnographic examples of
Baniy5 ritual and commercial activities in the mandi
outlined in this chapter suggest a high degree of conti¬
nuity between ritual and market activity in the lives of
Baniya arhatls. Ritual encourages and validates economic
activity in this sphere, and it also serves the function
of rendering the sometimes risky and insecure world of
market relations both meaningful and controllable, from
the perspective of these traders. And the rituals of
basaricL badalna, muhurat. Divali, and so forth not only
affirm their identity as Baniyas, but also are seen, by
the Baniyas themselves, as essential components of their
occupational culture.
For kisans, by contrast, as I have shown in Chapter
3, the world of market exchange is split off, ideologi¬
cally, from the world of ritual and dharma; village
rituals enacted by dominant caste Hindu kisans validate
a world of interdependency and ritualized gifting, but
say nothing of market exchange. As kisans have been
drawn, in increasingly important ways, into market
relations, they themselves articulate a sense of con¬
flicting worlds and conflicting values, a sense that is
absent in Baniy5:s' talk about commercial exchange.
The ethnographic examples, provided in this chap¬
ter, clearly show* that the Baniya arhatis provide
different contextually shifting meanings and modes of
interpretations of their actions and thoughts in the
context of their ritualistic and commercial activities.
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Therefore, I suggest that the most appropriate approach
to understand Indian society and culture would be nondu-
alistic and context-specific approach. Because the
nature of Hindu culture is still not dualistic as sug¬
gested by Dumont (1970).
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CHAPTER SIX
BUY ING AND SELLING IN THE MAND1i
ARHATlS AND THEIR CLIENTS
—j_ —,
In this chapter 1 will discuss aspects of the
marketing process within the mancji, the relationship
between the state and the mandi, the manner in which
* *
arhatis recruit and maintain long-term relationships
with their c1ients--particu1ar1y kisans--and kisans' and
arhatis' images of each other and their differing per¬
spectives on wealth, profit, and commercial exchange.
During the colonial period before 1935, the
district of Muzaffarnagar was an important wheat export
centre not only to other parts of the country but also
to Europe. Nevill (1903:60) wrote concerning the dis¬
trict that:
...Most noticeable is the export of wheat, which has
obtained a good name and commands a high price in
the European market.
Since 1935, however, sugarcane has gradually re¬
placed wheat as the district's main cash crop. As a
result of this change, Muzaffarnagar District has been
one of the major sugarcane producing and marketing areas
of Asia for the last twenty-five years (Hindustan news¬
paper, Hindi ed., 17 June 1984, Delhi). Nearly 30% of
the total amount of gurijaggery of cakes of unrefined
sugar) exported from western U.P. passes through the
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A. Two views of the mandi : off-season and the peak of the season.
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Muzaffarnagar mandi, and about 50% of the district's
sugarcane products (excluding fully refined sugar) is
brought to the Muzaffarnagar mandi for sale (Lai
1980:13,83).
The Muzaffarnagar mandi is entirely ma 1e-dominated
because local custom effectively prevents women from
being involved in any kind of trading activity at this
level. kisans come to the mandi from villages within a
radius of about twenty miles from the city, and within
this area kisans are able to arrange for the transport
of their product themselves. Beyond this radius, other
mandi are used, because the cost of hiring motor trans¬
port would be very expensive, and also because price
differentials from one mandi to another are minimal. The
4
main forms of transport used by kisans are water-buffa-
io-carts, tractor-troI 1eys and horse-carts. During the
harvesting period of the sugarcane crop (the busiest
time for the mandi), a constant stream of these carts
"nd tractor-tro11eys loaded with produce may be seen
entering the city from all directions, every day that
the mandi is open. The mandi is officially open between
8 a.m. and 5 p.m. every day except Sunday.
The Muzaffarnagar mandi deals in all the main
agricultural products of the d is tr ict—f ood grain, oil
seed, sugarcane products and so forth--but its main
business is in sugarcane products, particularly gur.
Uheat and rice sales at town mandis have boon declining
because, over approximately the last fifteen years, the
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government has increasingly been buying these crops
directly from the producers, almost at market prices.
The main sugarcane products traded in the mandi are
as f o11ows :
1. Chene (whiteish fully refined sugar)
2. SaJphar (whiteish raw sugar)
3. Buri (whiteish powdered sugar)
4. Khand (whiteish floury; not fully refined sugar)
5. Sakkar (unrefined scrambled sugar)
a. Sakkar safed (light yellowish unrefined scram¬
bled sugar)
b. Sakkar sunari (yellowish unrefined scrambled
sugar)
c. Sakkar lal (redish-yeJ 1owish unrefined scram
bled sugar)
6. Gur (cakes of unrefined sugar)
a. Ladcjoo (brownish, approx. size and weight 2"
diameter, 0.5 Kg.)
b. Pahsara or bhall (brownish, approx. size and
weight 10", 4 Kg. )
c. Daheya (brownish,aprox. size and weight 8 diame¬
ter, 2 Kg. )
d. Chaku or minja brownish, size and weight 2'-3',
10-15 Kg. )
e. Khurpapaf (brownish, Approx. size and weight 6"
diam. 1 Kg. )
f. Ruskat (same as chaku, dark brownish
The quality, and hence the price, of the various
sugarcane products depends on their colour, dryness,
taste, hardness and the degree of their refinement.
These products also have a cultural hierarchical value,
and the above list is arranged according to this--with
the most highly valued product at the top and the least
valued at the bottom. The consumption of highly refined
sugar is considered to be, typically, characteristic of
wealthy people, while the consumption of gur is consid¬
ered characteristic of less well-off people. With sugar¬
cane products there is an inverse relationship between
product status and molasses content. Pale is higher
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status and more valuable. All sugarcane products (ex¬
cluding fully refined sugar) are collectively called
khandsari in local usage. Five sugar factories in the
district manufacture only fully refined sugar, and these
are contractually bound to sell a fixed percentage of
their production (usually half of the total) to the
state government. Every year, the government fixes the
limit of levy on sugar according to its demand and the
■est of their production is sold in the open market.
The State arid the Mandi
The mandi is administered and governed by the state
government. There are several government departments
that are directly responsible for marketing in the
mandi, but the DAPM committee is the main governing
body. A staff of about seventy government employees work
in the office of the DAPM committee, which is located in
the precinct of the mancji. To stop the illegal commer¬
cial activities of the Mrhatis (e.g. black-marketing,
hoarding, tax-evasion, cheating agricultural producers
etc.), and to standardize and regularise agricultural
marketing in the state, the state government enacted the
•U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Act* in 1965. In fact, the
key person responsible for putting pressure on the
government for passing this act was a Jat kisans leader
from Muzaffarnagar District, and he was the state agri¬
culture minister at that time. Under the terms of this
Act, the state ministry of agriculture has been estab-
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lishing mandis in all main towns and cities of the state
since 1965. For example, in the District of Muzaffarna-
gar, by 1986 seven mandis had been established in the
following towns of the district: Muzaffarnagar city,
Kairana, Khatauli, Thanabhawan, Shamli, Shahpur and
Kandhla (see map 2).
According to the Act, all government-administered
mandis in the state are governed by three tires of
interconnected government bodies. At the district level
is the DAPM committee; at the regional level, the Re¬
gional Agricultural Production Mandi committee; and at
the state level, the State Agricultural Production Mandi
Board, which is the highest governing and law making
body. These three committees consist of representatives
of the producers, of the arhat is and of government•
r
Officials. Among the members of these committees, some
are elected and some are nominated by the state govern¬
ment. The president is an elected official, but the
secretary is an appointed government official in each
committee. The term of each committee member is one
"ear, but this term can be extended by the state govern¬
ment.
In 1972. the State Agricultural Production Mandi
Board amended the Act. According to the amendment, al1
the DAPM committees were abolished throughout the state
and the District Magistrate (DM) of each district was
appointed to the chairmanship of the DAPM committee. The
DM is authorized to nominate, with the approval of the
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state government, eleven members in the new DAPM commit¬
tee from among the arhatis and producers, the local
members of the State Assembly and Parliament and from
among appointed government officials. The office of the
DAPM committee in Muzaffarnagar city was established in
1967. (See Saxsena 1988).
I here summarize the main responsibilities and
rights of the DAPM committee, as I have abstracted and
translated them from the committee handbook (Saxsana
1988): The committee is responsible for the implementa¬
tion of all those rules, regulations and laws which are
passed by the state government and for the collection of
mandi taxes and trading licence fees from the arhatis.
The committee is responsible for making sure that arha¬
tis pay the producers for their products without cheat¬
ing or unreasonable delay, and without any deductions
from the agreed price of the consignment. If any dispute
arises between a^hatls and produce sellers or among
arhatis, the committee can play the role of arbitrator.
The secretary of the DAPM committee told me that since
he mandi was opened, no dispute of any type was brought
to the committee by sellers or buyers. The committee has
the right to inspect and check arhatis' stock invento-
« *
ries, account books, weights, measures and scales which
are used by the arhatis. The committee has the right to
issue, renew, refuse or cancel the trading licences of
any arhati. The committee has the responsibility to
classify, grade and standardise, for pricing purposes,
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the agricultural products which are traded in the mandi,
to make sure that all products which are brought by the
producers to the mandi should be sold by open auction,
and not through middle men (dalals) who might otherwise
work between kachcha and pakka arhatis and between
*> »
produce sellers and kachcha arhatis.
In practice, many of these responsibilities of the
committee are not fulfilled at all by the committee
officials, because they collect bribes on a monthly
basis they call it their own "commission") from arhatis.
(This was reported to me by many arhatis in the mandi. )
The committee is responsible for checking and issuing
-asses to the producers at the entrance gates, passes
that state the quantity and nature of the products which
they have brought to the mandi to sell, and for issuing
passes to the arhatis regarding what and how much they
import and export from the mandi. Also, the committee is
responsible for maintaining, constructing and repairing
arhats, roads, warehouses and public facilities in the
mandi precincts, and for building roads to the nearby
villages from which producers bring their products to
sell in the mandi.
*
Besides the DAPM committee, other government agen¬
cies which are directly related to the mandi are the
following: the District Marketing Department, which
checks export and import trade and sends daily price
information from the mandi to the state government; the
District Supply Department which issues licenses for the
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marketing of sugarcane products; the District Labour
Department which supervises labourers' welfare; and the
District Weights, Measures and Scales Department which
verifies the weights, measures and scales of all the
traders in the district. The nationalised commercial
banks provide loans to the arhatis against their stocks.
There are several central and state government
marketing agencies that buy food grain crops directly
from kisans and so protect them from exploitation by
middlemen. As a result of this, a kisan has several
options open to him when he sells his crop. A typical
kisan is very much aware of the conflicting advantages
and disadvantages of growing different crops for sale to
different customers, be they government, arhatis, itin¬
erant traders or village Baniya shopkeepers. Year by
year the kisan tries to calculate which crop and which
customer will maximise his profit. Government agencies
buy food grain crops at fixed supportive prices from the
kisans. Despite central and state government involvement
indirect purchasing, however, except at times of short¬
ages kisans are free to sell their corps to whomever
will give them the best price. Nowadays only a very
small portion of produce is sold at the village level to
the Baniya shopkeepers and itinerant traders.
The state and central governments alike are in¬
volved in the direct buying of food gain crops from the
kisans, because they wish to maintain prices at a level
acceptable to both producers and consumers. The state
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government restricts speculative hoarding by arhatis and
traders and keeps buffer-stocks partially to counteract
the effect of fluctuating supply. But there are no
government restrictions concerning kisans stockpiling of
their crops. If there is a severe shortage of food
grains in the state or in the country as a whole, the
government counteracts price increases by releasing
their stocks through government retail outlets to con¬
sumers. In the event of government stocks being insuffi¬
cient, either kisans or g ra, i n-dea 1 i ng arhatis, or both,
can be compelled to sell a portion of their stock to the
government. Such emergency measures have been used
several times in the past.
At the time of my field research, in Muzaffarnagar
District, food grain arhatis were only allowed to hold
nine tonnes of wheat stock because of the bad crop in
that year in the country. Not only that, the District
administration also forced food grain arhatis in the
mandi to sell a fixed percentage of their wheat, which
they had bought from the kisSns, to the government food
grain marketing agencies at the government's fixed
price. The food grain arhatis resented this demand of
the government, because prices in the open market were
higher than the prices offered by the government and
also because arhatis thought that wheat prices would
rise sharply in the future. So they wanted to hoard
wheat for future sale. Many arhatis complained to me
about this government demand. They told me and govern-
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ment officials that the government should demand wheat
from the producers and not from them, and also, the
government should allow them to keep at least twenty
tonnes of wheat stock. Officials of the government food
grain marketing agencies made several unsuccessful
visits to arhatis in the mandi, attempting to persuade
them to sell a fixed percentage of the wheat bought from
the kisans to the government. Finally, the officials
threatened the arhatis, saying that if they would not
comply, then their warehouses would be raided and their
illegal wheat stocks would be confiscated by the govern¬
ment. In the end, arhatis negotiated with the District
• *
Magistrate and the required percentage of wheat to be
sold to the government was reduced by the District
Magistrate. Still, as I noted, most of these arhatis
were able to stock wheat illegally for future sale. Some
arhatis managed to hoard wheat illegally by keeping the
purchased wheat with trustworthy seller kisans in the
villages. Because there was no maximum legal limit for
kisans for stocking their crops, the seller kisans could
pretend that the wheat stock belonged to them in the
event that government officials wanted to make raids on
the stocks, Magan Sharma, a Brahman kisan from Khari
village, sold his surplus wheat crop to his arhati
because the arhati offered a higher price than the
government's supportive price. Magan Sharma stored the
wheat in his house in his village for three months at
his arhati*s request. Magan Sharma did not ask for any
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money for doing this. I asked him why he had done this
for the arhati. He said that first of all he was not a
shahari (urban) person who could think in terms of
making money for providing this storage facility for his
arhati, and secondly, his arhati would give him loans
«• • • • •
any time he needed them. So, he regarded it as a recip¬
rocal exchange of services between himself and his
Mrha t i.
'.
Since 1965 the gradual implementation of the U.P.
Krishi Utpadan Mandi Act of 1964 has resulted in a
reduction in the fluctuation of food grain prices.
Whereas previously there was no limit to the magnitude
of such fluctuation, now at most the price of grain can
double from harvest time to sowing time. As a result of
this government intervention, the arhatls and the big
1 andho 1 ders--who could afford to tie up capital—can no
longer make the vast profits that they used to make in
the past by hoarding. The government normally offers
prices for food grain crops that are very nearly as high
as those offered by arhatis in the mandi.
• • «■
There are several other state government measures
aimed at stabilising price levels in the state. The
state government uses the Essential Commodities Act of
1964, the Preventive Detention Act (under which a person
can be detained for an unlimited period), and restric¬
tion on both the inter-zonal movement of grain and the
granting of credit for speculative (satta) trading to
prevent trading activities it regards as establising.
226
is one reason why kolhus are usually operated by land¬
less service castes people and by very smal1 kisans who
can manage labour within their families.
If a kisan wishes to sell his crop to a sugar
factory, he enters into a written contract with the
factory just after the crop has been planted. Such
contracts specify the amount of cane to be supplied to
the factory. The minimum price level is fixed by the
central and state governments. First the central govern¬
ment sets minimum prices nationally for all sugar facto¬
ries, then each state government may individually raise
these minimum prices. Except in times on shortage or
very high sugar prices in the international market, the
price received by the kisans from the sugarcane facto¬
ries is usually the minimum for their particular states.
About half of the total sugarcane production of Muzaf-
farnagar Districts sold to the sugarcane factories and
the rest of the production is crushed by khandsar1
mills, cane-crushers and koJhus.
Buying and Selling in the Mandi
In the Muzaffarnagar mandi, kachcha arhat business
is dominated by the local arhatis and the pakka arhat
business is dominated by the Marwari and Panjabi arha¬
tis. Because Marwari traders are spread all over India,
it is easier for the Marwari arhatis to establish con¬
tacts with other parts of the country than for the local
arhatis. Panjabi afhatis also have good contacts with
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D. Early morning ; kiaans arriving at the mandi in their carts.
E. Two kisans taking tea at their kachcha adati'a adat. Adatis
normally offer their clients such hospitality.
228 A
traders. {vyaparis) in Panjab, where most of these
arhat is' caste people and relatives are also engaged in
trade. Because both the Marwari and Panjabi arhatls are
• * «
outsiders in Muzaffarnagar District, they find it diffi¬
cult to get a sufficient number of kisans for kachcha
arhat business: it is easier for local arhatis to get
* » - w
clients for kachcha arhat business. The most important
function of an arhati is to bring sellers ibikwals) and
buyers {liwals) in contact. (These Hindi terms-bikwal
and liwal--are used mainly by business traders; they are
not used in ordinary speech).
Uhen a kisan or an agricultural producer reaches
his kachcha arhati at the mandi, the arhati's palledars
unload his cart and heap the produce in a pile {mohandi-
lagana) in front of the arhat, to await the arrival of
the pakka arhatis. This produce is sold at open auction
in the mandi. From about 9 a.m., after receiving order
from vyaparis, the pakka arhat is ana their munims start
to go around to the kachcha arhats in order to bid for
whatever items and quantities their vyaparis require.
kisans watch this process with great interest. Before
accepting the highest bid (called boJi the kachcha
arhati formally seeks the approval of the kisan who is
selling. Although in theory the kisan could refuse to
sell, in practice a kisan hardly over refuses if one
deal is recommended
229
Figure 5. A Diagrammatic View of Stages in Agricultural
Marketing in Muzaffarnagar District
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by his kachcha arhati. When I asked one kisan who had
come to the mandi to sell his gur why kisans do not
% «
participate in the auction process themselves, he re-
pi i ed :
This mandi is the world of the Baniyas. We are just
observers and we have to accept whatever prices are
offered to us because once we have come to the
mandi to sell our product we are in the world of
the Baniyas and we have no control over it. We
cannot take our produce back to the village and
come back another time because even then the price
would not be much different.
When a bid is accepted by the kachcha arhati, he
asks the pakka arhati to give him a signed slip of paper
in which the quantity, rate and the nature of the com¬
modity are verified by the pakka arhatf. After the
acceptance of the bid, all parties are bound to these
stipulated terms, according to the custom of the mandi.
After deducting his labour charges palledari and other
expenses, the kachcha arhati pays the amount in cash to
the kisan. But customarily the pakka arhatf is only
bound to pay the kachcha arhati after he has taken the
commodity. Normally pakka arhatis takes delivery in the
* «
evening, when the commodity is loaded on to trucks for
vyaparis. In a few cases it happened that after finaliz¬
ing the purchase, the pakka arhatis refused to accept
delivery and to pay the kachcha arhatis. Normally this
happens when pakka arhati receives a call from a vyapari
informing him that for some reason his order should be
cancelled. Usually a vyapari acts in this manner when he
finds that the price of that commodity has suddenly
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declined in other mandis in the country. Whenever a
pakka arhati cancels his order in this way with the
kachcha arhati it always creates bitterness between them
and the pakka arhati acquires a bad reputation not only
among the kachcha arhatis but also among all arhatis in
the mandi and kachcha arhatis usually would not want to
accept bids from this type of pakka arhatis unless the
pakka arhati is ready to pay to the kachcha arhati in
cash right away after the acceptance of the bid. The
same thing occurs between a.pakka arhati and a vyapari
when the vyapari reneges in an agreement with the pakka
arhati. Gandamal, a kachcha arhati, told me that in the
- « « •
last five years, two pakka arhatis had refused to take
the deliveries and to pay the amount to him after the
acceptance of the bid. And therefore, he hesitates to
accept bids from these two pakka arhatis.
According to the DAPM committee rules, kachcha
arhatis are not allowed to charge any commission or
expenses except their actual labour charges (palledari)
from the sellers (i.e. kisans). Kachcha a'rhatis must get
their commission (arhat) from the buyer (i.e. pakka
* r
arhati). But in practice, a kachcha arhatf not only
charges more money for labour work than he has actually
spent on it, he also charges some money from the sellers
for charity and religious gifts (called dharmada) . In
fact, these two deductions from the payment of the
sellers are, in part, a hidden commission to the kachcha
arhati, because they allegedly (according to the kisans
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ff. A pakka ada-y. (centre with classes) surrounded by kachcha adatis
during bidding.
I. A pakka adati (balding man standing to left of picture) bidding
for gur. 232 A
,'ith whom I spoke) give only a fraction of the money so
collected as religious gifts. Many kisans told me that
in the past, before the implementation of the U.P.Krishi
Utpadan Mandi Act of 1964, kachcha arhatis used to make
many more charges from them than now.
According to the customs of the mandi, it is normal
for the kachcha arhati to give the pakka arhati seven
* . ' »
days grace before expecting payment (with interest being
payable for any period in excess of this). A kachcha
arhati charges the buyer (i.e. pakka arhati) of the
produce he auctions IX commission, donation to charity
work, labour charges and one and half per cent mandi tax
which he has to pay to the DAPM committee office.
By custom, it is normal at the Muzaffarnagar mandi
for the pakka arhatis to be responsible for transporting
the commodities they have purchased to the vyaparis. All
the costs to the pakka arhatis are ultimately passed
onto the vyaparis. A pakka arhati charges all types of
expenses he has incurred for buying the produce for the
vyapari plus transportation cost, plus IX as his own
commission from the vyapari. It is also the responsibil¬
ity of the pakka arhati to collect one and half per cent
mandi tax from the vyapari and deposit it in the office
of the DAPM committee.
The time of delivery depends on the verbal contract
between the pakka arhati and his vyapari, whether it has
been made for ready stock (tayari ka saudha) or forward
contract (agami saudha) . If the contract is a forward
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one, the produce is delivered on a future date decided
by both parties. Vyaparis send their demands to their
pakka arhatis by telephone, telegram and sometimes they
send their agents to the pakka arhatis. The mode of
payment by vyaparis to their pakka arhatis is usually by
hundi or bill of exchange (an indigenous system of
payment) promising payment after a specified period,
usually one month or less and allowing a discount which
includes interest, insurance charges and cost of trans¬
mission of money. The final balance is settled on a
seasonal basis.
The nature of the process of buying and selling in
the mandi does not necessitate the development of stable
relationships between kachcha and pakka arhatis. Howev¬
er, they can borrow money from one another, particular¬
ly, when they are in an urgent need of money, mainly on
the bases or friendship, neighbourhood and kin ties.
Such loans are usually for a very short period, ranging
from a few hours to 2-3 days (but not more than a week),
without paying any interest. They call this type of loan
hath-udhar (means to return a loan quickly). A Baniya
pakka arhati told me that in the previous year, one of
^ r~
his kachcha arhati neighbours borrowed ten thousand five
» • .
hundred rupees from him for one week without any inter¬
est. But when the kachcha arhati returned the money, he
gave him only ten thousand rupees and said that he
borrowed only this amount. They started a dispute with
each other and both the parties called some of their own
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friends from among the arhat is to solve the dispute.
These invited arhatis formed a panchayat (an informal
* »
committee) from among themselves to resolve the tangle.
The kachcha arhati told the panchayat that he had not
borrowed ten thousand five hundred rupees. Then, the
panchayat gave the judgment that if the kachcha arhati
could swear to the god in a temple, he would not be
asked to turn over an additional five hundred rupees to
the pakka arhati. He did swear to this in a temple.
Three days later, his son died and everybody in the
mandi said that the god had thus punished him immediate¬
ly for his bad karma.
For a pakka arhati to be successful in his trade,
he needs to maintain Pong-term relationships with vyapa-
ris in other mantis around the country. Because of this,
to maintain old contacts and establish new ones, pakka
arhatis and their munims travel from mandi to mandi
< «
during the slack period (from May to the begining of
October). Relationships between vyaparis and pakka arha¬
tis are normally maintained by verbal agreements or just
contained buying and selling in the normal course of
trade. The trading relationship between a pakka arhati
and his vyapari may also have a kinship element. There
are many Marwari and Panjab i pakka arhatis in the mandi
whose family members and relatives have pakka arhats in
other mandis of the country, and a good deal of buying
and selling follows these kinship linkages. Also, some¬
times, pakka arhatis write letters and make telephone
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calls to the vyaparis in order to get business and for
maintaining relationships with them. For example, 1
translate here one business letter, written by a pakka
arhati to a vyapari in Calcutta.
jrj Sri Ganesha namaha ^
Sri Lakshmi namaha ~
Date
Sri Raja Ram ji,
We do hope that his letter reaches you at an auspi¬
cious time. Accept good wishes from Jwaharlal and
Ramdass of Muzaffarnagar. We would like to inform
you that the prices of gur are very low here nowa¬
days. Therefore we would like to suggest that you
send us your order soon for purchasing gur. About
60% of the total sugarcane crop has so far been
harvested in this district. The arrival of sugar¬
cane products will continue for the next two months
in this mandi. PakkS Sfhatls of this mandi have
already stocked about six hundred thousand bags of
gur, and we are hoping that about two hundred
thousand more bags of gur will be stocked by the
local arhatis of this mandi. Such quantity of gur
has never been stocked by the local arhatis in the
past. The sugarcane crop is also very promising in
other nearby states.
The rest depends on god's wish.
Y ours,
Jwaharlal and Ramdass
When the trading relationship between a pakka
arhati and his vyapari breaks down it is usually for one
of three reasons. The vyapari may get into the habit of
paying the pakka arhati too late. The vyapari cancels
his order after the pakka arhati already had purchased
the commodity for the vyapari or the pakka arhati may
236
provide inferior quality produce or overcharge for
labour, taxes, or transportation. Increasingly, because
of these practices, some vyaparis are now sending their
agents or munims to oversee the activities of the pakka
arhatis. During my stay in the mandi, a young son of
vyapari from Kanpur city stayed for a few weeks, at the
arhat of his pakka arhati in the mandi, in order to
purchase gur and to oversee the activities of the pakka
arhati. He told me that he had been sent by his father,
because his father suspected that twice in the previous
month, the pakka arhati had misrepresented the price
that he had bid on his behalf at gur auctions, and had
pocketed the difference himself. So the son had come to
the mandi in order to be present himself at the auc¬
tions.
In the mandi, there are about twenty people who act
as intermediaries (dalals) between kachcha arhatis and
pakka arhatis, although this is contrary to the DAPM
committee regulations. Most of these dalals are from
Baniya castes. These dalals, who have to operate secret¬
ly, can be divided into two categories. One type specia¬
lises in sugarcane products, and they essentially act as
trusted agents between kachcha arhatis and pakka arhatis
in the off-seasons. During this time when cane products
are not reaching the mandi, these dalals expedite the
i.ale and purchase of stock held by the arhatis. The
service of dalals is needed by arhatis, because of the
fear of the government tax and marketing officials, as a
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result of which arhatis cannot reveal openly their
actual stocks. These dalals go from one arhat to another
and collect information about who has stock to sell and
who wants to buy and also to negotiate about prices on
behalf of both parties, the buyer and the seller. These
dalals normally receive IX commission from both parties
(i.e. a 2% total commission).
The other category of dalals work between food
grain and spices arhatls on one hand and retail shop¬
keeper buyers from nearby villages and the local city
markets on the other. These dalals guarantee the credit
worthiness of retail buyers to the sellers and ensure
fair dealing in terms of prices and quality. These
dalals maintain close business contacts with village
shopkeepers and, like the other type of dalals, receive
IX commission from each party.
The arhatis of the mandi maintain their account
* 0 -
books in a Ban iya" traditional account'keeping manner.
Depending on the nature of his arhat, an arhati keeps
many account books (bahis) in the course of his business
and domestic life. The practice of keeping separate
accounts is a very old tradition among Baniya trading
communities which perhaps long predates western modern
capitalism and industrialization. 1 list below the
.ccount books kept by each and every arhati in the
mandi: but, in addition to these, many arhatis have
account books for individual marriage, death, and birth¬
day ceremonies, in which they record the amounts of
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money they have given and received on those occasions
they have either arranged or attended. For arhati, such
social records take the form of accounts. They maintain
separate accounts for "home expenses" and " arhat ex¬
penses". Account books which are normally kept by the
Baniya arhatis are as follows:
Rokar khata bahi (daily cash account book)
Lekha khat£ bahi (individual account book)
Kharcha khata bahi (daily expenses account book)
Dharmada khata bah'i (charity account book)
— -
Palla khata bahi (sale account book)
Palledari khata bahi (labourer account book)
Nakal khata bahi (Bank drafts and cheques account
"book )
Len-den khata bahi (money-lending account book)
Mohandi or Khar id bahi (purchase account book)
Gharelu khata bahi (domestic account book)
Almost all arhatis keep two sets of all of these
account books. The first set, called nambar ek ki khata
bahis (number one account books) are for government
taxation purposes; false figures are shown in this set.
The second set of records, namber do ki khata bahis
(number two account books) contains accurate figures,
and this set is kept secret and hidden in a place where
no one can find it. Only trustworthy family members and
munims are allowed to see this set. All the Srhatis knew
the meaning of these two terms but most were reluctant
to admit that they kept a second set of account books
(i.e. number do ki khata bahis). Most of the arhatis
' 0
told me that it was not possible for them to pay full
government taxes and remain in trade, because taxes are
so high and taxation laws are so complex. Kis'ans, 1
found, were generally aware that arhatis kept two sets
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An aOati's account-book (bahi). The nearest one is written
in hindi-mundi script.
K. Two varieties of gur : the round cakes are bahali and the
broken slabs are minja.
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of account books in order to hide their actual income.
In Muzaffarnagar District, not only large and
medium kisans are able to have surplus crops market but
also many small kisans have some surplus produce for
sale in the market. Also, many big and medium kisans are
financially capable of stocking a large portion of their
surplus food grain crops at the harvesting time for
future sale in order to gain maximum profit.
Normally, when such kisans decide to stock food
grain crops they take into account two main factors:
whether the crop is bad in western U.P. and/or whether
the government is asking or compelling them to sell a
definite percentage of their crop to the government. For
instance, during my field research, I noted that in
several villages many large and medium kisans stocked at
least some portion of their surplus wheat crop at the
harvesting time for future sale. For example, Sewa Ram,
a wealthy Gujar kisan from Hathchoya village, who
stocked all his surplus wheat crop at this time, told me
that he stocked his wheat crop because the wheat crop
was not very good in western U.P. and the government was
forcing grain arhatis to sell some percentage of their
purchased wheat. So, these two factors led him to pre¬
dict that wheat prices would increase sharply in the
future. Therefore, he thought that he should stock his
wheat for future profit. In the case of smaller kisans,
their financial position does not allow them to stock
their food grain crops. They have to sell immediately at
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the harvesting time.
The situation is different with regard to the
sugarcane crop. Kisans generally cannot stock cane pro¬
duce more than two to three months, mainly because of a
lack of cold storage facilities , and also, because most
of them have legal obligations to the sugar factories to
supply a definite quantity of their crop whenever they
are asked by the sugar factories. Only some wealthy
owners of khandsari mills and cane-crushers can afford
to stock their product for a few months. In the case of
ko 1 hu operators, few of them can afford to stock their
produce for more than a few days. Not only because of
cold storage facility, but also, because most of them
cannot afford to wait for payment for their cane. The
majority of them run their kolhus on the basis of bor¬
rowed capital, mainly from the arhatis. So, they are
morally bound to sell their produce, as soon they manu¬
facture them, to those arhatis from whom they have bor¬
rowed capital and made promises for selling their pro¬
duce to these arhatis.
PricB Informat ion and Speculation
Kisans of Muzaffarnagar District have detailed
knowledge of daily prices at the town mandis, as might
by expected from people whose quality of life depends so
much on them. This information comes from several
sources. The main source of information is other villag¬
ers who have just returned from the towns or the mandis.
♦
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Especially at harvest time, kisans' conversation re¬
volves around the exchange of price information, in
casual conversation and in small informl groups that
gather in the evening in the villages. Some kisans have
access to radio, television and newspapers that offer
information about many mandis in the country, and about
government policies and government prices.
In the constant quest to predict prices, arhatis
use many sources of information. They scour the business
newspapers, keep in close contact with other mandis,
interrogate kisans about crops sold and still standing
in the fields, keep a close eye on government stocks and
arrears, the effects of government export-import policy
and demand from their vyaparis, and they also pay close
attention to national production figures and interna¬
tional prices and demand. In addition to these sources
of price information, there is another very important
source of information concerning prices of gur: the
futures trade (phataka or vayda ka sauda). During the
colonial period the futures trade was exclusively in
wheat and it was very disordered and the government was
not involved in it. After Independence, the government
declared the futures trade in food grain an illegal
activity. Later, the futures trade was allowed only in
gur, but in 1962 during the war with China, it was again
banned by the government. Then in 1965, the state gov¬






L. The Board of Directors of the Futures Association.
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The gur futures trade building is located in the
nai mandi area. Most of the arhatis who are involved in
< ' *
sugarcane produce business are members of the futures
trade organization (called Vijay Vyapar Chambers
Limited), which is a private trading company and has its
head office in Bombay. The futures trading organization
is run by a board of directors elected annually by all
members of the organization. Only members are allowed
full participation in futures trading, but non-members
are also allowed on a daily basis for a fee. I noted
that not only arhatis and other traders but also some
professionals (e.g. doctors and college lecturers) who
are mainly Baniyas participate in the futures trade.
Most of the non-arhati people, and some arhatis also,
who participate were not willing to disclose their in¬
volvement in the futures. This was so because there is a
good deal of social disapproval, in Muzaffarnagar city,
of anyone involved in the futures trade. One local
Baniya college lecturer who sometimes participates in
the futures trade told me that he was involved in the
futures trade because he found that it was more profita¬
ble for him to invest some of his savings in the futures
trade than earning bank interest from money. But for
social reasons he does not like to disclose publicly his
involvement. One Baniya director of the futures trade
organization gave this explanation to me :
The futures trade is so risky that several members
have become bankrupt (divaliya) in this trade in
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the past. Because of this, it is considered to be
akin to gambling and any type of gambling is con¬
demned in the Hindu religion.
In the gur futures trade, one unit of share is
called bijaki. one bijak = four tonnes). If a bidder
offers bids when prices are rising, he is called taja-
diya (from tej = high; bull) and when a bidder intends
to buy or sell shares in anticipation of falling prices,
is called mandadiya (from manda = low price) in the
colloquial trading language. Rise and fall in prices of
shares in the futures trade-has a positive correlation
with the prices of sugarcane products (particularly gur)
in the mandi. That is, if the rate of the shares starts
to rise then the prices of sugarcane products also start
to rise in the mandi and if the prices are falling in
the mandi then the rate of shares in the futures trade
also starts to fall. Also, because the Muzaffarnagar
mandi is the biggest gur mandi in the country, it af-*
#
fects sugarcane products' prices all over the country.
Most of the national daily newspapers publish prices of
sugarcane products of Muzaffarnagar mandi. The main
factor which determines prices in the gur futures trade
and in the mandi is the principle of supply and demand.
Long-term Relationships Between arhatis and kisans
When a kis&n or a non-kisan kolhu operator goes to
sel1 his produce he does not go to just any kachchS
arhati but to one with whom he has a long-term relation¬
ship.
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Many studies of internal marketing systems in non-
western societies have indicated the importance of
multiple dyadic personalized relationships between
traders and the people to whom they sell and from whom
they buy. Studies of pratik relationships in Haiti
(Mintz 1959, 1961), suki relationships in the Philip¬
pines (Devis 1973; Szanton 1972), onibara relationships
in Nigeria (Trager 1981) and bazaar relationships in
Morocco (Geertz 1979) illustrate how long-term "recipro¬
cal relationships" between..buyers and sellers in a
market place are formed and maintain on the basis of
credit and local market customs in order to gain long-
run profit. In each of these cases, the relationships
between buyers and sellers were of an egalitarian type
or in Plantter's words' "equilibrating relationships".
In the case of the Muzaffarnagar mandi, the rela¬
tionships between kacheha arhatis and their k i san
* *
clients are "reciprocal economic" relationships in which
both parties benefit. There are two important features
of this relationship. The first feature is that because
the commodities are sold through open actions in the
mandi and all arhatis charge almost same amount of money
for their services from the producers, so if a producer
thinks that he has been cheated in any way or he has
been refused a loan by his arhati, then he would not
like to maintain his relationship with his Srhati. The
second feature is that it is the Srhati's economic power
that maintains this relationship. To keep his old cli-
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ents and recruit new ones a kachcha arhatl uses several
strategies. One important one is to provide loans and
advance money to the kisans and particularly to those
people who run kolhus.
About 15% of the total sugarcane products arriving
in the mandi is brought by non-kisan kolhu owners. Most
of these kohlu operators are landless and are from serv¬
ice castes. In the past, they had been engaged in their
traditional jajmani occupations and had worked as agri¬
cultural labourers. But because of the impact of market
economy and industrialization in the villages, they were
forced to give up their traditional occupations. Now
they not only make more money and achieve a higher
social position in kolhu business, but also, in this
occupation, they are their own masters. They can however
only run kohlus for a few months, during the cane har¬
vesting period. And for the rest of the year, man-'' of
them take contractual labour work in agricultural
fields, in brick kilns and during the summer months,
some of them buy fruit crops on a contract basis from
kisans. In general, they prefer to work on a contract
basis rather than as wage labourers.
There are many government co-operative societies
and banks in the district that provide loans to the
kisans. Their rate of interest (which is at most 18% per
annum) is cheaper than the open market rate (usually
from 24 to 34% per annum). But still kisans depend to
some extent for loans from arhatis prefer to borrow
246
money from their arhatis rather than village money¬
lenders or the considerable cheaper government banks and
financial agencies.
In essence, afhat is offer a very different finan¬
cial service from government banks and other government
agencies and, despite the higher interest rates, kisans
prefer their terms. Arhatis will give loans for any
purpose, while government agencies will only give loans
for agricultural purposes. Also, arhatis relying on
their own assessment of their clients' reputation and
ability, offer unsecured loans. By contrast, government
banks and other financial agencies require legal guaran¬
tees or the security of a kisans agricultural land or
other assets. Arhatis tend to be flexible about repay¬
ment dates, while government agencies may well foreclose
mortgages and dispose of assets used for security if
repayment is not prompt. For example, a few years ago,
three kisans from Muzaffamagar District who had mort¬
gaged land to the District Co-operative Bank had their
lands seized by the bank because they could not repay
the loans taken out for cane-crushers in due time.
For a Kisan, losing land is not just a financial
misfortune but also a social catastrophe. The loss of
the kisans social reputation is every bit as damaging as
the loss of his land and possessions. Therefore, a non-
negotiable repayment date is, for a kisan, like the
sword of Damocles. A loan from an a^hati may be a
weightier object than a loan from a bank, but it is far
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less likely to crash on the head of the recipient.
Many kisans also try to avoid borrowing from vil¬
lage money-lenders, who are often wealthy kisans. Such
money-lenders charge no more interest, and sometimes
charge a little bit less interest than the arhatis; but
a villager who borrows from another kisan becomes obli¬
gated to him and may have to support him in village
politics and other matters. In addition, because such
debts are common knowledge, the debtor loses some of his
social prestige in the village.' Being socially and
geographically remote, the arhati money-lender is not
normally a public embarrassment to his clients.
When an arhati calculates what interest rates to
* c
charge on a loan, he takes several factors into account.
He considers the amount of the loan, the length of the
period of the loan, the length of his relationship with
the client, the client's reputation and how much busi¬
ness the client has put in the arhatii way in the past.
If the client is a big landholder who has done a lot of
business with the arhati and has a reputation for set¬
tling debts promptly, the Srhati may well offer inter¬
est-free short-term loans to him.
In the case of the kolhu owners, they are not in a
position to take out loans from the banks for kolhu
business because they do not have land to mortgage to
the banks against the loans. 1 was told by several kolhu
operators that when they borrow from kisan money lend¬
ers, they are expected to (provide several types of
248
free services to the money-lenders not only because they
are under obligation but also, because they are from
service castes.) For example, Raj Singh a chamar (a
service caste) from Pchanda village, told me that he had
borrowed two thousand rupees from a Jat kisan of his
village two years ago and he paid all debt in easy
instalments together with interest in a period of one
year. But during this period of debt, he had to provide
many times free labour services to the kisan because he
was a debtor of the kisan from the lower caste. The
kisan could not ask labour service from his any Jat
debtor. So, they always try to avoid borrowing from
village money-lenders. They usually get interest-free
loans (as advances), in the beginning of cane harvesting
period, from kachcha arhat'is, if they promise to bring
their products to the money-lender arhatls. Given that
it is customary for the recipients of loans to bring the
produce they wish to sell to the arhati to whom they owe
money, it can be seen that for an arhati, money-lending
• •
to the producers is doubly profitable. He profits from
the charging of interest and from the trade his clients
are morally obliged to bring to him.
How far a kachcha arhati is successful in his trade
• t
depends, to a large degree, on how much money he has to
lend to his producer clients and how effective he is in
getting the loans back and securing business from these
clients. In the past, a few arhatis in the mandi have
been forced to close their businesses because they
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failed to recover such debts. Usually about two to three
arhats a year go bankrupt at this mandi because of bad
debts or losses in hoarding or futures trading. For
example, Lala Radheshyam, who is the head of a joint
family of twenty members, owns three jewellery shops in
Muzaffarnagar city. All adult male members of the family
work at these shops. Most of his clients come from
nearby villages. Three years ago, Radheshyam decided to
open a kachcha arhat in the mandi, in order to provide a
job for one of his grandsons. Radheshyam at that time
hoped that he would be able to persuade his many village
customers to become clients of the arhat as well. But he
got only a very few of his jewellery shop clients to do
business at the arhat, because most of the clients did
not want to break their long-term relationships with
their arhatis for him. In the first year, he got only a
very little profit in the arhat business, and then in
the second year he decided to distribute advance money
to some kohlu owners in order to get business from them.
But three of his debtors neither paid his loan back nor
gave him any business,, .and the arhat suffered great
losses. Therefore, a few months later he decided to
close the Srhat business. In a similar way, a retired
Baniya government officer, after being unsuccessful in
recovering loans from some of his clients, closed his
business in the mandi and became bankrupt.
For some arhatis, bankruptcies have been a means
by which they avoided having to pay their own creditors
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(I was told this by several arhatis and two civil court
lawyers who specialise in such matters). After such
"bankruptcies", arhatis often start other businesses or
re-start their arhats in the name of one of their family
members. Despite initial difficulties, such arhatis
eventually re-build their businesses. Such artificial
bankruptcies damage the arhatis reputation with people
of other castes, but they have very little effect on his
social reputation within his own caste, where such
things are regarded as acceptable business maneuvers.
By contrast, real bankruptcy severely damages an ar-
hati's social reputation among all castes, including his
own.
Most of the kachcha arhatis have their particular
geographical areas from which they get the majority of
their c1 ients. There are several reasons for this. An
arhati* s clientage area may be the place where he comes
from. Alternatively or additionally, he may have rela¬
tives (most probably petty shopkeepers) in the area.
These contacts may we 1 1 encourage local kisans to take
their produce to that particular arhati. These village
shopkeepers may provide information about the kisans to
the arhati. Such shopkeepers may also use the arhati
• < ' '
themselves because, through cash deals and barter, they
also buy food grains for re-sale from kisans. For in¬
stance. Kalash Chand, a Baniya grocery shopkeeper from
Lacjpur village, told me that his brother-in-law is a
kachcha arhati in the mandi and not Only does he sell
4 . #
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his food grains (which he gains through barter with
villagers) to his relative, but also, he has offered him
four clients, two Jat kisans and two kohlu operators, in
the last five years.
The importance of family connection extends far
beyond relationships between kachcha arhatis and village
shopkeepers. A kachcha arhati may well refer his clients
to, and have potential clients referred to him by,
relatives who are doctors, lawyers, government officers
and so forth. I have encountered many instances of this
"mutual reference" process among networks of relatives
and family members who, in different capacities, service
the villagers. For example. Pradeep Kumar and his oider
brother, a kachcha arhati and a Baniya district court
• #
lawyer respectively, have many common clients among the
kisans. Many arhatis' family members and relatives have
fertilizer, pesticide and cloth shops in the city. These
arhatis always like to recommend to their kisan clients
that they make purchases from these shops. kisans may
also seek the advice of their arhatis concerning good
shops for buying itertiS. In particular, when a kisan
wants to buy on a credit basis, he may request his
arhati to give him references to the shopkeepers.
During the mandi season, some aphatis employ people
from their clientage area so that they can easily obtain
information about their kisan clients. It is only
because of this kind of information that an arhati can
offer unsecured loans to new customers. Such employees
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are officially employed as assistants at the arhats.
Neither these employees nor their employers disclose
that they are providing this sort of information about
kisans to the arhatls. This kind of information gather¬
ing is particularly important when a kachcha. arhatl is
considering giving cash advance to people from service
castes for starting koBf,us for gur manufacturing. Such
people do not usually have land or property that can be
used as security. It is vital in such a situation that
the arhati have good information about his client's
character and reputation. -
Long-term relationships can be mutually beneficial
to both arhatis and their clients. Such relationships
» I *
ensure that the client has a source of credit and the
arhati has a source of trade. Both parties have an
interest in maintaining this mutually advantageous
economic relationship. Also, given that all kachcha
arhatis charge about the same for labour charges and for
other services, a kisan has no simple economic reason to
change from one arhati to another. However, in some
cases, relationships between kachchS arhatis and their
village clients have been broken in the past.
When the relationship between a kachcha arhati and
kisSn client does break down, it is usually for one of
five reasons. The breakdown may be occasioned if the
arhati refuses a loan. Alternatively, the breakdown may
t /"
occur if the arhati fails to persuade the kisan to repay
his loan and is forced to go to his village to demand
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repayment. In such a situation, either party may want to
break the relationship. A kisan may break off a rela¬
tionship if, for any reason, the arhati has disclosed
0 *
the kisSn's indebtedness to any of the kisan*s rela¬
tives; in such circumstances the kisan would feel grave¬
ly insulted. A kisan may be persuaded by a friend,
relative, or fellow villager, on behalf of their own
arhati to break off his relationship with his own arhati
and to start a trading relationship with their arhat1s.
Finally, a relationship may break down if the kisan
believes that he has been cheated by his arhati. This
belief, on the part of the kisan, is all too likely to
have a basis in fact. Some kisans told me that some
arhati underweight their clients' produce, sell under-
price to pakka arhatis (for a secret commission), keep
false accounts and charge more interest on loans than
they had originally agreed. If a kisan has found out
that he has been cheated by his arhati, he would cer-
• »
ta inly prefer to break off his relationship with that
arhati. A Muslim kisan from Sarwat village, who also
runs a koJhu in his village, told me that many years
ago, when he started manufacturing gur, he was intro¬
duced to a kachcha arhati in the mandi by the
pradhan(e1ected head of the village council) of his
village. The Muslim kisan started bringing his produce
to this arhati for sale. In the beginning, for several
years, he never suspected that his arhati cheated him at
any time. But two years ago, once when he sold his gur
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through his kachcha a^hati to a pakka arhati, he later
learned that some of his fellow villagers had sold gur
of the same quality at the mandi, on the same day, for a
much higher price. He then became suspicious that the
arhati may have entered into a secret agreement with
the pakka arhati to whom the gur was sold, thus lowering
the price that was paid. The Muslim kisan sold gur to
the arhati two more times. He again received lower
prices for his produce, and his suspicions were con¬
firmed. He then ended his very long-term relationship
with the arhati. The arhati apparently tried his best to
persuade the kisan to continue the relationship, but the
Muslim kisan refused and established a relationship with
another arhati.
In normal situations, if a relationship has been in
existence for many years, a breakdown is rare in the
mandi. In fact, most of the relationships between Kisan
families and kachcha arhati families go back several
generations. Dal Singh, a Jat kisan from Bhansi village
said to me:
I do not know exactly how long my family has been a
client of Gandamal arhati. I just can tell you that
my family has been connected {Jore hui hae) with
Gandamal's arhat for the past three generations.
And why should I leave my arhati when he is a good
man and always ready to give loans or advance money
to me whenever I need them?
During my field research, a Jat kisan from Pinna
village asked his arhati, for a loan of 10,000 rupees to
be used in financing his panchayat election campaign.
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The arhati refused to extend the loan, on the grounds
that he could not spare the money. The Jat kisan re¬
turned to his village and discussed the situation with a
fellow Jat kisan. The second kisan took the man to his
own arhati, provided surety, and asked the later to*
/
extend the loan on that basis. The arhati did so, and
the Jat kisan accepted the loan and later became a
client of that arhati.
In another case, Jai Prakash, a Baniya kachcha
arhati told me that in the previous year he gave advance
money to some kolhu operators with the understanding
that as soon they manufactured their gur, all of it
would be brought to his arhat for sale. But he came to
know during the middle of the gur season in the mandi
that one of the kolhu operators who had borrowed five
thousand rupees as advance money from him was bringing
only half of his total manufactured gur to the arha He
« m '
had been selling the other half of his gur through his
brother, to another arhati from whom he had collected
* *
the same amount of advance money in the beginning of the
gur season. Jai Prakash asked the kolhu operator to
repay his money with interest immediately. The kolhu
operator denied the allegation that he had been selling
some of his gur to another arhati. He said that his
> • •
brother had a partnership in a kolhu business with two
persons in his village and his brother sold his own gur
to another arhati from whom he and his partners borrowed
advance money. Therefore, he could not ask his brother
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to bring his produce to Jai Prakashl. Then, the kolhu
operator asked Jaiprakash for an extension for the
repayment of the advance money, to be paid in four
instalments without any interest, within a two month
period. But Jai Prakash did not accept his request and a
dispute started between them. A few weeks later, Jai
Prakash, then approached one of his close relatives and
asked him to put pressure on the kolhu operator to pay
the money back immediately, with interest. The relative
mediated between both parties and both parties accepted
his decision that the kolhu operator should pay the
advance money back to the arhati within six weeks but
without any interest. After settling this dispute, both
parties decided to break off their relationship.
In a fourth case, a few years ago, a small kisan
from Barkali village borrowed one thousand rupees from
his arhati during the off-season of the manai, for
buying fertilizer, on the condition that the kis&n would
return the money within two months. But the kisan did
not return the money in time. Then, the arhati went to
the village of the kisan and demanded that he pay back
his loan. The kisan promised him that after two months,
during the sugarcane harvesting period, the arhati could
deduct his loan from the payment for his produce. But
the kisan never went to the urhati during the harvesting
period and sold his produce to another arhati. A few
months later, when one day they happened to meet at a
cloth shop in the city, the arhati again demanded his
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money. At this time, the kisan refused to pay the loan,
saying that he already had paid two months ago and he
accused the arhati of damaging his reputation by coming
to his village. And the arhati gave up hope of recover¬
ing his loan and his relationship with the kisan.
As I have mentioned earlier, most relationships
between kachcha arhatis and kisans in the mandi have
been maintained for a very long period. But even within
their long-term relationships, Baniya arhatis and kisans
maintain sharply disparate views of one other: each view
being a product of the sharply disparate value systems
in which each is embedded, as 1 will explain in the
f o1 1owing pages.
kisans and Baniya arhatis' Images of One Another and
Their Different Perspectives
Baniya arhatis (including traders) and kisans (who
are, for the most part, members of the tradition kisan
castes locally defined as Kshatriya) have particular
images of themselves and one another. They have differ¬
ent evaluations of market exchange, wealth, prestige and
so on, which they not only covertly express but also
overtly in their daily conversations with each other.
They use many sayings ikahavats) and proverbs to illus¬
trate their images about one other. Crooke (1896:174), a
colonial officer, wrote in the nineteenth century about
the north Indian Baniya traders:
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The Banijra [Baniya] has rather an indifferent
reputation in the country-side, where he is ' ated
and despised for his habits of money-grubbing,
meanness, and repacify. But at the same time he is
an indispensable element in the social life of the
people whose trade and business he finances.
Most of the kisans and kolhu operators from service
castes whom I interviewed think that they do very hard
work and face very many risks to produce crops. They
resent how, from their point of view, the Baniya arhat is
get a large share of the profit on their products,
without doing any hard work or taking any risk. When
kisans go to the mandi, they go there with a stereotypi¬
cal image of their Baniya &rhat is in their minds. They
say that their arhatis, being from Baniya castes, have
the gunas (traits) of miserliness, extreme passivity,
cowardliness, profit-orientation even at the expense of
social prestige and acquisition of wealth (see Fox
1969 :58).They say further that these qualities are in
the blood that they inherit from their parents. Many
Baniya arhat is with whom 1 have spoken about this image
also believe that they have these traits in their per¬
sonalities. But some of'them said that these traits are
not in their blood, but are part of their occupational
culture which they learn from their parents. Many prov¬
erbs and sayings regarding these traits of the Baniyas
and the image of the kisans were told by kisans and
also, some of them were mentioned by Baniya arhatis
themselves. In the following pages, 1 will quote some of
them. A story about the Baniyas' profit-menta1ity which
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I heard many times from the arhatis and kisans in the
mandi is as follows:
Once upon a time a Kshatriya king was concerned
because Baniya traders were making too much profit
in his kingdom, when he himself was facing a reve¬
nue collection problem. One day, he discussed this
issue with his ministers. The ministers told him
that it was not possible to control the Baniya
traders. So the king said, "let me see how they
make profit and why they cannot be controlled". The
king summoned a Baniya to him and gave him a job-to
stay at the sea shore and count the waves. The
Baniyas went to the sea and started counting the
sea waves. But whenever a ship passed nearby the
Baniya told the ship's captain that his vessel was
preventing him carrying out this official job--the
counting of the waves. Therefore, the ship s'.ould
either stay away from the shore or the captain
should compensate the Baniya for his inconvenience.
In this way, the Baniya started to amass money.
When the king found out, the Baniya was sacked and
given another job in the king's stables weighing
the dung of each horse. After a few days doing
this, the Baniya told the groom one day that he was
not giving enough fodder to the horses because some
of the horses had not been producing enough dung.
He said that he would inform the king that the
groom had been selling the horses' fodder on the
black market unless the groom paid some commission
to him. The groom became afraid and agreed to pay
some money to the Baniya.
After a few months, the Baniya started to
build a beautiful house in the city. When the king
found out, he called the Baniya and told him to
tell him truthfully how he got the money to build a
beautiful house, or otherwise he would be hanged.
The Baniya told him the whole story. After this the
king accepted the opinion of his ministers that a
Baniya cannot be controlled and can make a profit
in any situation.
After telling this story, One Baniya arhati said to
me: "Baniyas have never been controlled in any raj
(reign)"
One evening when I was interviewing a Baniya arhati
at his arhat, four Jat kisans from Mansurpur village
came there to collect payments for the produce they had
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sold in the morning. The arhat i suggested that I inter¬
view them. During the interview one Jat kisan said to
me :
Baniyas are not just kanjus (misers) about they are
makhichos (extreme miser, who would regard a fly in
their food as an additional gift from god). The
Baniyas' dharma (code of conduct) is to acquire
wealth by whatever means they have--adu1teration,
cheating, illegal hoarding, tax-evasion and so
forth--even at the cost of social prestige (izzat).
Another Jat kisan mentioned this saying to me as
characterizing Baniyas: for Baniya chamari chali jai,
damari na jai (let your body waste away but not your
money). According to this Jat man, for Baniyas money
alone is prestige (paise he izzat hai) but for them
[Jats], prestige is more important than wealth because
money comes and goes but prestige, once it has gone,
never comes back again. During my conversation with the
kisansj the arhati sat quiet and calm and was paying
attention to his account work. After completing his
account work, he gave the payments to the kisans and
when one kisan was putting the money in his pocket
without counting, the.arhati said to him that before
putting money in his picket, he must count first. The
kisan replied to him that he always trusted him. But the
arhati said that it was not a question of trust but it
<• >
was his belief that even a son gives money to his father
or the father gives money to his son, always count it
before accepting or giving and enter it immediately into
the account book. They [Baniyas] do not like to cheat
261
their customers, the Baniya man said.
As soon as the kisans had left the arhat, I asked
the arhati why he was quiet when the kisans commented on
Baniyas. He replied:
They were g'anwarsl literal ly villager but it is used
by urban people for stupid and uncivilized person
in north India). Therefore, it was useless to argue
with them. We [Baniyas] always prefer to speak
sweetly and politely to our customers and never try
to bully a customer. We always try our best to
avoid any type of confrontation, to maintain our
relationships with customers for trading purposes.
We believe that it is Lakshmi who comes in, in the
form of a customer. Prestige is also important for
us as much as it is important to anybody. We are
not miserly people as we are said to be. We spend a
lot of many on giving dan and donations to charita¬
ble institutions, temples and the poor and also, we
spend a lot of money on the marriages of our chil¬
dren. We believe in simp1e-1iving.
I noted that most of the kisans of Muzaffarnagar
District do not hesitate to spend a great deal of money
on disputes in the courts on those issues in which their
social prestige is invo1ved-issues which seem to be
relatively unimportant for Baniya traders. In my survey
of police records at the mandi police station, I noted
that no dispute of .any kind whatsoever had been brought
there by the arhatis since the mandi was opened in 1982.
But from an average sized village usually one dispute
quarterly reaches the local police stations or the
courts. In my previous research (Tomar 1985) on lawyers
and their clients in Muzaffarnagar District's courts, I
found that more than 70% of the cases in the criminal
courts involved kisans. Also, in a number of disputes,
kisans spent more money on legal expenses than the
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actual value of the disputed piece of land itself: Just
because their social prestige was involved. By contrast,
as some Baniya arhatis told me, Baniyas are perhaps more
inclined to calculate financial gain and loss before
going to the police or the court.
One Gujar kisan from Hathchoya village said this to
me :
Prestige Iizzat) and money are enemies. We kisans
prefer prestige and the Baniyas prefer money. We
speak of two kinds of prestige bol ke izzat (pres¬
tige of fulfilling a promise) and paisa ke izzat
(Prestige earned by money). For Baniyasthe latter
prestige is more important and for us the former
one is more important. For a Baniya arhati to
become bankrupt is lust like charging a dress
(chola badalna) but for us to become bankrupt is
1 ike death.
When I mentioned this statement to some Baniya
arhatis in the mandi, they did not accept the argumentft *
of the Gujar kisan and one arhati said that in fact,
kisans are the only people who never fulfill their
promises for paying their loans and advance money in due
time. However, many Baniya arhatis said to me that they
believe that any show of anger, violence or a confirmed
that this view of Baniya temperament is shared by them
as well. He said
Baniyas never fight physically, and if in any
circumstances they do fight, it is just with words
(bol ke larai). they do not fight as we do
sometimes even to the death. The Baniyas never like
to involve outsiders in their disputes. But we
invite and expect our kin, neighbours and friends
to support us by all means in our disputes and
fights. Being Kshatriyas we can lose our tempers and
become aggressive very quickly because our blood is
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hot (hamara khun garam hai) . The Baniya digest
their anger and we vomit our anger.
This statement reflects the common perception that
just as Baniyas want to retain wealth, so to do they
retain and "digest" their anger. They do not bring it
out in every day transactions and Kshatriyas are said to
do. The Kshatriyas see themselves as non-retentive, both
with respect to anger and to wealth. The Rajput kisan
quoted one story in this context:
Once a Rajput kisan said to his Baniya trader
neighbour, "You eat very little food but are fat
and 1 eat a lot but 1 aifi still slim, why is this?"
[having a big belly for a Baniya is considered his
physical sign of being a Baniya and wealthy in
north India generally]. The Baniya replied, "well,
we [Baniyas] eat sorrow (hum gam khate hai) but you
do not"' The kisan asked, "How?" The Baniya re¬
plied, "You have abused me so many times and beaten
me up once in the past when I asked you to pay my
loans back. But I did not say any bad word to you
and if 1 say a single bad word to you now, you
would probably beat me up again, would you not?"
The kisSn said, " Yes of course".
Another kisan who was sitting with the Rajput kisan
outside an arhat also said the same thing about
Baniyas:
The Baniyas are a flexible type of iron that, even
in the fire does not become hot, but we are a hard
type of iron that, even when just exposed to fire
from the distance, becomes hot. These Baniyas are
cowardly people and we are brave and proud people.
Kisans and Baniya arhatis with whom I spoke con¬
firmed this view that as a Baniya trader becomes more
and more wealthy, he becomes more and more polite and
humble in his public appearance. And, conversely, a
kisan, upon increasing his wealth, will become more
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ostentatious and aggressive.
Several kisans and kolhu operators from service
castes claimed to me that they do not regard themselves
as profit-oriented with respect to kin ties and social
relationships, and when considerations of profit and
loss enter into relationships, they consider the rela¬
tionship to be irrevocably damaged (for an example see
Chapter 3). They consider, however, that Baniyas are
profit-oriented even with respect to kin ties and
friendships. A Jat kisan mentioned this proverb to me:
"As a prostitute cannot be a virgin, so a Baniya cannot
be a friend" (na baniya mitra na besa kanwari). Another
kisan told two other proverbs in this connection: "A
Baniya cheats his friends, and a rogue cheats strangers"
'Baniya mare jan, thaq mare anjan) and a Baniya can be
only a fair weather friend (baniya to bani ka). When I
asked two kisans if they really believed the character¬
izations set forth in these proverbs, the first one said
that he believed that if a relationship is established
with a Baniya, he will certainly make money from the
relationship. The second kisan contradicted his earlier
statement. He said that it is good to live in the neigh¬
bourhood of Baniyas because they never fight with people
and neighbours can expect from a Baniya neighbour that
he would not generally refuse to loan them if they were
in need.
A proverb known throughout the western U.P. says
"kisan (or a Jat) ek ganna na dega, gur ki bhali de
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dega' (A kisan will give away a big cake of gur but not
a single stick of sugarcane) as a typical kisans mental¬
ity. When a Baniya uses this proverb, he means to say by
this that kisans are stupid because they can be obsti¬
nate about the wrong things and they do not take econom¬
ic rationality into account, because a cake of gur is of
greater value than a sugarcane stalk. Sometimes, when a
Baniya trader wants to refer to another Baniya trader in
the same manner, he may use this proverb for him as
well, kisans also frequently use this proverb referring
to themselves to the Baniya traders--but with a very
different meaning. For kisans, the meaning of this
proverb is that for them prestige is more important than
financial gain and giving generously is more important
for their prestige than economic accounting.
On a number of occasions 1 noticed in the mandi
that Baniya arhatis sat more or less passively while
kisans from Kshatriya castes berated their miserliness,
cowardliness and their profit counting mentality. When 1
asked some kisans from the Kshatriya castes how they
ranked the Baniyas in the hierarchical order of castes
they replied that Baniyas were lower than them. And this
was not because Baniyas are involved in trading but
because they are misers and cowardly and also they never
ruled in the past. When 1 privately asked some Baniya
arhatis the same question about their kisan clients from
Kshatriya castes, most of them did not want to respond.
Those who did respond said that they were equal because
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they were doing their calling as kisans do a kisan's
calling. But when 1 put this question to these arhatis
in the presence of their clients from Kshatriya castes,
their response was that Kshatriya kisans were higher than
them in the social hierarchy. This different response
was clearly because the arhatis do not want to antago-
nise their kisan clients for trade purpose.
Confrontation with kisans is also avoided by the
Baniya arhatis when the arhatis refuse, as they general¬
ly do, to discuss politics with kisans. kisans of west¬
ern U.P. are generally extremely voluble on the topics
of district, state, and national politics, and often try
to engage their arhatis in such discussions. But arhatis
know that their political opinions are often at odds
with those of the kisans, so to avoid conflict and con¬
frontations, they withdraw from such conversations, or
feign agreement. I cite one conversation here which took
place between a Baniya arhati and one of his Jat kisan
clients at the arhat in my presence: glESSl
Kisan - "Lala ji [the arhatil which party you are
going to support in the next elec¬
tion?"
Arhati - "I have not decided yet but it does not
matter. Whomever you will suggest, I
will support that party. For us
[Baniyas] all parties are equal." Kisan-
"1 do not think you will support our
par ty."
Arhati - "Why not? We can support your party.'
Kisan - "1 do not believe it because you Baniya
people do not like us."
Kisan - "1 am thinking of buying a house plot in
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your neighbourhood. Will you find out for
me the prices of the plots? and whom
should 1 contact for buying the plot?"
Arhati - "You should contact the secretary of our
housing society for that,"
Later, when the Jat kisan left the arhat, the
arhati told me that he did not want to discuss politics
/ «
with the kisan, because discussing politics with kisans
can end up in a confrontation and any type of confronta¬
tion with the clients would be harmful for his trade. He
also mentioned that he would not like the Jat man to get
a plot in his neighbourhood because he did not like the
aggressive behaviour of Jats. Therefore, he would ask
the secretary of his housing society not to sell any
plot to the Jat.
1 asked Bhula Singh, a Jat kisan from Bhansi vil¬
lage, why there were only three arhats owned by kisan
castes people in the mandi. He replied that it was
partly because of a lack of capital and business skill
and also, more importantly, they do not have Baniyas'
traits in their blood just as Banias do not have agri¬
culture in their blood. Several kisan and arhati inform¬
ants told me that in the past several people from kisan
castes who had enough capital and good client networks
tried to establish kachcha arhats in the mandi, but
because of their non-Baniya traits and lack of business
experience, they could not succeed.
Kisan and koJhu operator informants from service
castes also expressed to me the same view regarding
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Baniya arhati s (including traders) as the kisans from
Kshatriya or dominant castes. One kolhu operator from
the Jhiwar (water-carrier) caste told me that, from his
point of view, Baniya arhatis are wealthy people because
they do not like any type of fighting, and they are very
calculating people. Even when they provide refreshment
to their clients, he said, they extract that expense
some how from the payments they make. Another kolhu
operator from a Muslim service caste said that Baniya
arhatis are wealthy people because they have Baniya
f J
traits like miserliness, accumulating savings, wisdom,
calmness and so forth. The wealth of Baniyas is a spe¬
cial gift to them from god. Even they worship Lakshmi
goddess for gaining wealth.
It is significant that while dominant caste kisans
would not hesitate to describe what they perceived as
the negative character traits of Baniyas to me in the.
presence of their Baniya arhatis, I never once heard a
service caste person do so in the mandi. Service caste
kisans and kolhu operators very frequently, however,
described such traits to me when Baniya arhatis were not
present. This is perhaps because of their low position
in the social hierarchy, and also, because many of them
must depend on their arhatis for loans and thus cannot
afford to lose their good-will.
In the mandi, arhatis usually call their kisan
• ■ t '
clients from dominant caste, chaudhari sahab (a respect¬
ed term for a kisan in western U.P. ) or just kislkn or
269
kastkar (another term for kisans). They use these the
later terms for service castes' clients also. Kisans
call a Baniya arhati lala ji or ssth ji (a wealthy man).
c*
But in western U.P., when a non-Baniya person refers to
somebody of his own caste or someone from a non-Baniya
caste a "Baniya" or "Lala", he means that the person is
a coward or a miser or a wealthy man, depending on the
context.
While most arfratis prefer to invest profits from
their arhat business in industries, kisans who realize
» e
profits prefer buying land or depositing their profits
in banks. During my inquiry on this subject, several
bank managers told me that they have more money in fixed
deposits from kisans than from Baniya traders (including
arhatis) in their banks.
Conversations between arhatis and kisans as they
sit in the mandi reflect the different moral perspec¬
tives and expectations brought to the situation. When a
kisan client arrives at the arhat of his arhati, the
• * - a
arhati greets him with a barrage of questions about his
family, village, and crops. The kisan generally regards
this as a display of amity, and does not hesitate to
reply to the questions. The arhati, however, regards
this as an opportunity to extract crucial information
about the amount of crops to be harvested and when and
to whom the crops would be sold. The arhati can pass
this information onto pakka arhatis (who finaly may pass
on to their vyaparis for gaining orders from them) and
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use it to his own advantage. Thus, such conversations
maintain, for the kisains, an illusion of mutuality and
amity, thus strengthening the tie with the arhat i. Yet
at the same time, they are for the arhati a matter of
gaining economic advantage.
I have shown in this chapter as to how and to what
degree the government exercises control over and influ¬
ences the function of the mandi, its marketing process
and the marketing relationship between buyers and sell¬
ers. The government's agricultural marketing policies
and control of the mandi in'the stage have to a consid¬
erable extent checked the exploitation (see chapter 2.)
of the agricultural producers, particularly after the
enactment of the Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadan Mandi Act
of 1964 in regard to marketing of agricultural products
and the regulation and organization of mandis.
1 have discussed in this chapter why both the
kachcha arhatis and agricultural producers remain inter¬
ested in maintaining mutually beneficial relationships.
The agricultural producer gets the benefit because of
close rapport based on long-term relationship which
helps him in securing the advances or loan as and when
the need arises, a facility he cannot enjoy if he keeps
changing his arhati and in that eventuality a relation¬
ship on faith and trust cannot easily develo p,s*J. Besides
this reason, two other reasons, which are probably most
important ones, for agricultural producer not to break
his business relationship with a particular arhati, are
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that all kachcha arhati charge almost same money for
their service and the buying and selling process takes
place to open auction. Therefore, in these circumstances
there is no need for a producer-seller to shift his
business from one arhati to another. On the other hand
> *
the kachcha arhati also gets the benefit and feel secure
both his advance money and the business from his clients
on continuous and regular basis. Similarly, in the case
of the relationship between pakka arhati and vyaparis,
the relationship is also mutually beneficial when main¬
tained on a long-term basis. The vyapari would like to
conduct his business on faith and trust which generally
developed after a long-term relationship and the pakka
arhati feels secure about his money which he pays to the
kachcha arhati for the purpose made on behalf of his
vyapari and the pakka arhati gets regular business. But
in the case of relationships among kachcha arhatis and
among the pakka arhatis the need for a long-term or
stable relationship is not felt by them because they are
competitors of one another. In the case of the relation¬
ship between kachcha arhati there is also no need for
them to maintain long-term relationships because of the
nature of their trade in the mandi. The kachcha arhatis
get their money from the pakka arhatis on a regular
basis according to the local customs of the mandi. Long-
term relationship does not play any significant role
because they sell their producer clients products
through open auction. However, kachcha arhatis and pakka
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arhatis sometimes borrow money from one another in case
of emergent needs for a very short duration but that
depends on kinship and friendship ties and long-term
relationships don't usually come into play.
1 have also shown that although the agricultural
producers and kachcha arhatis prefer to maintain long-
term business relationships, but they still keep oppo¬
site images of each other because of their distinctive
caste ideologies and moral qualities. The kisans from
Kshatriya castejrand Baniya arhat is have different mean-
ings of prestige, wealth, profit and so forth. There¬
fore, Dumont's argument (1970) cannot be justified when
he asserts that the Hindu trading caste would have to
follow either the Kshatriya or the Brahmanical model of
behaviour. In the case of Muzaffarnagar mandi 1 have
demonstrated how the Baniya arhati follow their own
distinctive BaniyS model of behaviour.
In summary, the ethnography from the Muzaffarnagar
mandi suggests that both arhatis and kisans enter into
and attempt to maintain long term reciprocal economic
relationships not for the purpose of immediate gain, but
with a view towards securing profits over the long term.
Though both arhatis and kisans seek such long-term gains
in their dealings with one another, they nonetheless
enter into these relationships with distinct views
concerning the proper relationship between ritual and
economy, and holding fairly well defined and culturally
significant views about the moral dispositions and
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economic acumen of the other party. Like the ritual
activities described in Chapter 5, these cultural per¬
spectives form part of the occupational cultures of
kisans and arhatis, and as such they have important




This thesis has dealt with a number of issues
concerning Indian town markets, relationships between
traders and their clients, and the relationships of
agricultural production and exchange to market and
ritual spheres. Four interconnected questions assumed
priority in the field research on which this thesis is
based. First, what theoretical approach is most appro¬
priate for understanding the cultural and structural
aspects of a town market in India? Secondly, how and to
what degree are the religious beliefs and practices of
Hindu traders and kisans connected with their economic
actions. Thirdly, does an approach that specifies the
differing "spheres of exchange" (e.g. "traditional"
jajmani type intra-vi11age relations, and market-orient¬
ed relations both within and beyond the village), and
flie possible conflicts generated when differing expecta¬
tions arise in movements from one sphere to the other,
help us to further our understanding of economic rela¬
tions in rural India? And finally, how does the study of
the relationships between traders and their kisan cli¬
ents modify our understanding of models of Indian caste
society?
This study makes clear that in the past, particu¬
larly during British regime, the agricultural producers
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were not able to get market price of their products in
the market and the relationship between traders and
agricultural producers was exploitative. But since the
last 3-4 decades as the state has started direct control
of agricultural markets. Direct control has not only
changed the nature of marketing process in India but has
also changed the relationship, in a large degree, be¬
tween agricultural producers and traders from exploita¬
tive to mutual beneficial relationship. Now the produc¬
ers are able to get market price of their products
because many government marketing agencies are also in
the market to buy directly from the producers. There¬
fore, producers have their option either to sell to the
government or to the traders in the markets and obvious¬
ly they prefer to sell to that buyer whoever offer
h i ghest price.
The Muzaffarnagar mancji, which is administered and
controlled by the state government, is exclusively domi¬
nated by Hindu traditional trading castes (i.e. Baniya,
Jain and Khatri), mainly because of their distinctive
occupational culture, which stands in rather sharp
contrast to the occupational culture of the Hindu kisan
castes. Dumont (1970) has argues that there is no sepa¬
rate normative model of behaviour for Hindu trading
castes in Hindu ideology. He mentions that on "the ques¬
tion of the merchant, the normative texts are silent",
and thus draws the conclusion that economic activity is
not ideologically constructed in Hindu society (ibid. :
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165-66). According to him, trading castes either follow
the Kshatriya model of behaviour or the priestly model
of behaviour. It appears that Dumont's view on this
issue has foreclosed, until recently, many possible
avenues of research into economic activity in India,
particularly the ritual aspects of trade, commerce and
markets.
In my study of the Hindu trading caste arhatis of
the Muzaffarnagar mandi, I found that these arhatJs
follow neither the Kshatriya model of behaviour nor the
priestly model of behaviour. Though their rituals and
normative codes are part of an overall Hindu cultural
system, they are inflected by a specific Baniya ideology
concerning, for example the ritual significance of
accumulating wealth, and its proper disposition within
social relationships. This conclusion concerning a
distinct normative model specific to trading castes is
supported by historical analyses of trading caste beha¬
viour in other parts of South Asia (e.g. David 1974,
Mines 1984). 1 argue therefore that there are not just
two or three but many models of behaviour available to
Hindus in Indian culture.
In the Huzaffarnagar mandi, Baniya arhatis' dis¬
tinctive moral perspectives and ritual attitudes and
beliefs are so interwoven with their commercial activi¬
ties that they experience no "contradiction" between the
demands of ritual and sociability on the one hand, and
the demands of the marketplace on the other. Their
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ritual practices are perceived as conducive to the
accumulation of wealth, and their obligations to give
and receive prestations are such that they do not come
into conflict with their perceived finacial interests. 1
have shown in this thesis also that although Baniyas
take material, practical and commercial factors into
account to predict future prices and loss and profit, at
the same time they seriously take into account many
signs and omens, and participate in many rituals and
festivals in a distinctive Baniya way to ensure their
profit and to gain wealth. For a Baniya arhatl in the
mandi , his arhat is not a sphere that is totally sepa¬
rated from wider Hindu ritual practices, beliefs and
values. So Baniya arhatis have, to use Weber's charac¬
terization, both "this-wor1d1y" and "other-worldly"
orientations, because the Hindu world view is not, as
Marriott (1959, 1968, 1976) has pointed out, one that
posits a necessary disjunction between the two. 1 am
not, in this connection, drawing necessarly on Marri¬
ott's conclusion about the "monism" of Indian culture,
nor 1 am suggesting that Baniyas fail to differentiate
between 'economics* and "religion". Rather, 1 am sug¬
gesting that the distinctive moral codes and ritual
practices expoused by Baniyas are not seen as conflict¬
ing with the pursuit economic gain in the market place.
In other words, they think that their some particular
beliefs and rituals are necessary related facts with
their commercial activities.
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Just as Baniya arhatis perform a number of rituals
■'or material gain and to remove i naus p i c i ous nes s from
their arhats and from their wealth, kisans perform a
number of rituals to increase their production to enable
them to feed their families and give proper gifts to
their kin, neighbour and kamins (service caste people)
who are atached to them in jajmani relationships. In
other words, a Bania arhati performs most rituals in
which the focus is, overtly and explictly, the increase
of wealth in market exchanges, kisans, however, perform
no rituals at all connected with market exchange. Their
rituals focus not on market relations but on increasing
crop production and the subsequent distribution of their
produce in village jajmahi relationships. Their ritual
domain stresses the value of generous giving rather than
the accumulation of wealth. But this does not deny,
however, the profit orientation of kisans when it comes
to decisions concerning what to grow, to whom to sell,
irrigation, use of new varieties of seed, fertilizers,
and so forth.
Baniya arhatis normally do not perceive a conflict
between their ritual practices and their Baniya moral
codes ( dharma) on the. one hand, and commercial activi¬
ties on the other. But when the demands of their profit
orientation compel them to engage in practices they do
see as at variance with their caste dharma, they use
manytypes of "strategies* (e.g. giving dSn, going on
pilgrimage and so forth) to convert the "wealth of sin"
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into "auspicious wealth."
Their kisan clients, on the other hand, frequently
face situations in which the demands of their "moral
economy" and the demands of their ritual practices come
into conflict with the demands of a market orientation,
or, as kisans themselves sometimes put it, the demands
of a "market language" (bazaaru jaban). The kisans of
Muzaffarnagar District exchange their products according
to three separate models of exchange: a jajmani and
kinship based moral economy, barter, and market ex¬
change. These models of exchange differ in ritual and
moral meanings for kisans. From this point of view,
jajmani and kinship exchanges are grounded in a ritual¬
ized production process and in moral values connected
with prestige and social obligations, barter is based
partly in moral economy and partly in market principles,
and the model of market exchange involves calculations
of profit and loss that are for kisans (but not, signif¬
icantly, for Baniya arhatis) relatively divorced from
ritual considerations. That is why when kisans go the
mandi to sell their produce, they are well aware that
they are going to exchange their produce on the basis of
market principles. But in the villages, they may face
conflicts and disputes in those situations when these
different models overlap because these models provide
conflicting sets of expections and may create disputes
among the actors in any given exchange situation. 1 have
prodvided, in Chapter 3, several examples of this sort
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of conflict, and the ways in which models of exchange
are variously contested and negotiated in these contex¬
ts.
Kisans obtain labour for agricultural work on the
bases of three different ideologies: caste heirarchy,
mutuality and market principles, depending on the nature
of the work and the context. srhat is recruit their
labourers and business clerks on the basis, largely, of
market principles. The relationships between arhatis and
their employees are governed by the values of trust and
honesty they are culturally and contextually defined,
and not by the principle of caste hierarchy.
Although most of the kisans and kachcha arhatis
have been maintaining their trading relationships for a
very long-period, both Baniya arhatis and agricultural
producers, particularly from the kisan castes maintain
contrasting views and images of each other. Their ster¬
eotypical images of one another result from the dispa¬
rate value systems to which each is oriented. Both
Baniya arhatis and dominant kisan castes people use many
sayings and proverbs to express their views and images
of one another and themselves. Baniya arhatis express
negative images of dominant kisan castes only behind
their back, mainly because of the fear of losing them as
their clients, and because of their views about the
"aggresive nature" of dominant kisan caste people. But
the kisSns from dominant castes do not hesitate to
present negative images of Baniyas in the presence of
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their Baniya arhatls. Baniya arhatis believe that
*
» » #
friendship and amity both can be harmful for their
trade. They believe that kisans from dominant castes are
aggressive people. Therefore, Baniya arhatis generally
prefer to maintain a certain distance from their domi¬
nant caste kisan clients. They try to avoid conversa¬
tions with their kisan clients which can lead to con¬
flict situations. Most of the Baniya arhatis and their
non-Baniya clients believe that Baniyas have some
"Baniya traits" in their blood and also in their occupa¬
tional culture which enable them to be skill fully in¬
volved in trade and to gain profit. These traits are
politeness, wisdom, the ability to accumulate savings,
avoid disputes and conflicts and to be involved in party
politics, risk taking attitude in trade, passiveness,
conwardliness, miserliness and a profit-oriented atti-
tute. kiscins believe that Baniya traders have a profit-
orietation even at the expense of their social prestige.
All of my kisan informants denied having these traits in
their own blood or in their occupational culture and
they say that for them, social presitage is more impor¬
tant than financial gain. They say that because they
lack Baniyas' these traits they cannot be as successful
in trade as Baniyas.
The exchanges in the mandi conform in certain
obvious and important ways to the requirements of market
exchange; yet in other ways, the differing perspectives
and values brought to the mandi by kisans and Baniya
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arhatis imply that market exchange is here significantly
influenced by local meanings, expectations and moral
assumptions that are not comprehensible in terms of
formalist models of economic behaviour.
In summary, an important implication of my study of
a wholesale marketplace is that Dumont's view that Hindu
trading castes do not have their own model of behaviour
distorts the ethnographic reality of north Indian social
life. The mandi is of further theoretical interest
because in provide a situation in whichmu1tip1e sets of
values interact and are juxtaposed to eachother. The
mandi connects agricultural production and village
economywith the town market and national and interna¬
tional economies. The ethnographic descriptions provided
in this thesis demonstrate how it is that kisans who
sell their produce in the mandi on the basis of market
principles, but at the same time bring their own sets of
categories and ritual asseuptions and values to bear in
ihs market while Baniya arhatis bring quite a different
set of perspectives to bear on these situations. There¬
fore, I suggest that Indian society cannot be explained
in terms derived from European social and religious
categories. Indian society can only be fully understood
in terms of indigenous social categories, values and
meanings and the multiplicity of conflicting perspec¬
tives found in this transcationally complex society.
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APPEND I X
Interview Schedule for Arhatis:
Name of the arhat: Year of Estab:
Nature of business:







Position in the arhatis' Associations:
Membership in non-economic institution:
Main area of clients:
Other occupations:
munims (No.): Their caste and religion:
No. of pal 1 edars
Date:
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GLOSSARY
arhat ; A business stall of an arhati; commission of an
arhati.
a^hatl : A commission agent between producers and
traders; a business stall.
agami sauda : Forward trade agreement.
asuddh (apavitra) : Impure.
asubh : Inauspicious.
asami : Client; agricultural tenant.
avtar : "A descent," the incarnation of a deity.
bahl : A traditional sty 1 e "ledger.
batai : Division of the produce between a farmer and
share-cropper.
bataidar : Share-cropper.
bazar : Market; retail market place.
bhaichara : Brotherhood; corprcenary estate, held in
severalty.
bhog-1agana : Offering food to a deity.
bhumi (zamin; dharti) : Land; soil; earth.
bijak : An invoice; a unit of shares in futures
trade (one bijak = four tones).
bikawal : Seller.
boll : Bid; dialect.
buri-najar : Evil-eye.
chanda : Donation; fees.
chitpa : Balance-sheet.
chhoJa : Suugarcane harvesting worker.
dakshina : Remuneration of a Hindu priest for his
ritual performance service.
dan : Religious gifts; donation for charity work.
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dalal : Tout; broker; go-between between traders
or between buyers and sellers.
devata : A godling.
dharma : Religion; faith; justice; duty; reghteousness.
dharmada : Endowment; charity-donation.
dharmasaJa : A hospice; pilgrims' rest house.
dhan : Money; wealth.
divaliya : Bankrupt; an insolvent.
disasual : Any inauspicious planetary conjunction for
bidding departure from or journey to certain
directions on particular days.
doab : Basin formed by Ganga-and Yamuna rivers.
do-fasali : Double-crop in the course of a year.
gaddi : A pillow; a large sitting pad or throne; the
sitting place of a trader usually covered by a
white sheet.
Ganesh : God of wisdom, auspicious beginnings and the
remover of obstacles.
ganwar : A villager; stupid or rustic person (used only
by town residents.
got (gotra) : Exogamous "clan".
guna : Quality; trait.
gur : Jaggery or cakes of unrefined sugar.
haJi : Contracted farm labour (from hal = plough).
hani : Loss.
hindi-mundi : A script in which business correspondence
and ledgers are kept by traders.
hissab-kitab : Accountancy-work.
hundi : An indigenous bill of exchange.
ilaka : Region or territory.
izzat : Prestige.
jagir : A military land grant.
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jajman : "Serificer": patron of Brhaman prists and
service castes injajmani system of ritual
exchanges.
janam-kund1i : Birth-horoscope.
kachch'h : Anything unripe or boiled or baked food; non-
solid; rough; opposite of pakka.
kam : Work; job, occupation; function; performance.
kan jus ; A miser.
karma : Deed; action; any religious action or rites;
fate.
khandsari ; Unrefind sugar.
kharlf : Autumn crops or harvest.
khadar ; A law-lying land near the bank of a river.
khap : A clan area.
khurak : Diet.
kisans : Agriculturalist.
Ksatriya i A warrior caste person.
kunba (kutumb): Lineage of any depth; sometimes refers
to extended family.
1 abh : Prof i t.
Lakshmi: The goddess of wealth and prosprity.
lava : Wheat harvesting labourers.
1iwal : Buyer.
lambardar (nambardar) : During colonial period a village
headman or a person responsible
for turing over revenue collec¬
tions to the government; a
labour-contractor in the mandi.
malguzari : Land-revenue.
mandi : A wholesale market place.
mantra : Ritually efficacious speech.
mandadiya : A bidder who bids for low prices (from
manda=1ow price).
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mazdur (mazdSr) s Wage- 1 aboulrer.
muhurat : A ritual for beginning a new work.
munim : A trader's clerk cum-cashier.
mohandi-Jagana : To heap produce in a pile in front of
an arhat.
palledars : Grain-porter.
pakka : Opposite of kachcha; anything ripe or finished;
infood anything friend; solid.
pandit : Priest; a term of address for Brahmans.
pargana : Administrative and revenue sub-division of a
tehs i 1 .
paith : Periodic market.
pavitra(suddh) : Pure.
pap : Sin; evi1.
phasJana : Payment or share given by kisans to service
castes in jajmani relationships.
phataka (satta) : Futures trade.
prasad : A form of grace; food consecrated by being
offered to a deity.
punji : Capital.
puja (n) : Worship of a deity.
puiapa : Offered items to a deity which are given later
to a appropriate recipient.
rabi : Spring harvest or crops.
ras : A grain pile in the field.
ristadar : Relative through amarriage tie.
sadhi : Wheat harvest.
savani : Rice harvest.
sa1ana-chetta: Annual balance-sheet.
« 0




tahsi1 : Administrate and revenue sub-sivision of a
district.
tayari ka sauda: Trade agreement for ready stock.
tajadiya : A bull in trade or futures trade.
tirthyatra : Pilgrimage.
uci&r-d*na : Selling by credit.
vyapar (ri) : Trade (trader).
yantra : Mystical diagram or amulet; a machine.
ziad : Summer crops or harvest.
zamindar : Landlord; during.co1 onia1 period a large
landowner and contractor for the government
land revenue.
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